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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	1	APPEARANCES
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA	2	ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF:
3	MONROE DIVISION	3	D. JOHN SAUER, ESQUIRE
4	X	4	TODD SCOTT, ESQUIRE
5	THE STATE OF MISSOURI :	5	KENT CAPPS, ESQUIRE
6	et al.,	6	JOSH DIVINE, ESQUIRE
7	Plaintiffs, : No.	7	MISSOURI ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
8	v. : 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM	8	Supreme Court Building
9	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., :	9	221 W. High Street
10	et al.,	10	P.O. Box 899
11	Defendants. :	11	Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
12	X	12	(573) 751-8870
13		13	John.sauer@ago.mo.gov
14	Videotaped Deposition of BRIAN J. SCULLY	14	Todd.scott@ago.mo.gov
15	Thursday, January 12, 2023	15	
16	9:06 a.m.	16	ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT:
17		17	JOSHUA E. GARDNER, ESQUIRE
18		18	INDRANEEL SUR, ESQUIRE
19		19	DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
20		20	1100 L Street, Northwest
21	Job No.: 138046	21	Washington, D.C. 20530
22	Pages 1 through 376	22	(202) 514-3259
23	Reported by: Cassandra E. Ellis, RPR	23	Joshua.e.gardner@usdoj.gov
24		24	Indraneel.sur@usdoj.gov
25		25	3 73
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1	Deposition of BRIAN J. SCULLY, held	1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED
2	pursuant to agreement, before Cassandra E. Ellis,	2	ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS:
3	Certified Shorthand Reporter Hawaii #475,	3	JESSICA SCHAU NELSON, ESQUIRE
4	Certified Court Reporter - Washington #3484,	4	Senior Counsel, Special
5	Certified Shorthand Reporter - California -	5	Litigation and Matters
6	#14448, Registered Professional Reporter #823848,	6	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
7			Cypercocurry and immediate
	Certified Realtime Reporter, Realtime Systems	7	Security Agency
8	Certified Realtime Reporter, Realtime Systems Administrator, and Notary Public of the District	7 8	
8 9			Security Agency
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	EXHIBITS CONTINUED (Attached to the Transcript) BRIAN J. SCULLY Deposition Exhibit PAGE Exhibit 9 Assortment of Documents Bates 156 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008353-355, 9676-680,8356-358, 10679-682, 10603-605, 13661-663,13511-517, 7633-634, 8349-352, 13729-734, 9603-605, 7583-587, 7574-576, 10538-541, 7564-566, 8768-769, 10512-516, 10523-526, 8496-498, 8756-758, 8778-780, 10492-494 Exhibit 10 Assortment of Documents 212 Bates Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008722-725, 10449-453, 13603-609, 8739-741, 8696-700, 10420-422, 8521-522, 8693-694, 8710-711, 8695, 8663-667, 8660-662, 8689, 8679, 8668-669, 8649-650, 8634, 8636-639, 8631-632, 8628-630, 8640-643 Exhibit 11 12/01/2020 E-mail(s) Bates 227 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008600-604	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	EXHIBITS CONTINUED (Attached to the Transcript) BRIAN J. SCULLY Deposition Exhibit PAGE Exhibit 19 Elections Misinformation 363 Reporting Portal Bates Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00012672 Exhibit 21 CNN Politics Web Article CNN 364 Exclusive DHS rejects plan to protect Election officials from harassment as Midterms loom Exhibit 23 The Hill Web article Cyber 335 Agency beefing up disinformation, Misinformation team Exhibit 24 10/18/2022 CISA Mis, Dis, 365 Mal-information Team Announcement Exhibit 27 Cyberscoop Article CISA 301 Expands efforts to fight election Disinformation ahead of `challenging' 2024 vote, dated 08/12/2022 Exhibit 28 01/28/2022 E-mail Bates 306 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00011450-451
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	EXHIBITS CONTINUED (Attached to the Transcript) BRIAN J. SCULLY Deposition Exhibit PAGE Exhibit 9 Assortment of Documents Bates 156 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008353-355, 9676-680,8356-358, 10679-682, 10603-605, 13661-663,13511-517, 7633-634, 8349-352, 13729-734, 9603-605, 7583-587, 7574-576, 10538-541, 7564-566, 8768-769, 10512-516, 10523-526, 8496-498, 8756-758, 8778-780, 10492-494 Exhibit 10 Assortment of Documents 212 Bates Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008722-725, 10449-453, 13603-609, 8739-741, 8696-700, 10420-422, 8521-522, 8693-694, 8710-711, 8695, 8663-667, 8660-662, 8689, 8679, 8668-669, 8649-650, 8634, 8636-639, 8631-632, 8628-630, 8640-643 Exhibit 11 12/01/2020 E-mail(s) Bates 227 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008600-604 Exhibit 12 Defendants' Amended Combined 190	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	EXHIBITS CONTINUED (Attached to the Transcript) BRIAN J. SCULLY Deposition Exhibit PAGE Exhibit 19 Elections Misinformation 363 Reporting Portal Bates Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00012672 Exhibit 21 CNN Politics Web Article CNN 364 Exclusive DHS rejects plan to protect Election officials from harassment as Midterms loom Exhibit 23 The Hill Web article Cyber 335 Agency beefing up disinformation, Misinformation team Exhibit 24 10/18/2022 CISA Mis, Dis, 365 Mal-information Team Announcement Exhibit 27 Cyberscoop Article CISA 301 Expands efforts to fight election Disinformation ahead of 'challenging' 2024 vote, dated 08/12/2022 Exhibit 28 01/28/2022 E-mail Bates 306 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00011450-451 Exhibit 29 Text Messages Bates Stamped 309
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	EXHIBITS CONTINUED (Attached to the Transcript) BRIAN J. SCULLY Deposition Exhibit PAGE Exhibit 9 Assortment of Documents Bates 156 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008353-355, 9676-680,8356-358, 10679-682, 10603-605, 13661-663,13511-517, 7633-634, 8349-352, 13729-734, 9603-605, 7583-587, 7574-576, 10538-541, 7564-566, 8768-769, 10512-516, 10523-526, 8496-498, 8756-758, 8778-780, 10492-494 Exhibit 10 Assortment of Documents 212 Bates Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008722-725, 10449-453, 13603-609, 8739-741, 8696-700, 10420-422, 8521-522, 8693-694, 8710-711, 8695, 8663-667, 8660-662, 8689, 8679, 8668-669, 8649-650, 8634, 8636-639, 8631-632, 8628-630, 8640-643 Exhibit 11 12/01/2020 E-mail(s) Bates 227 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00008600-604 Exhibit 12 Defendants' Amended Combined 190 Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs'	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	EXHIBITS CONTINUED (Attached to the Transcript) BRIAN J. SCULLY Deposition Exhibit PAGE Exhibit 19 Elections Misinformation 363 Reporting Portal Bates Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00012672 Exhibit 21 CNN Politics Web Article CNN 364 Exclusive DHS rejects plan to protect Election officials from harassment as Midterms loom Exhibit 23 The Hill Web article Cyber 335 Agency beefing up disinformation, Misinformation team Exhibit 24 10/18/2022 CISA Mis, Dis, 365 Mal-information Team Announcement Exhibit 27 Cyberscoop Article CISA 301 Expands efforts to fight election Disinformation ahead of 'challenging' 2024 vote, dated 08/12/2022 Exhibit 28 01/28/2022 E-mail Bates 306 Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00011450-451 Exhibit 29 Text Messages Bates Stamped 309

2 (Pages 5 to 8)

	Page 9		Page 11
1	EXHIBITS CONTINUED	1	Justice, on behalf of the defendants, and
2	(Attached to the Transcript)	2	witness does reserve the right to read and sign.
3	BRIAN J. SCULLY Deposition Exhibit PAGE	3	With me today is Jessica Nelson,
4	Exhibit 30 The Intercept_ Truth Cops 319	4	with CISA. Matt Fleischman, with the Department
5	Article Leaked Documents Outline	5	of Homeland Security and Indraneel Sur, with my
6	DHS's Plan to Police Disinformation,	6	office, the Department of Justice. We all
7	Dated 10/31/2022	7	represent the defendants.
8	Exhibit 31 OIG Report DHS Needs a 328	8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Would the court
9	Unified Strategy to Counter	9	reporter please swear in the witness.
10	Disinformation Campaigns, dated	10	(Witness sworn)
11	08/10/2022	11	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You may proceed.
12	Exhibit 46 CISA Draft Report to the CISA 352	12	BRIAN J. SCULLY
13	Director, dated 06/22/2022 Bates	13	having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
14	Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00015459-463	14	EXAMINATION
15	Exhibit 49 The Breakdown Article Brian 345	15	BY MR. SAUER:
16	Scully on government response to	16	Q. Mr. Scully, could you please state
17	Disinformation, dated 06/18/2020	17	your full name for the record?
18	Exhibit 52 02/17/2022 E-mail string Bates 349	18	A. Sure. Brian Joseph Scully.
19	Stamped MOLA_DEFSPROD_00015736-737	19	Q. How long or what is your current
20	Exhibit 59 02/11/2022 E-mail Bates Stamped 359	20	job title?
21	MOLA_DEFSPROD_00011414-415	21	A. Brand P for the MDM branch, at the
22	Exhibit 61 NRMC Election Security Initiative 13	22	National Risk Management Center, which is part
23	Organizational Chart - August 2022	23	of the Department of Homeland Security.
24	Exhibit 62 LinkedIn Profile of Jack Cable 194	24	Q. How long have you had that
25	Public Interest Technologist	25	particular job?
	Page 10		Page 12
1	PROCEEDINGS	1	A. Almost almost four years, I
2	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the	2	started in January 2019.
3	record. Today's date is January 12th, 2023, and	3	Q. What did you do before that?
4	the time is now 9:06 a.m. This is the video	4	A. I was a deputy for the countering
5	recorded deposition of Brian Scully in the	5	and foreign influence task force, starting in
6	matter of the State of Missouri, et al.,	6	April-ish, April/May 2018.
7	plaintiff, versus Joseph R. Biden, Junior, et	7	Q. And what was your what was your
8	al., defendants, Case Number	8	job before that one?
9	3:22-CV-01213-TAD-KDM in the United States	9	 A. I was a director for policy and
10	District Court for the Western District of	10	strategy in the Office of Infrastructure
11	Louisiana, Monroe Division.	11	Protection.
12	This deposition is being held via	12	 Q. Have you ever given a deposition
13	Zoom.	13	before?
14	The reporter's name is Cassandra	14	A. I have not.
15	Ellis. My name is Robyn Ellis. I'm the legal	15	Q. So this is your first one?
16	videographer. We are with Lexitas Legal.	16	 A. This is my first deposition.
17	Would the attorneys present please	17	Q. Can I just go over some common
18	introduce themselves and parties they represent.	18	ground rules with you?
19	MR. SAUER: John Sauer, from the	19	First of all, obviously what you
	Missouri Attorney General's Office, on behalf of	20	and I say is being transcribed by the court
20	the plaintiffs. And I'm joined by my colleague,	21	reporter, so can we make an effort not to talk
21			
21 22	Todd Scott, who's in the room with the witness,	22	too fast?
21		22 23	A. Yep.
21 22	Todd Scott, who's in the room with the witness,	l .	

3 (Pages 9 to 12)

i	Page 13		Page 15
1	you try and give a verbal answer to my	1	sure, because I think the day's going to go more
2	questions, you know, don't rely on uh-huh or	2	smoothly, if I can direct your attention to
3	uhn-uhn or head shaking as we go forward today.	3	stuff on the screen share.
4	A. Yes, I can do that.	4	So you can see the screen share,
5	Q. Can we make an effort not to	5	sir?
6	interrupt each other, because that results in a	6	A. Yes, I can.
7	kind of confused transcript.	7	Q. Okay. Just looking at the top of
8	A. Of course.	8	this document, do you recognize it as an org
9	Q. Okay. And then can you make an	9	chart for August 2022, of a subdivision of CISA?
10	effort to listen carefully to the question that	10	A. Yes.
11	I'm asking you, and respond to the question that	11	Q. And what what are you
12	l ask, instead of discussing some other	12	familiar with this org chart?
13	tangential topic as the day goes forward?	13	A. Somewhat familiar with it, yes.
14	A. Of course.	14	Q. I just want to direct your
15	Q. And you understand	15	attention over here on the right side of the
16	A. Yes.	16	page, you see here where it lists you as the
17	Q. You understand that at the end of	17	chief of the mis, dis and mal-information team?
18	the day, if your attorney wants to ask you some	18	A. Okay.
19	follow-up questions he may have the opportunity	19	Q. Is that your job title?
20	to do that.	20	A. Yes.
21	But when as I ask questions, I	21	Q. Yeah, what, exactly generally
22	would ask you to focus on the questions I'm	22	speaking, what do you do as the chief of the
23	asking you, and respond to those; is that fair?	23	mis, dis and mal-information team for CISA, the
24	A. That's fair.	24	Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security
25	(Exhibit No. 61 was marked for	25	Agency?
	Page 14		Page 16
1	identification.)	1	A. So I obviously I manage the
2	BY MR. SAUER:	2	team, as a team lead. So I manage the staff,
3	Q. Let me start by showing you an	3	set priority, things like that.
4	exhibit, and I apologize, this exhibit is out of	4	The purpose of the team is to build
5	numerical order already, so I'm e-mailing it to	5	national resilience to MDM, targeting critical
6	your counsel right now. It's pre-marked Exhibit	1 _	
		6	infrastructure.
7	61, but it will be the first exhibit we look at	6 7	
7 8	61, but it will be the first exhibit we look at today.		Q. Generally speaking, what kind of
	today.	7	 Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience
8 9	today. And I'm going to pull it up on the	7 8	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of
8 9 10	today. And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share?	7 8 9	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure.
8 9 10 11	today. And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit.	7 8 9 10 11	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is
8 9 10 11 12	today. And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't	7 8 9 10 11 12	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and
8 9 10 11 12 13	today. And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up. MR. SAUER: You said you can't see	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides developing products?
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up. MR. SAUER: You said you can't see what's on the screen share if I zoom in?	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides developing products? A. We engage with different
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up. MR. SAUER: You said you can't see what's on the screen share if I zoom in? MR. GARDNER: As you make it larger	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides developing products? A. We engage with different stakeholders, civil society groups, obviously
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up. MR. SAUER: You said you can't see what's on the screen share if I zoom in? MR. GARDNER: As you make it larger it's easier, but I don't want to speak for what	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides developing products? A. We engage with different stakeholders, civil society groups, obviously other federal partners, private sector
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up. MR. SAUER: You said you can't see what's on the screen share if I zoom in? MR. GARDNER: As you make it larger it's easier, but I don't want to speak for what the witness can and can't see.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides developing products? A. We engage with different stakeholders, civil society groups, obviously other federal partners, private sector organizations, and then we we do some
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up. MR. SAUER: You said you can't see what's on the screen share if I zoom in? MR. GARDNER: As you make it larger it's easier, but I don't want to speak for what the witness can and can't see. THE WITNESS: Yeah, I can see it.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides developing products? A. We engage with different stakeholders, civil society groups, obviously other federal partners, private sector organizations, and then we we do some analysis of open source reporting, and we do obviously, you know, in 2020 we did some
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	And I'm going to pull it up on the screen share. Can you see that screen share? I'm going to zoom in a little bit. MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a little challenging to see, but as soon as we get your e-mail we'll pull it up. MR. SAUER: You said you can't see what's on the screen share if I zoom in? MR. GARDNER: As you make it larger it's easier, but I don't want to speak for what the witness can and can't see. THE WITNESS: Yeah, I can see it.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of activities are involved in building resilience to critical infrastructure or sorry A. We felt sure. So principally what we do is develop products for public awareness and education or products for key stakeholders to help them understand how MDM works and steps they can take to mitigate the risks. Q. Do you do anything else, besides developing products? A. We engage with different stakeholders, civil society groups, obviously other federal partners, private sector organizations, and then we we do some analysis of open source reporting, and we do

	Page 17		Page 19
1	Q. Switchboard work, what does that	1	Q. Who's doing it while she's gone?
2	mean?	2	A. And she I'm sorry, could you
3	A. It was essentially an audit	3	repeat that?
4	official to identify something on social media	4	Q. Who's who's playing that role in
5	they deemed to be disinformation aimed at their	5	her absence?
6	jurisdiction. They could forward that to CISA	6	A. Iam.
7	and CISA would share that with the appropriate	7	Q. Okay. And so for the past, I
8	social media companies.	8	guess, three or four months you've served as
9	Q. And what was the purpose of sharing	9	essentially the active engagements lead for the
10	it with social media companies?	10	MDM team?
11	 A. Mostly for informational awareness 	11	A. Correct.
12	purposes, just to make sure that the social	12	Q. And that goes back, I think you
13	media companies were aware of potential	13	said, to September of 2022; is that right?
14	disinformation.	14	A. Correct.
15	Q. Was there an understanding that if	15	Q. When do you expect Ms. Protentis to
16	the social media platforms were aware of	16	return?
17	disinformation that they might apply their	17	A. Her maternity leave ends in a
18	content moderation policies to it?	18	couple of weeks, I believe the 23rd, potentially
19	A. Yes. So the idea was that they	19	being gone on a detail assignment, so probably
20	would make decision on the content that was	20	January 2024.
21	forwarded to them based on their policies.	21	Q. Oh, so you don't expect her back
22	Q. Whereas, if it hadn't been brought	22	for another year, because of the detail?
23	to their attention then they obviously wouldn't	23	A. Correct.
24	have moderated it as content; correct?	24	Q. Is the detail in relate to
25	A. Yeah, I suppose that's true, as far	25	anything having to do with mis, dis or
	Page 18		Page 20
1	as I'm aware of it.	1	mal-information?
2	Q. Directing your attention to the org	2	A. I believe that will be part of her
3	chart again, can you I would sort of walk	3	portfolio on the detail, yeah.
4	through the people here on your team and ask	4	Q. Where is she going, if I may ask?
5	you, kind of who they are and what they do, so	5	A. The National Security Council.
6	starting on the right column, I see Lauren	6	Q. And in her absence, you're serving
7	Protentis on as the engagements lead; who is she	7	as the kind of person who directly communicates
8	and what does she do for your team?	8	with social media platforms, among other
9	A. So she was she's a she's the	9	stakeholders?
10	engagements lead. So her job was engaging with	10	A. Correct.
11	key stakeholders, interagency partners, private	11	Q. I should mention, you used the
12	sector partners, essentially a majority of	12	shorthand earlier, MDM, and I assume it will
13	our outreach and engagement efforts, she managed	13	come up again today. When you use that, you're
14	those.	14	referring to mis, dis and mal-information;
15	Q. Outreach and engagement to key	15	right?
16	stakeholders, does that include social media	16	A. Correct.
17	platforms?	17	Q. I think sometimes CISA refers to MD
18	A. It did, yeah.	18	to refer to mis and disinformation; is that
19	Q. When you say: "It did," does she	19	right?
20	still do this or does she no longer communicate	20	A. I'm not sure I've ever seen us use
21	with social media platforms?	21	MD, but that would be proactive in the context,
22	A. Well, she's on the she's been on	2.2	yeah.
	matarnity leave since Contember, so she's	23	Q. Turning your attention back to the
23	maternity leave since September, so she's	23	G. Turning your attention back to the
23 24	she's not currently doing it, when she returns	24	period from September of 2022 to the present,

	Page 21		Page 23
1	social media platforms in Ms. Protentis's stead?	1	decision was made; correct?
2	A. Two I would say two general	2	MR. GARDNER: Objection.
3	types of communications, one, we did regular	3	BY MR. SAUER:
4	sync meetings between government and industry,	4	Q. Correct?
5	so federal partners and different social media	5	MR. GARDNER: Sorry. Objection,
6	platforms. So it's just a coordinated meeting.	6	mischaracterizes the witness's previous
7	Facebook was the industry lead, so	7	testimony.
8	I would have coordination calls with them prior	8	A. Yeah, the earliest would have been
9	to the meetings, just to set the agenda for the	9	mid April
10	meetings, so that was one.	10	Q. The earliest would have been mid
11	And then two, if a platform was	11	April?
12		12	A probably.
	putting out a public statement or not public		. ,
13	statement public report on policies or	13	Q. Okay. And then possibly beginning
14	activities, we would often get a briefing on	14	of May?
15	that or at least get an awareness that it was	15	A. Yeah.
16	going out.	16	Q. And you said you called this
17	Those are the two main types of	17	switchboarding.
18	communications.	18	A. Mm-hmm.
19	Q. Did you were you involved in the	19	 Q. Switchboarding refers to routing
20	last in the period since September 2022, and	20	particular disinformation concerns to social
21	have you been involved in flagging any	21	media platforms so they can evaluate them under
22	misinformation or disinformation issues for	22	the content modulation modulation policies;
23	social media platforms?	23	correct?
24	A. No, not that we recall. We didn't	24	A. So switchboarding is CISA's role in
25	do switchboarding in 2022.	25	forwarding reporting received from election
1	Page 22	1	Page 24
1	Q. So when was that decision made not	1 2	officials, state/local election officials, to
2	to do switchboarding in 2022?		social media platforms. Q. CISA forwarded disinformation
3	A. I believe it was back in April that	3	
4	that decision was made?	4	concerns from many other sources, besides state
5	Q. Who made that decision?	5	and local election officials, to social media
6	A. April 2022.	6	platforms?
7	Q. Was that early or late April, do	7	A. I don't believe so, not that I
8	you know?	8	recall.
9	A. I don't. I don't recall.	9	Q. Turning back to the two kinds of
10	Q. Who made that decision?	10	interactions you had with social media
11	A. I I heard about it through Geoff	11	platforms, the last months since September of
12	Hale, who is is a senior org chart would be	12	2022, the first one you mentioned was, I
13	my supervisor. I believe he received that	13	believe, a sync meeting between social media
14	guidance from the director, Director Easterly.	14	platforms and the US government; correct?
15	Q. So in some time around was	15	A. Correct.
16	this late April?	16	Q. How often did those occur?
17	A. Honestly, I don't recall. It's	17	A. They started as monthly, until, I
18	even possible it was in May by the time my	18	think, October. And then we did a couple of
19	memory's a little foggy on it but the	19	biweekly, I believe two biweekly meetings
20	earliest it was is probably mid April.	20	Q. What was the purpose of the
21	Q. Do you know	21	A prior to the election.
22	A. And it could have gone any time	22	Q. What was the purpose of these
23	into early May.	23	meetings?
24	Q. So the earliest would have been	24	A. Generally speaking, from a CISA
25	late April, but possibly early May is when that	25	perspective, we would we would provide kind
ı -~	quin, and process, conty may to milest that		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

	Page 25		Page 27
1	of we would try to educate the platforms on	1	saying to social media platforms, are they
2	how elections actually function, how they're	2	saying, hey, you're going to see this kind of
3	administered, potential threats to the election	3	content popping up on Facebook and Twitter and
4	administration, things like that.	4	so forth, and, you know, therefore, we want you
5	So CISA's you know, has some	5	to be alert to it, what kind of what's the
6	expertise in the election security space. So	6	purpose of giving them these briefings?
7	our role in the meetings was generally to	7	 A. So generally speaking, it's hard
8	provide kind of expertise on how elections	8	for me to speak directly to the I&A reporting
9	actually work to the platforms.	9	because, you know, I don't recall all the
10	Q. And you said that was your role.	10	details of it, but generally speaking, it was
11	Were there other federal agencies	11	more strategic-level. So high-level things that
12	involved in these meetings?	12	they might be seeing, actors that might be
13	A. There were, and and that role	13	interested in undermining confidence in the
14	was generally Geoff Hale. My role in the	14	elections.
15	meetings was generally to just oversee them,	15	If they were seeing potential
16	facilitate the meetings.	16	domestic terrorism type threats, those sorts of
17	Other agencies would provide	17	things, generally speaking, at least as long as
18	high-level reviews or strategic intelligence	18	I recall, there was never any discussion of
19	briefs, if they had any anything to share	19	specific content.
20	that was unclassified.	20	 Q. Did they identify specific domestic
21	Q. What sorts of first of all, what	21	actors who they believed might try to undermine
22	agencies participated?	22	confidence in election outcomes through social
23	A. DOJ, FBI, ODNI, and then DHS.	23	media?
24	Q. When you say DHS, was that just	24	A. Not that I recall.
25	CISA, you and Geoff Hale, or were there other	25	Q. Let me ask this: Who, on the
	Page 26		Page 28
1	components of DHS involved?	1	government side of these meetings, who
2	A. The Office of Intelligence and	2	participates on behalf of who participated on
3	Analysis of DHS also participated.	3	behalf of CISA?
4	Q. And that's called IA; is that	4	A. Geoff Hale and myself were the
5	correct?	5	primaries, and then you might have others who
6	A. Correct.	6	were in listen-only mode. So Kim Wyman, for
7	Q. And what was what did they say	7	example, would sometimes be in listen-only mode.
8	at these meetings, I&A?	8	Allison Snell would sometimes be essentially the
9	A. If they put out unclassified	9	deputy or, slash, chief of staff of the
10	reporting, under their normal mandate, they	10	underneath Geoff, she would sometimes be in
11	would just talk about the reporting that they	11	listen-only mode. And then obviously when
12	that they published, that was related to	12	Lauren was pre-maternity leave she would also be
13	election security.	13	on.
14	Q. What kind of reporting did they do,	14	Q. And then for I&A, who was on these
1 -	is it about foreign influence or is it about	15	meetings?
15		16	A. In 2022, I believe Luke Beckman was
16	domestic threats, what kind of reporting do they		
	domestic threats, what kind of reporting do they do?	17	the lead. And then they would, depending on,
16			the lead. And then they would, depending on, you know, what product they were briefing, they
16 17	do?	17	
16 17 18	do? A. I'm not a hundred percent certain	17 18	you know, what product they were briefing, they
16 17 18 19	do? A. I'm not a hundred percent certain of their their mission of authority. I	17 18 19	you know, what product they were briefing, they would bring an analyst on, so those would
16 17 18 19 20	do? A. I'm not a hundred percent certain of their their mission of authority. I believe and recall what they talked about, they	17 18 19 20	you know, what product they were briefing, they would bring an analyst on, so those would change.
16 17 18 19 20 21	do? A. I'm not a hundred percent certain of their their mission of authority. I believe and recall what they talked about, they certainly talked about foreign threats. I'm not	17 18 19 20 21	you know, what product they were briefing, they would bring an analyst on, so those would change. Q. Do you remember any other human
16 17 18 19 20 21	do? A. I'm not a hundred percent certain of their their mission of authority. I believe and recall what they talked about, they certainly talked about foreign threats. I'm not sure they may have also talked a little bit	17 18 19 20 21 22	you know, what product they were briefing, they would bring an analyst on, so those would change. Q. Do you remember any other human beings, besides Luke Beckman, from I&A, who

	Page 29		Page 31
1	A. I don't know. Like I Luke was	1	working, you know, in the timeframe we're
2	the kind of principal lead, and who I coordinate	2	talking about, I don't believe that they raised
3	with, I don't recall the analysts' names that	3	any.
4	they might have on there now.	4	Q. Do you have how about before
5	Q. What's his title?	5	that, when Ms. Protentis was still handling the
6	A. Honestly, I don't know. I believe	6	meetings?
7	he's in the cyber mission center, but they are	7	A. Not not that I recall. Yeah, I
8	odd up there, so I'm not entirely sure what his	8	don't I don't I don't recall, in
9	title was, sorry.	9	particular, yeah, sorry.
10	Q. You mentioned FBI had	10	Q. And I take it these meetings, we've
11	representatives at these meetings; is that	11	been talking about them in the period from last
12	right?	12	September until now, but they're actually going
13	A. Correct.	13	on intermittently, at least, for years; right?
14	Q. Who from FBI participated in these	14	A. Yeah, so the first meeting we had
15	meetings?	15	with between federal and and industry was
16	A. I recall Laura Dehmlow, at least	16	in 2018.
17	one, and I forget who who the other folks	17	Q. Yeah, we're talking we're now
18	were.	18	kind of four years in, and then in terms of
19	Q. How many FBI people?	19	their frequency I take it they they
20	A. Generally, there would be one,	20	they're less frequent when you're further away
21	maybe two.	21	from election, and they become monthly as the
22	Q. How about Elvis Chan, was he on	22	election gets closer, and then they become
23	these meetings?	23	weekly or biweekly, you know, within the last
24	A. Oh, good reminder. Thank you.	24	month or so before an election; is that right?
25	Yes, he would be on some of them,	25	A. I would say 2018, 2019 they were
	Page 30		Page 32
1	as well. I forgot about Elvis.	1	very infrequent, so we maybe did them quarterly
2	Q. Do you remember anyone else,	2	or less. And then sometime in 2020 we started
3	besides him?	3	monthly. And then, like you said, as we got
4	A. There would be, again, periodically	4	closer to the election they would pick up. And
5	other people would be on from different parts of	5	then after the election they would we would
6	FBI, but again, Laura was usually who we	6	spread them back out again.
7	coordinated through, and I don't really	7	But 2018 and 2019 was different
8	remember I don't really remember the other	8	than 2020 and beyond.
	-		Q. And is there a plan to have these
10	names, sorry. Q. When you say Laura, that's Laura	10	meetings continue in 2023?
11	Dehmlow is who you coordinated through?	11	A. Not currently.
12	A. Correct.	12	Q. So you don't know you don't know
13	Q. When you say: You coordinated	13	-
14	through them, what kind of coordination did CISA	14	whether there's going to be quarterly meetings or anything like that in 2023?
15	do with FBI as it pertained to these meetings?	15	A. Correct.
16	A. Yeah, so basically coordinating	16	Q. Who from DOJ was at these meetings?
17	time and the logistics of the meeting, and then		A. Rodney Patton Patton.
18	two, if they had any particular agenda items	17	Q. Anyone else?
19	they wanted to raise, you know, when we were	19	A. No, not that I recall.
20	putting together the agenda, I would just check	20	Q. How do you spell his last name?
21		20	A. I believe it's P-a-t-t-o-n.
22	with them to see if they had any any particular agenda items they wanted to raise.	21 22	
23		23	Q. Like the general? A. Yes.
24	Q. What sort of agenda items did they raise?	24	Q. What what is his title at DOJ?
25	A. I don't believe in the time I was	25	A. I don't know what his title is, but
• 2J	A. I GOLLE DELIEVE III THE THILE I MAS	2.0	A. I GOLL KLIOW WHAT HIS THE 15, DUT

	Page 33		Page 35
1	I believe he's in the national security	1	(Recess.)
2	division.	2	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
3	Q. Was national security division of	3	9:34. We're back on the record.
4	DOJ participating in these meetings leading up	4	MR. GARDNER: And counsel, I will
5	to the 2020 election?	5	instruct the witness not to answer that question
6	A. Yes.	6	on the basis of the National Security Act, that
7	Q. Who from NSD participated in those	7	information is extraordinarily protected.
8	meetings?	8	MR. SAUER: Before we proceed, I
9	A. I believe it was Rodney, back then,	9	I'm announcing, for the record, that Mr. Kent
10	as well.	10	Capps, from the Missouri Attorney General's
11	Q. Do you remember anyone else?	11	Office joined the call on behalf of plaintiffs
12	A. Adam Hickey may have jumped on a	12	in the last break.
13	couple.	13	BY MR. SAUER:
14	Q. Is he also from the national	14	Q. Was there anyone how many
15	security division of DOJ?	15	individuals from ODNI participated in these
16	A. I believe so, yeah.	16	meetings in 2022?
17	Q. Is that H-i-c-k-e-y?	17	 I believe there were two to three.
18	A. Yes.	18	Q. Without telling me who they are, do
19	Q. What, if anything, did DOJ say in	19	you remember who they are?
20	these meetings?	20	A. I remember one's name and one's
21	A. Generally speaking, they didn't say	21	position, the second one's position.
22	anything. Yeah, I don't recall in 2022 or even	22	Q. How about 2020, how many
23	back in 2020 that they were were particularly	23	A. Again, it was it was three or
24	active in the meetings.	24	four.
25	Q. Do you remember anyone from DOJ	25	Q. Do you remember who they were?
	Page 34		Page 36
1	saying anything at any point?	1	A. I remember the lead person's name.
2	A. I mean, I'm I'm sure they did,	2	Q. Did people from ODNI speak in these
3	but I don't recall.	3	meetings during 2022?
4	Q. Do you remember anyone from DOJ	4	A. Yes.
5	ever, you know, putting an agenda items on the	5	Q. What did they say?
6	calendar for these meetings?	6	A. Again, generally speaking, if they
7	A. I don't, no.	7	had some strategic intelligence, unclassified,
8	Q. How about ODNI, the Office of the	8	strategic intelligence reporting, they might
9	Director of National Intelligence, what human	9	share a quick summary of that. It was fairly
10	being from there participated in these meetings	10	limited in the timeframe from September
11	in 2022?	11	through through the election, though.
12	A. Is it okay if I ask my attorneys a	12	Q. Were you in the meetings prior to
13	quick question?	13	September of 2022, when Ms. Protentis was still
14	Q. The question	14	at your team?
15	MR. GARDNER: Is it about a	15	A. I joined several of them over the
16	privilege?	16	summer, a couple couple of them over the
17	THE WITNESS: Yeah.	17	summer, prior to her departure. And that was
18	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, John, if you	18	just the meetings, themselves, not necessarily
19	want him to answer that question we'll need to	19	the coordination meetings prior to the actual
20	recess quickly so he can consult with counsel	20	sync meetings.
21	about these issues of privilege.	21	Q. So the coordination meeting, is
22	MR. SAUER: Let's go off the	22	that a bilateral meeting that happens between
23	record.	23	CISA and Facebook?
24	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now	24	A. Yes, CISA and Facebook, and then we
2 1		1	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Q. That would be separate from the meeting with Facebook? A. Correct. Q. Would there be two preparatory meetings, one between CISA A. Generally, yes. A. Sorry. Q CISA and Facebook, and one between CISA and other federal agencies? A. Yes, that is correct. Q. Turning back to what ODNI said at these meetings in 2022, what do you remember, more specifically, that they said? Did they more specifics, so I'll just say that upfront. And generally speaking, it was it was higher level, kind of strategic of what a 23 these meetings to A. I know they paddon't know how frequent don't know how frequent don't know how frequent fedon't know how frequent freedall them participating it's possible. 7 Q. Were concerns and disinformation on discussed in these me it's possible. 7 Q. Were concerns 10 timeframe? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. What what to about those concerns 13 about those concerns 14 A. Again, it was a 15 these meetings in 2022, what do you remember, 15 approach. So from a C if we were developing a discuss those. We didn't 19 And in others, if 20 recall specifics, so I'll just say that upfront. 21 And generally speaking, it was 22 it was higher level, kind of strategic of what a 23 mention that in their brid	g from September on, but as about misinformation social media platforms etings in the 2022 was what was said and by whom? a more general ISA MDM team perspective, any products we would and to released, I ducts in that timeframe.
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A. Generally, yes. Q. One between 10 A. Sorry. 11 Q CISA and Facebook, and one 12 between CISA and other federal agencies? 13 A. Yes, that is correct. 14 Q. Turning back to what ODNI said at 15 these meetings in 2022, what do you remember, 16 more specifically, that they said? Did they 17 ever raise a specific threat advisory? 18 A. Not that I recall. I again, 19 generally speaking, it was it was I don't 20 recall specifics, so I'll just say that upfront. 21 And generally speaking, it was 22 it was higher level, kind of strategic of what a 23 threat actor may be considering or thinking 24 about. Q. One between 9 discussed in these me 10 timeframe? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. What what was about those concerns about those concerns approach. So from a C if we were developing a discuss those. We didn't approach are included foreign actors in the was it was I don't approach and in others, in the was it was	was what was said and by whom? I more general ISA MDM team perspective, any products we would o't we released, I ducts in that timeframe.
9 Q. One between 10 A. Sorry. 11 Q CISA and Facebook, and one 12 between CISA and other federal agencies? 13 A. Yes, that is correct. 14 Q. Turning back to what ODNI said at 15 these meetings in 2022, what do you remember, 16 more specifically, that they said? Did they 17 ever raise a specific threat advisory? 18 A. Not that I recall. I again, 19 generally speaking, it was it was I don't 20 recall specifics, so I'll just say that upfront. 21 And generally speaking, it was 22 it was higher level, kind of strategic of what a 23 threat actor may be considering or thinking 24 about. 25 Q. And do they identify specific	was what was said and by whom? I more general ISA MDM team perspective, Interpretation of the company products we would on't we released, I ducts in that timeframe.
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14 Q. Turning back to what ODNI said at 15 these meetings in 2022, what do you remember, 16 more specifically, that they said? Did they 17 ever raise a specific threat advisory? 18 A. Not that I recall. I again, 19 generally speaking, it was it was I don't 20 recall specifics, so I'll just say that upfront. 21 And generally speaking, it was 22 it was higher level, kind of strategic of what a 23 threat actor may be considering or thinking 24 about. 25 Q. And do they identify specific 19 A. Again, it was approach. So from a C 15 if we were developing a discuss those. We didr 16 if we were developing a discuss those. We didr 17 discuss those. We didr 18 believe, two sets of proving a community, 20 intelligence community, 21 included foreign actors 22 it was higher level, kind of strategic of what a 23 mention that in their brid 24 remember specific, you of every kind of mentior	n more general ISA MDM team perspective, any products we would a't we released, I ducts in that timeframe.
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24 about. 24 remember specific, you 25 Q. And do they identify specific 25 of every kind of mention	
25 Q. And do they identify specific 25 of every kind of mention	efings. But I don't
1 1 1	know, what the specifics
Page 38	n were.
	Page 40
1 threat actors? 1 Q. But you	
	platforms sorry, to
3 other countries. 3 give you both sides, tl	· ·
	e platforms, they might
	I trend information from
	ney put out. So a lot of
	own regular reports on
	n their platforms and what
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	s they're taking. And so
	elves, would share that type
11 recollection, there's no mention of specific 11 of information.	,
12 actors, individuals, or groups that I recall. 12 Q. So they wou	ld report to the
13 Q. What social media platforms 13 government on what	-
14 participated in these meetings? 14 disinformation they w	
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	ontent moderation actions
16 Microsoft, Google, Reddit generally 16 they were taking with	
	Id share essentially
	g ready to make public or
	made public. So they
	hat they're seeing in their
21 I believe there are others, as 21 public reports, and the	
22 well, at different times, that maybe 22 some additional conte	
23 participated in a meeting or two. 23 So as I mention	
	,
25 election, I think it was principally the five I 25 on what they were do	ut regular public reporting

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	Page 41		Page 43
1	were taking. And so they would share that, and	1	products. So, you know, for putting out a fact
2	if the government had questions or was looking	2	sheet or, for example, we have several graphic
3	for additional context they would often talk	3	novels that we've developed, he would work and
4	about that, they would generally talk about any	4	manage that process to get the products out, so
5	new tactics that they were seeing.	5	the review process, the drafting process, things
6	Most of what they my	6	like that.
7	recollections for the time period we're talking	7	Q. These products you're referring to,
8	about here, from September 2022 to the election	8	I take it those are written, publicly available
9	in 2022, I recall most of it was foreign based.	9	bulletins or other written work products
10	But, you know, when we often	10	discussing disinformation and misinformation; is
11	what you see overseas essentially makes its way	11	that right?
12	to the United States. So they would share kind	12	A. Correct. All of our product are
13	of trends and tactics that they were seeing, but	13	available on our website.
14	again, it was all based on public reporting that	14	Q. Below him is Alex Zaheer, analyst;
15	they put out.	15	what does he do?
16	Q. And you say that this all these	16	A. He's a more junior analyst. He
17	things that they're doing all relate to	17	supports essentially across our three lines of
18	misinformation and disinformation on the	18	work. So he helps Chad on some, he helps Warren
19	platforms; correct?	19	on some of the engagement work, and then he
20	A. They don't call it misinformation	20	supports Rob Schaul, who leads our analysis work
21	or disinformation, generally, on the platforms.	21	in doing analysis activities, but he kind of
22	They generally define it as coordinated	22	cuts across all three.
23	inauthentic behavior.	23	Q. And Rob Schaul is listed over there
24	So they so so that's how they	24	on the left side as analysis and response lead;
25	would describe it. They wouldn't normally kind	25	correct?
	Page 42		Page 44
1	of say misinformation or disinformation. And	1	A. Yes.
2	they would each kind of define coordinated and	2	Q. What does he do?
3	inauthentic behavior differently.	3	A. So he does a couple things, so one,
4	I don't so I don't know that	4	he leads our engagement with international
5	they would agree. I don't want to speak for the	5	partners; two, he builds relationships with the
6	platforms, obviously. I don't know if they	6	research community, both in academia, across the
7	would agree that they were framing it as	7	federal government, as well as in the private
8	misinformation or disinformation.	8	sector; and then, three, he pulls that together
9	Q. From the CISA MDM teams	9	to identify new reporting or research about MDM
10	perspective, is coordinated inauthentic behavior	10	that might be of interest to the team; and then
11	typically a kind of mis and disinformation?	11	the fourth bucket of it is he helps develop kind
12	A. It could lead to mis or	12	of analytic type products.
13	disinformation, for sure, yeah. But it's not	13	So right now, for example, we're
14	always mis or disinformation.	14	working on a risk framework to help our
15	Q. So the coordinated and inauthentic	15	stakeholders understand how to determine if an
16	behavior may be a source of mis or	16	MDM campaign is a risk to them or not.
17	disinformation of particular concern?	17	So he would help kind of on that
18	A. It could be, yeah. It could be an	18	side of things.
19	indicator.	19	Q. Okay. There was so he talks to
20	Q. Let me ask this: Turning back to	20	international partners; who are they?
21	the org chart, that should be on the screen,	21	A. It varies. Generally, all of our
22	below Ms. Protentis, is Chad Josiah, who's	22	engagements with international partners come
23	described as the resilience lead. What is his	23	through the State Department or the CISA
24	role on your team?	24	international office.
l		1 .	

11 (Pages 41 to 44)

Fax: 314.644.1334

We have engaged with NATO, G7 at

25

A. So he manages the production of our

25

	Page 45		Page 47
1	the kind of multilateral level, with the CFI,	1	University of Michigan.
2	counter foreign interference forum, that	2	Essentially, if there's an academic
3	includes several countries. And then we have	3	research that puts out a report that we think is
4	different bilateral engagements. A lot of	4	of interest, and kind of reflects our work, we
5	countries want to come and talk to us, and so	5	try to have conversations with them to try to
6	we'll do basically MDM 101 for different	6	understand what their research findings are, and
7	countries at their request.	7	in a non-profit stage, you know, the Alliance
8	Q. So this is both these are both	8	For Securing Democracy, the Digital Frameworks
9	foreign governments and foreign nongovernmental	9	Research Lab sorry, for the court reporter, I
10	organizations?	10	know I'm talking quickly. So, you know, groups
11	A. Yeah. I suppose if you consider	11	like that.
12	the multilateral organizations, like NATO and G7	12	And then from a private sector
13	as nongovernmental, but essentially we're only	13	perspective we talk to groups like Graphika,
14	talking to government foreign government	14	Alethia Group (phonetic), and organizations like
15	officials.	15	those, who, again, kind of do that sort of work,
16	Q. So the purpose of those discussions	16	mandates, you know, different organizations.
17	is to, what, track misinformation that is	17	So again, the idea is to have a
18	circulating in foreign countries that might come	18	relationship with them so if they put out some
19	to the United States?	19	reporting or some research publicly, that we can
20	A. No, that's not the purpose of the	20	set up a meeting and kind of learn more about
21	meetings.	21	what they're seeing and what they're doing.
22	Q. Then what's the purpose?	22	Q. And has that kind of coordination
23	A. The purpose of the meetings is to	23	gone on not from the last year but before the
24	share information about from a CISA	24	2020 election cycle?
25	perspective, share information about resilience	25	A. Yeah.
1	Page 46 building. So there's some countries that are	1	Page 48 Q. And I think you mentioned a few
2	much more mature and have been doing it for a	2	entities there that includes Stanford and the
3	long time. So we try to learn from them kind of	3	University of Washington, Graphika; correct?
4	what they're doing, what works, what doesn't	4	A. Correct.
5	work.	5	Q. And all those organizations were
6	So that's, again, from a CISA	6	were involved in something called Election
7	perspective, that's primarily our engagement	7	Integrity Partnership; right?
8	with these groups.	8	A. Yep.
9	Q. And then you mentioned that	9	Q. Yeah, what is the Election
10	Mr. Schaul coordinates with academic and	10	Integrity Partnership?
11	research partners; is that correct?	11	A. I mean, it's a collaboration
12	A. He doesn't coordinate, he builds	12	amongst I believe in 2020 it's amongst those
13	relationships with, so that we can you know,	13	four amongst four organizations, to to
14	if you have questions about reporting they put	14	better understand what was going on in the
15	out or public reports that they have, public	15	information environment around elections.
16	research, things like that, then we can have	16	Q. And you say were those four you
17	conversations with them about that research.	17	say those four organizations, I think I
18	Q. Who who who do you	18	mentioned three, Stanford, University of
1 ^	have relationships like that with?	19	Washington and Graphika, and was the Atlanta
19	A. We have relationships with a range	20	Council involved in that?
19 20	71. We have relationiships with a range		A Veel I haliave the Digital
	of different entities. So from an academic	21	A. Yeah, I believe the Digital
20	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	21 22	Forensic Research Lab was involved.
20 21	of different entities. So from an academic		
20 21 22	of different entities. So from an academic standpoint, we've talked to folks at Harvard, at	22	Forensic Research Lab was involved.

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1	A. I think those were the official	1	Q. Are you you're declining to
2	members of the partnership. I I don't know	2	answer the question without an instruction?
3	if you mean something different about	3	A. Correct.
4	collaborators.	4	Q. And you said those interns were
5	Q. Well, let me ask this: Was CISA	5	also involved in the Election Integrity
6	did CISA have any involvement in the Election	6	Partnership; correct?
7	Integrity Partnership?	7	A. I believe they worked for the
8	A. Involvement in the sense that a	8	Stanford Internet Observatory, as well, so yes.
	couple of our interns came up with the idea and		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
9	·	9	Q. And they were working for CISA and
10	that we had some communications with them, yes.	10	Stanford Internet Observatory on the project?
11	Q. What kinds of communications did	11	A. When they came up with the idea,
12	you have with them?	12	they obviously they were just interns. After
13	 A. So we received some briefings on 	13	their internships a couple of interns remained
14	the work that they were doing. And then, like I	14	as interns. Several others went back to
15	said, we had some interns that ended up working	15	Stanford, as students, and did not remain as
16	on it. Those are principally principally the	16	interns. Two of the interns ended up working on
17	communications.	17	both in the fall; correct.
18	We had some communications early on	18	Q. You said two of the interns who
19	in the process, when they were making decisions,	19	were CISA interns, in the fall of 2020, worked
2.0	when Stanford was trying to figure out what the	20	on the Election Integrity Partnership; is that
21	gap was.	21	right?
22	So yeah, so it was just general,	22	 A. They worked at the Stanford
23	like you would have with any other research	23	Internet Observatory, which was part of the
24	organization.	24	Partnership.
25	Q. So it was no different than the	25	Q. Were there any other interactions
	Page 50		Page 52
1	communications you had with other research	1	between CISA and the Election Integrity
2	organizations?	2	Partnership, that you're aware of?
3	 A. I think the one difference, I would 	3	 A. So just to say so we had some
4	say, is that we we probably connected them	4	initial conversation with the interns. We had a
5	with other so we connected them with the	5	conversation with the Stanford Internet
6	Center For Internet Security, and we connected	6	Observatory folks about the gap.
7	them with some of the election official groups,	7	I believe we received a briefing
8	so the National Association of Secretaries of	8	from them, or two, on kind of what they were
9	State and the National Association of State	9	putting together.
10	Election Directors, and then we facilitated some	10	We facilitated some meetings
11	meetings between those three.	11	between Stanford folks, the Center For Internet
12	Q. Let me ask you this: You said you	12	Security, and election officials, where they had
13	had I take it you said some CISA interns came	13	discussions about how they would work together.
14	up with the idea; is that right?	14	And then I I'm sure we had some
15	A. Correct.	15	conversations, kind of throughout, when they
16	Q. And who are those interns?	16	were particularly when they were putting out
17	A. I'm not going to give their names.	17	public reporting about what they were seeing.
18	Q. Who were those interns?	18	I wouldn't be surprised if there
19	A. Yeah, I'm not going to give those	19	were some other kind of brief conversations in
		20	there, but I'm not recalling.
20	names.		,
· '/ '	Q. Who were you have no	21	But those are generally the
21		22	categories of the conversations we had.
22	A. The Stanford students Stanford		_
22 23	students have seen substantial amount of	23	Q. Did the Election Integrity
22			_

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

	Page 53		Page 55
1	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.	1	Q. Sorry, I think you said this
2	BY MR. SAUER:	2	earlier, and I can't remember.
3	Q. You may answer.	3	When did this briefing occur, would
4	A. So I believe the EIP did operate,	4	you say it was in May or June of 2022?
5	but I'm not I'm not certain what they did.	5	A. I believe it was around that
6	Q. How do you know they operated in	6	timeframe. My timeline recollections are awful,
7	2022?	7	so I apologize for that, but I think it was
8	A. I believe they put out a public	8	around that timeline.
9	some public reporting.	9	Q. Did you
	·	10	-
10	Q. Did you have A. But I		A. Things all blur together.
11		11	Q. Did they in fact, let me ask
12	Q. Go ahead.	12	you: Did they invite CISA to participate again?
13	A. We did not have communications with	13	A. No. CISA didn't I mean, I
14	them. They gave us a briefing, early on, about	14	wouldn't say CISA participated in 2020, so it
15	what they were thinking about, and that was the	15	wouldn't have been again, so it would have been
16	extent of our communications with them on that	16	participate for kind of for the first time.
17	stuff.	17	Q. Did they invite CISA to have any
18	Q. When did that briefing occur?	18	role, at all, in what they were doing?
19	A. I believe it was May/June of 2022.	19	A. Not that I recall.
20	Q. Who was at that briefing on your	20	Q. Why were they giving you a
21	end, CISA?	21	briefing, then?
22	A. On my end, it was me, I believe	22	A. I think they should know our role
23	Geoff Hale. Who else was in that? I think one	23	in the federal government for election security.
24	of our I think that may have been it, but	24	And we have, you know, an established
25	there might have been one other staff person	25	relationship with them. So I think they were
	Page 54		Page 56
1	there, as well. But it was primarily Geoff Hale	1	just going around and making sure again, I
2	and myself, that I recall.	2	don't I don't want to speak for them, but my
3	Q. Who was in the briefing on the EIP	3	sense was that they were just kind of briefing
4	side?	4	people who who were involved in election
5	A. Renée DiResta was the lead, and	5	security at the federal level.
6	then one of their staff, I believe his name was	6	Q. Do you do you know do you
7	John, but honestly I forget what his name is.	7	have any knowledge of what they actually did,
8	Q. So just two people?	8	after that briefing, during the 2022 election
9	A. That I recall, yeah.	9	cycle?
10	Q. What did they say in the briefing?	10	A. No. I know like I said, the
11	A. Essentially, they just walked	11	reason I I think they were operating was
12	through what their plans were for 2022, some of	12	there was a couple of public reports, one at
13	the lessons learned from 2020, that was	13	least one public report, that I recall, that I
14	essentially the gist of the conversation.	14	thought was pretty good, but was it about
15	Q. What were their plans for 2022?	15	specific disinformation, it was basically how to
16	 A. It sounded like they were going to 	16	think about whether or not a narrative poses
17	do something similar to what they did in 2020 in	17	risks.
18	terms of trying to support election officials.	18	As I mentioned earlier, we were
19	Q. Did they indicate that they were	19	particularly interested in understanding how to
20	coordinating with state and local election	20	determine if MDM creates risk. And we thought
21	officials?	21	their products was pretty good on that.
22	A. I think that was their goal with	22	Q. You used a phrase earlier, that I
23	the with the work with state and local	23	did I passed over, and I didn't understand, a
24	election officials. I'm not sure how they would	24	specific gap that we were talking about putting
25	describe it.	25	together the I&P in the first place. What's the
	UESCHIDE II.	1 43	together the for in the first place. What S the

	Page 57		Page 59
1	gap that you're referring to?	1	A. Our focus generally was not to play
2	A. Sure. So we had a conversation	2	that role, no. We we weren't looking to
3	with the interns, and they were asking questions	3	identify monitor social media to share with
4	about kind of needs that the election officials	4	platforms.
5	have, generally.	5	Q. You mentioned that you I think
6	One of the gaps that we identified	6	you mentioned you put EIP in touch with CIS, the
7	from 2018 is, as you know, most election	7	Center For Internet Security; is that right?
8	officials their offices are fairly low staff,	8	A. Correct.
9	low resourced, and so there was no they	9	Q. What is the Center For Internet
10	didn't have capabilities to try to identify	10	Security.
11	disinformation targeting their jurisdictions,	11	A. I don't I don't know how to
12	and so was essentially the gap is that most	12	describe them. They're essentially, as I
13	election offices throughout the country just	13	understand it, they're non-profit that oversees
14	didn't have that capacity or capability to be	14	the multi-state ISAC and the election
15	monitoring so that they could identify anything	15	infrastructure subsector information sharing and
16	that would be potentially target their	16	analysis center, that's what ISAC stands for, so
17	jurisdictions, so that was the gap.	17	that's my understanding of what they do. I
18	Q. So the gap is that state and local	18	don't know what else they do. I know them in
19	election officials don't just don't have the	19	those two contexts.
20	bandwidth or capacity to monitor mis and	20	Q. And those two contexts are
21	disinformation on social media that may affect	21	overseeing an ISAC, I-S-A-C, that involves
22	their jurisdictions; right?	22	multiple states; is that right?
23	A. Correct.	23	A. Correct.
24	Q. And then I take it was it the	24	Q. Now, and that's a basically a
25	interns' idea that the Election Integrity	25	sharing collaborative that they facilitate
	Page 58		Page 60
	5		1 ugo oo
1	Partnership could be set up to kind of fill in	1	amongst state and local election officials; is
1 2	_	1 2	_
	Partnership could be set up to kind of fill in		amongst state and local election officials; is
2	Partnership could be set up to kind of fill in that gap, was that the idea?	2	amongst state and local election officials; is that right?
2	Partnership could be set up to kind of fill in that gap, was that the idea? A. Again, I don't want to speak for	2 3	amongst state and local election officials; is that right? A. Yeah, it's a general woven artifact
2 3 4	Partnership could be set up to kind of fill in that gap, was that the idea? A. Again, I don't want to speak for the interns. But at that point I don't think	2 3 4	amongst state and local election officials; is that right? A. Yeah, it's a general woven artifact is information sharing with the sector. So each
2 3 4 5	Partnership could be set up to kind of fill in that gap, was that the idea? A. Again, I don't want to speak for the interns. But at that point I don't think they were necessarily thinking about more of a	2 3 4 5	amongst state and local election officials; is that right? A. Yeah, it's a general woven artifact is information sharing with the sector. So each sector not each most sectors have their
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	Page 61		Page 63
1	infrastructure one is focussed on on election	1	sure that they were all connected.
2	officials. I believe the multistate one is	2	Q. And so the same mission, I take it,
3	broader across state and local government, but	3	is the switchboarding role that you've talked
4	includes a broader set. I'm not sure if	4	about before?
5	election officials are involved in the	5	A. Correct.
6	multistate.	6	Q. Yeah, so I take it CISA was playing
7	Q. Is the Center For Internet Security	7	a switchboarding role in 2020, but you mentioned
8	funded, in part, by CISA?	8	that that's resource intensive and it wasn't
9	 A. To the best of my knowledge, CISA 	9	something that you guys wanted to be principally
10	provides funding for the EI-ISAC.	10	responsible for; right?
11	Q. Okay. And do you know how how	11	 A. Something we didn't want to be
12	is that funding provided, is it grants or how is	12	responsible for, at all. But election officials
13	it provided?	13	asked if we could continue serving in that role
14	 A. I don't believe it's a grant, but 	14	until they kind of got something else set up.
15	I'm not 100 percent certain what the what the	15	Q. And you did do that, right, in 2020
16	actual mechanism is, vehicle for the money to go	16	you mentioned earlier that CISA performed a
17	there.	17	switchboarding function; right?
18	Q. But they're	18	A. Correct, in 2020.
19	 A. My understanding is that it's 	19	Q. And then Center For Internet
20	statutory, as well, but I could be wrong, also,	20	Security performs a switchboarding function,
21	so I don't want to speak too much.	21	too; is that right?
22	Q. But you're aware that CISA does	2.2	A. Yeah. So yes, yes and no. So yes
23	provide funding for CIS to operate the EI-ISAC;	2.3	in the sense they were receiving reporting
24	is that right?	24	directly from election officials. In the early
25	A. My understanding is that they	25	part of 2020, they would forward what they were
	Page 62		Page 64
1	provide funding to the EI-ISAC. I don't know if	1	receiving election officials to us at CISA, and
2	the goes if the EI-ISAC is an organization,	2	then we would push that to the social media
3	and the money goes to them or if the money goes	3	platform; as 2021 moved along, CIS more
4	to CIS, and then they filter it down to the	4	frequently provided that directly to the
5	EI-ISAC. I'm not sure how it works, in	5	platforms, themselves.
6	practice.	6	And so I would say early on in the
7	Q. Does CIS operate the EI-ISAC, I	7	process, the switchboarding generally came
8	mean, does it kind of run it?	8	through CISA. Later on in the process, it was
9	A. Yeah, that's essentially how I see	9	more of a mixed bag of how the switchboarding
10	it, yeah.	10	worked.
11	Q. And then you say you put them in	11	Q. And then did EIP play a
12	touch, or CISA put the EIP in touch with CIS in	12	switchboarding role, too?
13	2020, do you remember that?	13	 A. I believe EIP did report stuff to
14	A. Yes.	14	the platforms, themselves, yes.
15	Q. How did that happen?	15	Q. And was there coordination between
16	A. So CISA's general position on on	16	the switchboarders, so to speak, CISA and EIP
17	the switchboarding role was that it wasn't a	17	and CIS?
18	role we necessarily wanted to play, because it's	18	A. Most of the coordination was
19	very resource intensive. And so we had been	19	between CISA and the Centers For Internet
20	working with election officials to try to find	20	Security.
21	an alternate way for them to have that role,	21	There was a point where one of the
22	somebody play that role.	22	platforms was concerned about too much kind of
	They seemed to settle on the Center	23	duplicate reporting coming in, and so we did
23			
23 24 25	For Internet Security. And so since the EIP was working on the same mission, we wanted to make	24 25	have some conversations with EIP and CIS on how to kind of better manage that activity to make

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	Page 65		Page 67
1	sure we weren't overwhelming the platforms.	1	media platforms; correct.
2	Q. In other words, like Twitter or	2	Q. Yeah.
3	Facebook would be hearing from CIS and CISA and	3	A. Yeah, I'm not sure. Sorry.
4	EIP about a disinformation concern; correct?	4	Q. When when was EIP copied by CIS
5	A. Yeah. Generally speaking, yes,	5	or you on disinformation e-mails, if ever?
6	I'll just leave it there, yes, that's correct.	6	A. I don't believe we ever CISA
7	Q. And then	7	ever copied EIS on e-mails we sent to platforms.
8	A. Twitter, in particular, reached out	8	I don't but where we were forwarding if we
9	to us and had some concerns about that.	9	were forwarding something we received from an
10	Q. And I take you talked to EIP and	10	election official to the platform, I don't
11	talked to CIS about creating a more streamlined	11	believe CISA ever copied EIP, certainly not to
12	process through the platforms?	12	my recollection. It wasn't kind of our process.
13		13	
	A. I don't think it was necessarily a		I can't speak for the Center For
14	streamlined process. We just wanted to make	14	Internet Security. I don't I don't recall
15	sure that there was that there was awareness	15	who they were including on theirs.
16	for the platform.	16	Q. Did you notify EIP if you were
17	So I think, to be honest with you,	17	flagging a disinformation concern for a social
18	I don't recall how we ended up following this,	18	media platform in any way?
19	in practice. But I think it was just we would	19	A. Not that I not directly, that I
20	let everybody know when we were setting	20	recall. We would we would generally copy the
21	something up through CIS. We would let CIS	21	Center For Internet Security.
22	know, and I think CIS, through that	22	 Q. Was it your understanding that they
23	relationship, would like EIP know.	23	were communicating with EIP?
24	But I don't recall, specifically,	24	 A. CIS? Yeah, that was essentially
25	how we ended up kind of solving that problem.	25	the their relationship was between those two,
1	Page 66 Q. But at least there was, I guess,	1	Page 68
2	kind of communication among CISA, the EIP, and	2	Q. So in other words, you had the
3	CIS about who was reporting various concerns in	3	understanding that CIS had a relationship of
4	an attempt to kind of de-duplicate what's being	4	communication and coordination with the Election
5	sent to the social media platforms?	5	Integrity Partnership; right?
6	A. Yeah, I don't recall being directly	6	A. Yes. Correct.
		7	
7	from CISA to EIP. Like I said, I think we		Q. And then you would notify CIS if
8	mostly worked it through CIS.	8	you were reporting something to a social media
9	Q. Was there for example, was there	9	platform on the understanding that they were
10	direct e-mail communication between EIP and	10	coordinating with EIP on what was being
11	CISA?	11	reported; correct?
12	A. I'm sure there was.	12	A. No. The reason we we would
13	Q. I mean, was it your practice to	13	coordinate with CIS was generally most of the
14	copy the CISA's or sorry the EIP's tips,	14	reporting we received from an election official
15	e-mail address when you were you or CIS was	15	came through CIS. And so we just wanted to let
16	reporting a disinformation concern to a social	16	them know that we were we had set it up so
17	media platform?	17	that they had awareness of kind of where the
18	A. No, that was not standard practice.	18	report had gone. And so that was the rationale
19	Q. Did CIS do that?	19	for us coordinating with CIS.
20	A. I don't know. That's a good	20	Q. And did you have the understanding
21	question. I don't know.	21	that CIS was coordinating with EIP on what was
22	Q. Why don't we	22	being reported?
23	A. Just to be clear, you're sorry,	23	A. I that would be speculating on
24	just to be clear, you were asking if they were	24	exactly what they were doing there. I'm not
25	sending EIP when they sent e-mail to social	25	sure.
	January Control of their to books	1 -	

Page 69	Page 71
1 Q. You didn't know what they were	A. I think they just walked through
2 doing?	2 kind of what they did and how they did it,
A. I mean, I know they coordinated on	3 explained what they kind of learned, how they
things. I don't know the full nature of what	4 viewed some of the issues, things like that.
5 they were coordinating on, I don't want to put	5 Q. Who participated in the briefing,
6 words in their mouth.	6 other than you, for CISA?
7 (Exhibit No. 1 was marked for	7 A. So I received a briefing when I was
8 identification.)	8 at the National Security Council. So it was a
9 MR. SAUER: Let's look at Exhibit	9 National Security Council colleague of mine,
1. I've sent that to your counsel.	10 Marybeth Foley (phonetic).
11 MR. GARDNER: Yeah, we've got it up	Q. Did CISA receive a briefing?
12 here.	12 A. I don't know for certain.
13 BY MR. SAUER:	13 Q. Did you do I can't remember if
14 Q. Can you also see it on the screen	14 you said this did you do a detail on the
15 share?	15 National Security Council in that timeframe?
16 A. Yes.	16 A. From January 2021 to March 2022 I
17 Q. Are you familiar with this	was on detail to the National Security Council.
18 document?	18 Q. Why did they report to the National
19 A. Yes.	19 Security Council?
20 Q. In other words, is this the report	20 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
21 that the Election Integrity Partnership did in	21 speculation.
22 2021 , about its activities in the 2020 election?	22 BY MR. SAUER:
23 A. Correct .	23 Q. You may answer.
24 Q. Had you read it before or how did	24 A. Yeah, I don't know why.
25 it get on your attention?	25 Q. I mean, were they reporting back to
3	
Page 70	Page 72
1 A. Yeah, I've read portions of it	1 you because you had communicated with them back
2 before, and some of the folks briefed us on it.	in 2020 or was it a report to your agency?
3 Q. Who are the folks that briefed you	3 MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound,
4 on it?	4 calls for speculation.
5 A. Alex Stamos and Renée DiResta.	5 A. Yeah, again, I don't I don't
6 Q. When did that briefing occur?	6 know why they why they wanted to brief us.
7 A. I'm sorry, when or where?	7 Q. Can you see the document on the
8 Q. When did that briefing occur?	8 screen share?
9 A. It was late spring, early summer	9 A. Yep .
10 2021 .	10 Q. Scrolling down here on the third
11 Q. This would have been around the	page of the document, they list the participants
12 time that the report was released?	12 here. Are these the same participants that you
13 A. Yeah, sometime after that.	13 talked about earlier?
14 Q. And Alex Stamos is at Stanford	14 A. Yeah.
15 Internet Observatory; right?	15 Q. Yeah? And I think you mentioned
16 A. Yes.	16 Stanford Internet Observatory includes Alex
17 Q. Does he also serve on some CISA	17 Stamos and Renée DiResta; correct?
18 committees or subcommittees?	18 A. Yes.
19 A. I don't know.	19 Q. And then the University of
Q. Renée DiResta, is she also at	20 Washington, Center For an Informed Public, is
21 Stanford Stanford Internet Observatory; is	21 that where Dr. Kate Starbird works?
22 that right?	22 A. I believe so, yes.
23 A. Yes. Yes, last I checked.	23 Q. And is she also on a CISA
24 Q. Do you remember what they said in	24 subcommittee? Actually, isn't she on the MDM
25 the briefing?	25 subcommittee for the CSAC?

	Page 73		Page 75
1	A. I believe that's correct, yeah.	1	conversations with them around that, as well.
2	Q. And is she also involved in the	2	Q. Was there any communication from
3	Election Integrity Partnership?	3	government officials to EIP about specific
4	A. Yeah, that's my understanding.	4	disinformation concerns?
5	Q. Jumping ahead just a tiny bit, past	5	A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
6	the table of contents, here in the executive	6	Q. Who at CISA was involved in any
7	summary, on page six, little Roman six, you see	7	interactions with the Election Integrity
8	here it says: Election Integrity Partnership	8	Partnership?
9	was formed to enable realtime information	9	A. In addition to the two interns, the
10	exchange between election officials, government	10	primary interaction was myself and Matt
11	agencies, civil society organizations, social	11	Masterson.
12	media platforms, the media, and the research	12	Q. Are you aware of anyone else at
13	community; correct?	13	CISA communicating with them?
14	A. Yeah, I see that sentence.	14	A. It's possible, but I don't recall,
15	Q. There's a reference to both	15	and it certainty wouldn't have been you know,
16	election officials and government agencies	16	they would have just been part of a meeting with
17	engaging in realtime information exchange with	17	either Matt or myself.
18	social media platforms; correct?	18	Q. How about Lauren Protentis, did she
19	A. Yes.	19	communicate?
20	Q. What do you know what government	20	A. She wasn't part of the MDM team in
21	agencies engaged in realtime information	21	2020.
22	exchange under the aegis of the EIP?	22	Q. How about
23	A. I don't know who they're referring	23	A. So she would not have been
24	to.	24	communicating them.
25	Q. Did CISA do that, at all? Did CISA	25	Q. How about Geoff Hale?
			a non about door nate.
		1	
	Page 74		Page 76
1	Page 74 share information with EIP?	1	Page 76 A. I I wouldn't be surprised if
1 2	•	1 2	_
	share information with EIP?		A. I I wouldn't be surprised if
2	share information with EIP? A. Generally speaking, no.	2	A. I I wouldn't be surprised if Geoff was on some of the conversations, but I
2	share information with EIP? A. Generally speaking, no. Q. How about more specifically, did	2 3	A. I I wouldn't be surprised if Geoff was on some of the conversations, but I don't recall I don't recall him
2 3 4	share information with EIP? A. Generally speaking, no. Q. How about more specifically, did anyone at CISA share information with the EIP?	2 3 4	A. I I wouldn't be surprised if Geoff was on some of the conversations, but I don't recall I don't recall him participating.
2 3 4 5	share information with EIP? A. Generally speaking, no. Q. How about more specifically, did anyone at CISA share information with the EIP? A. I mean, that's very broad. Did we	2 3 4 5	A. I I wouldn't be surprised if Geoff was on some of the conversations, but I don't recall I don't recall him participating. Q. How about Director Easterly? I
2 3 4 5 6	share information with EIP? A. Generally speaking, no. Q. How about more specifically, did anyone at CISA share information with the EIP? A. I mean, that's very broad. Did we share information? Can you be more specific	2 3 4 5 6	A. I I wouldn't be surprised if Geoff was on some of the conversations, but I don't recall I don't recall him participating. Q. How about Director Easterly? I guess she wasn't director back then. How about
2 3 4 5 6 7	share information with EIP? A. Generally speaking, no. Q. How about more specifically, did anyone at CISA share information with the EIP? A. I mean, that's very broad. Did we share information? Can you be more specific about what type of information you're asking	2 3 4 5 6 7	A. I I wouldn't be surprised if Geoff was on some of the conversations, but I don't recall I don't recall him participating. Q. How about Director Easterly? I guess she wasn't director back then. How about Director Krebs?
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19 (Pages 73 to 76)

	Page 77		Page 79
1	I'm not entirely sure.	1	Q. Yeah.
2	Q. Does it do anything related to	2	A. Yeah.
3	misinformation and disinformation?	3	Q. Are you aware of state and local
4	A. I don't know, if they do it hasn't	4	election officials engaging in realtime
5	been something they've been promoting, that I'm	5	information sharing with the election
6	aware of.	6	integrity you know, with social media
7	Q. Are you aware of any communications	7	platforms through the Election Integrity
8	between Director Krebs Krebs and Alex Stamos	8	Partnership?
9	while he while Krebs was still director?	9	A. I I don't know the relationship
10	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.	10	between EIP and election officials. I'm not
11	A. Yeah, it's really vague.	11	sure if they're referring to direct reporting to
12	Again what	12	them from election officials or if they're
13	Q. Any communications is broad and not	13	referring to reporting through the Center for
14	vague.	14	Internet Security, I'm just not sure what
15	I want to know if you have any	15	they're referring to there.
16	communications of any kind between Director	16	Q. How about through the Center For
17	Krebs and Alex Stamos when Krebs was still	17	Internet Security, was there election reporting
18	director of CISA?	18	through them?
19	MR. GARDNER: Same objection.	19	A. Yeah, so generally speaking, the
20	A. I believe they Director Krebs		
21		20	reporting that CISA received came through the
	may have participated in a couple of meetings	21	Center For Internet Security.
22	that I'm aware of, that Stamos was also in, but	22	Q. Gotcha.
23	beyond that I'm I'm not familiar with	23	And how about did
24	obviously not going to be familiar with Krebs's	24	as to the extent you understand, did EIP
25	direct communications with Stamos.	25	receive reporting through the Center of Internet
	Page 78		Page 80
1	Q. What meetings were they both	1	Security, you know, kind of from election
2	involved in, if you recall?	2	officials through the internet security to the
3	A. So I can recall an event that	3	Election Integrity Partnership?
4	occurred out in Stanford, that Krebs spoke at	4	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
5	for the Stanford Internet Observatory, for	5	foundation.
6	example. I believe the first government	6	BY MR. SAUER:
7	industry sync Stamos was the Facebook lead, at	7	Q. You may answer. Do you know if
8	the time. This was before he went to Stanford	8	A. Yeah, I I'm not I'm not sure
9	Internet Observatory, and Director Krebs	9	what their full relationship was and how they
10	participated in that meeting, so meetings like	10	were sharing, what the specifics were. It
11	that.	11	wouldn't surprise me if CIS had shared some with
12	Beyond that, I don't have a real	12	EIP, but I just don't know.
13	understanding of how they communicated with each	13	Q. You mentioned Matt Masterson, and I
14	other.	14	think you said that he was involved in briefing
15	Q. Was there any discussion of the	15	with the EIP; is that correct?
16	Election Integrity Partnership at the meetings	16	A. No. He was involved involved
17	you're aware of?	17	in in conversations with Stanford Internet
18	A. Not that I'm aware of, no.	18	Observatory. He probably generally, all of
19	Q. Turning back to the screen share,	19	our so just to take a step back, generally
20	it talks about election officials, engaging in	20	our communications, when VIPs stood up, were
21	realtime information sharing with social media	21	still at the Stanford Internet Observatory.
22	platforms, among others; do you see that?	22	So the conversations I'm aware of
23	A. Yeah, as part of that same	23	with Masterson were generally at the Stanford
24	sentence, right; is that what you're referring	24	Internet Observatory. He was also briefed I
25	to?	25	seem to recall he was probably in some of the
	 -	1 2	SSSIII to 1994ii iio wao probably iii bolilo of tilo

	Page 81		Page 83
1	briefings I was in or conversations when we had	1	MR. SAUER: I see a little
2	questions about reporting that they did, public	2	interference. Shall we go off the record?
3	reporting.	3	THE WITNESS: There's interference
4	So I don't know how to kind of	4	with the top and the bottom. I'm not seeing
5	thread the needle between, you know, when they	5	that. Still, we can go off we can go off the
6	were just conversations with Stanford Internet	6	record and try to fix that.
7	Observatory and when they would be considered	7	MR. SAUER: Let's go off the
8	conversations with the EIP.	8	record.
9	Q. And that, I take it, you said	9	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
10	thread the needle, I take it that's kind of a	10	10:27. We are off the record.
11	fuzzy distinction, because the EIP is a	11	(Recess.)
12	collaboration that involves the Stanford	12	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
13	Internet Observatory; correct?	13	10:40. We are back on the record.
14	A. Right.	14	BY MR. SAUER:
15	Q. Do you know do you know let	15	Q. Mr. Scully, I think we were talking
16	me ask you this: What discussions do you know	16	about Matt Masterson before we had the
17	of between Matt Masterson and Stanford Internet	17	technical technical difficulty.
18	Observatory that related in any way to the EIP?	18	Generally speaking, do you know
19	 A. I think it would have just been if 	19	what role he had, if any, in originating the
20	we had questions about public reporting.	20	concept for the Election Integrity Partnership?
21	Q. What is	21	 A. So his primary role was the same as
22	 A. Kind of once they were up and 	2.2	mine, in terms of just clarifying the gap that
23	running.	23	election officials faced for the folks at the
24	So he was involved in some of the	24	Stanford Internet Observatory early on in the
25	conversations before, you know, the first couple	25	process.
	Page 82		Page 84
1	that I talked to about, kind of in our	1	Q. And is that something that you
2	engagement with Stanford Internet Observatory,	2	discussed with the interns when they came up
3	he was involved, I know, in at least one of the	3	with the idea? Did the interns come to you or
4	conversations about that.	4	Mr. Masterson and talk about the gap?
5	And then, after that, I don't think	5	A. I'm sorry, so are you referring
6	he was particularly involved, but he may have	6	specifically to the gap?
7	been involved, and we had some briefings for	7	Q. Yeah.
8	or not briefings, I don't think is the right	8	A. Yeah, so the gap came from our
9	word, where we had conversations with them about	9	the gap came from myself.
10	public reporting we put out.	10	Q. That was your idea, that there is a
11	Q. When you say public reporting, what	11	gap, and you shared that with the interns?
12	do you mean?	12	A. I'm not sure I would say that was
13	A. So the EIP put out regular kind of	13	my idea. That was that was just kind of from
14	blog posts, excuse me, regular blog posts on	14	lessons learned from 2018, I think across the
15	what they were seeing, so so it was publicly	15	election community.
16	available information.	16	I don't know that I would say that
17	Q. And and did you did they	17	that was that was something that we came up
18	discuss, you know, those blog posts with Matt	18	with on our own.
19	Masterson or you before they were posted?	19	Q. Is that something you shared with
20	A. Not that I recall.	20	the interns?
21	Q. And what discussions did you have	21	A. It is something I shared with the
	with the public reporting?	22	interns, correct.
22		1	
22 23	MR. SCOTT: John, just one second,	23	Q. And then the interns came up with
	MR. SCOTT: John, just one second, it looks like the video is frozen on our end.	23	Q. And then the interns came up with the idea of putting together the Election

	Page 85		Page 87
1	state and local election authorities of filling	1	that there's a gap for election officials where
2	that gap; right?	2	most of them don't have the resources to do
3	A. I don't I don't know what the	3	to identify disinformation that may be targeting
4	exact process was, essentially they identified	4	their jurisdictions, is that did the interns
5	the gap. They went back and talked to the folks	5	give me that information correctly. He was
6	at the Stanford Internet Observatory. And	6	thinking about potentially doing something, and
7	somewhere in that sausage making process, along	7	he obviously didn't want to spend time and
8	the way, they decided that this partnership	8	resources doing something if there wasn't, in
9	would be the best approach to take.	9	fact, a gap.
10	Q. In that timeframe, did they also	10	Q. How long did this meeting occur or
11	have discussions with you about putting together	11	last, do you think?
12	something like this?	12	-
13		13	A. That's all of maybe 10 or 15 minutes.
	A. I'm sure they mentioned it to us		
14	somewhere along the line, that this was	14	Q. Was there any other communications
15	something they were thinking about, but I	15	with Mr. Stamos during this timeframe?
16	don't I don't know that it went beyond that.	16	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague,
17	Q. How about Mr. Masterson, did they	17	also calls for speculation.
18	discuss it with him?	18	BY MR. SAUER:
19	A. Again, I'm not familiar with all of	19	Q. Do you remember any?
20	Matt's communications with these folks, but he	20	A. So I don't recall any conversations
21	was in the meeting where we talked about the gap	21	I had with him in that timeframe. I obviously
22	with Stamos, in particular. And I believe	22	can't speak for Masterson.
23	Stamos mentioned that as an option during that	23	Q. Okay. Scroll ahead to page XII.
24	call. I don't know if he had any other	24	There's a thank you there for contributors, and
25	conversations with them. I don't know about	25	you see Kate Starbird is on that list; do you
	Page 86		Page 88
1	that.	1	see that? You can look at the screen share.
2	Q. When did that meeting with Alex	2	A. Yes.
3	Stamos occur?	3	Q. You're there? Yeah, do you know
4	A. Sometime in the summer of 2020, it	4	A. Yeah, I got it.
5	would have yeah, I don't know. The exact	5	Q. Do you know how she contributed to
6	date would be hard for me to figure out, sorry.	6	the Election Integrity Partnership?
7	Yeah, the interns sorry the interns	7	A. I don't.
8	probably arrived in the May timeframe, so we	8	Q. And I see Alex Stamos up here,
9	probably would have had had that conversation	9	obviously kind of set the thing off; right? Do
10	the initial conversation sometime in June. And	10	you know how else he was involved?
11	then probably Stamos, you know, a week or two	11	A. I don't.
12	after that, so probably June/July, I would say.	12	Q. Okay. Down here it says the
13	Q. Was Mr. Masterson in the meeting	13	Election Integrity Partnership would like to
14	where you discussed the gap with the interns?	14	thank Matt Masterson for additional feedback; do
15	A. Not that I recall, no.	15	you see that?
16	Q. What did Mr. Stamos say in this	16	A. I do.
17	meeting you recall from the June to July	17	Q. Do you know what feedback
18	timeframe of 2020?		
		18	Mr. Masterson provided to the Election Integrity
19	A. Essentially, he just wanted to	19	Partnership?
20	confirm that we agreed with the interns that	20	A. I don't.
21	this was a gap.	21	Q. When did Mr. Masterson leave CISA
22	Q. What what was said about the gap	22	and go to Microsoft?
	in that meeting, that you remember?	23	 A. So Matt left CISA, I believe, in
23			
23 24 25	A. Yeah, it was basically along the lines he just said, hey, the interns told me	24 25	January 2021. I don't think he started at Microsoft until early 2022.

22 (Pages 85 to 88)

	Page 89	Page 91
1 Q. Oh, do you know what he	e did in the 1	where he was reading.
2 intervening year?	2	THE WITNESS: Okay. Got you.
3 A. I believe he he worked	d he was 3	BY MR. SAUER:
4 a fellow at the Stanford Internet O		Q. So it says: Yet, no government
5 Q. Oh, so he went from CIS	A to work 5	agency in the United States has the explicit
6 with Alex Stamos's group at the S		mandate to monitor and correct misinformation
7 Internet Observatory?	7	and disinformation; correct?
8 A. That's my understanding		A. Sorry, I'm just trying to read and
9 Q. And Mr. Masterson is tha	· ·	catch up.
10 in this spring of 2021, I take it he	, i	Q. I'm just asking if you see where it
11 Stanford Internet Observatory by		says that.
12 A. I don't know when he offi		A. Yeah, I see where it says that.
13 started.	13	Q. And it seems to me that they're
14 Q. I'm going to jump ahead		talking about a slightly different gap than the
15 of the executive summary. So if y		one you talked about earlier; right? They're
16 following on the PDF it would be		
17 of the PDF.	the 20th page 16	saying there's a gap in federal government authority to monitor and correct election mis
18 There's a discussion here		
19 says: The initial idea for the parti		and disinformation, right, as opposed to a gap
1	· .	among the capacity for state and local election
		authorities to do it; right?
Observatory funded to complete		A. To be honest, I don't know what
22 internships at CISA; right?	22	they're referencing, so I don't I don't want
23 A. Correct.	23	to speculate on what they're trying to say
24 Q. Okay. You've declined to	-	there.
25 them, early in your testimony. Do	you know who 25	Q. Let me ask you this: Do you think
	Page 90	Page 92
1 they are? Who are those four stu	idents? Do you 1	there's a gap in the authority of federal
2 know who they are?	2	government agencies to monitor and correct
3 A. I know for certain who tw	o are, I 3	election mis and disinformation?
4 believe I know who the third is, I'n	n unsure who 4	MR. GARDNER: Objection to the
5 the fourth is.	5	extent it calls for a legal conclusion.
6 Q. What what were they d	loing in 6	BY MR. SAUER:
7 their internships for CISA at the ti	ime they 7	Q. Do you think that?
8 originated this idea?	8	A. Yeah, I'm not a I'm not a
9 A. They had different activit	ties, so 9	lawyer, I don't want to comment on the legal
10 they supported across the election		authorities of the departmental agencies.
11 initiative, broadly. So tying to thin	nkiflcan 11	Q. I'm just asking whether you
12 recall specific tasks that they had.		think I'm not asking for your legal
13 Q. And then, if you look to t	the next 13	conclusion, I'm asking whether you think there's
14 two sentences, it talks about resp	ponsibilities 14	a gap in the authority of federal agencies that
15 for election information security i		makes them unable to monitor and correct mis and
16 across government offices, and it		disinformation?
17 that, yet, no government agency i	•	MR. GARDNER: Same objection, calls
18 States has the explicit mandate to		for a legal conclusion.
19 correct election mis and disinform		A. Yeah, by definition, an authority
20 correct?	20	is a legal determination I'm not comfortable
21 A. I'm sorry, is that the next		making.
22 Q. If you look at the screen		Q. Let me ask you this: As a
23 can you read that? I can zoom in	·	practical matter, do you believe there's a gap
24 helps.	24	in the ability, as opposed to the authority, the
25 MR. GARDNER: A few s		ability of federal government agencies to
	

	Page 93		Page 95
1	monitor and correct mis and disinformation?	1	the EIP?
2	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.	2	A. Not that I recall, no.
3	BY MR. SAUER:	3	Q. Do you remember any discussions of
4	Q. You may answer.	4	that with anyone else, suggesting that, you
5	A. Yeah, can you clarify exactly what	5	know, there's no government agency in United
6	you're asking? I just want to make sure I	6	States with an explicit mandate to monitor and
7	understand what you're trying to get at.	7	correct election mis and disinformation?
8	Q. I'm using your word, a gap; right?	8	A. No, not that I not that I
9	A. Yes.	9	recall. It's possible, though.
10	Q. You just called it a gap, earlier,	10	Q. It goes on to say: This is
11	and that's a practical word, it's not a legal	11	especially true for election disinformation that
12	conclusion?	12	originates from within the United States, which
13	A. Correct.	13	would likely be excluded from law enforcement
14	Q. So I'm asking you, you talked about	14	action under the first amendment, is not
15	a gap with respect to the capacities of state	15	appropriate for study by intelligence agencies
16	and local election authorities; correct?	16	restricted from operating in the United States;
17	A. That's correct, yeah.	17	connect?
18	Q. Do you think there's a similar gap	18	A. That's what the sentence says, yes.
19	with respect to the ability of federal	19	Q. Do you agree with that sentence?
20	government agencies to respond to mis and	20	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
21	disinformation on social media?	21	a legal conclusion.
22	MR. GARDNER: Same objection,	22	BY MR. SAUER:
23	vague.	23	Q. Do you?
24	A. I I think the federal government	24	MR. GARDNER: Same objection.
25	certainly would have the capability, if it chose	25	A. I'm sorry, I'm reading the
1	Page 94 to use it, and had the authority to do it.	1	Page 96 sentence.
2	Q. Do you think it hasn't chosen to	2	Yeah, this definitely gets into
3	use that capability?	3	legal authority stuff that I would not want to
4	A. So generally speaking, I'm trying	4	comment on.
5	to understand your question. So is there a gap	5	Q. And the next sentence says: As a
6	in the federal government's ability to, what, to	6	result, during the 2020 election local and state
7	provide information on social media about what's	7	election officials, who had a strong partner on
8	online on their platforms, is that what you're	8	election system and overall cyber security
9	asking?	9	efforts in CISA, were without a clearinghouse
10	Q. I'm asking if there was a gap in	10	for assessing mis and disinformation targeting
11	the federal government's ability to, you know,	11	their voting operations; correct?
12	take any kind of action to correct mis and	12	A. Yeah, that's what this sentence
13	disinformation on social media?	13	says.
14	MR. GARDNER: Same objection, to	14	Q. That, to me, sounds like it's
15	the extent it calls for a legal conclusion.	15	talking about the same gap you talked about
16	A. Yeah, I don't know that there's a	16	earlier, and that's state and local election
17	gap in the federal government's ability to do	17	officials were without a clearinghouse for
18	it.	18	assessing mis and disinformation targeting their
19	Q. Well, let me ask this: It goes on	19	voting operations; right?
20	to say let me ask you this: This notion that	20	A. That's how I read that sentence,
21	the report says that no government agency in the	21	yeah.
22	United States has the explicit mandate to	22	Q. Yeah, and I take it that this
23	monitor and correct election mis and	23	report links that gap to gaps that they perceive
24	disinformation, is that something that was	24	in federal authority; right?
25	discussed with the CISA interns who originated	25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
2 0	aloudous with the olon litterns who originated	23	WITE CARDINETS. Objection, calls for

1 speculation. 2 A. Yeah, I don't want to speculate on 3 what they're trying to do there. 4 Q. Okay. Next sentence says: 5 Students approach SIO leadership in the early 6 summer, and in consultation with CISA and other 7 stakeholders a coalitition was assembled with 8 like-minded partner institutions; do you see 9 that? 10 A. I do. 11 Q. Whatlet me ask you this: It 12 says, in consultation with CISA, what 13 consultation with CISA, what 14 consultation with CISA, what 15 consultation with CISA do you recall relating to 16 with relation to the assembly of the coalition. 17 Q. Well, you don't recall any consultation with CISA about putting together the 19 Election Integrity Partnership? 20 MR. GARDNER: Objection, 21 mischaracterizes the witness's previous 22 testimony. 23 A. Yeah, so I don't recall any 24 consultation with us about who would be involved in the in the EIP, who their members would be 25 or anything like that. 2 Q. Do you remember any consultation of 3 any kind about starting up the EIP in any 2 matching about potentially just getting 3 any kind about starting up the EIP in any 3 and Yeap, I see that. 2 Q. Do you know what meeting see that? 4 A. Yep, I see that. 2 Q. Do you know what meeting that is 4 C. Yep, I see that. 4 Q. Do you know what meeting that is 4 C. Yep, I see that. 9 A. I don't know specifically what meeting that referring to, no. had with Alex Stamos about the specifically see that referring to, no. had with Alex Stamos about the apurt referring to, no. had with Alex Stamos about the pour ind, woul talked about earlier? Would you have de that phone call as a meeting with the EIP 12 EIP to present for to p	
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that? A. I do. Q. What let me ask you this: It says, in consultation with CISA, what consultation with CISA do you recall relating to the assembling of this coalition? A. I don't recall any consultation. Q. Well, you don't recall anyone consulting with CISA about putting together the Election Integrity Partnership? MR. GARDNER: Objection, mischaracterizes the witness's previous testimony. A. Yeah, so I don't recall any consultation with us about who would be involved in the in the EIP, who their members would be Page 98 that describe the 10 to 15 minute phone of tall talked about earlier? Would you have dered that talked about earlier? Would you have dered talked about earlier? Would the EIP A. That 10 to 15 minute phone call and poly included Stamos, that I recall. So I do not included Stamos, that I recall any only included St	d
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2 Q. Do you remember any consultation of 2 was thinking about potentially just getting	ge 100
2 Q. Do you remember any consultation of 2 was thinking about potentially just getting	9
	-
4 connection? 4 I don't recall it I don't even	
5 A. Just what I referred to earlier, 5 recall if he mentioned any names or not	. 1
6 the conversations with the interns and the 6 think it was more of a generic, where he	
7 conversation with Stamos about verifying the gap 7 think Stanford could necessarily do it or	
8 existed. 8 own, and would consider kind of forming	
9 Q. How about Mr. Masterson, is it 9 sort of partnership.	,
10 possible they consulted with him? 10 Q. Did he talk about forming any	/ kind
11 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 11 of partnership with CISA?	
12 speculation. 12 A. No.	
13 A. Yeah, I don't know what 13 Q. So he didn't ask CISA to play	anv
14 conversations Matt had with them. 14 role in the concept he was putting tog	-
15 Q. Do you know whether he had any 15 A. No. Again, beyond sorry, jus	
16 conversations with them relating to the 16 to beyond what I've talked about earlier to beyond what I'	
17 commencement of the EIP? 17 know, I think he knew he would need us	-
18 A. I don't. 18 him connect with election officials.	neiping
· · ·	21/
20 they provide an operational timeline; do you see 20 So he was asking for your help that?	-
21 that? 21 connecting with election officials in the	o in
22 A. I do. 22 meeting?	o in
23 Q. And here, the second entry in their 23 A. I believe that was one of the as	o in nat
24 operational timeline, is I'm having trouble 24 but I don't it could have been then, it c	o in nat sks,
25 highlighting it says: July 9th of 2020, 25 have been at another time, if that happe	oin nat oks, could

25 (Pages 97 to 100)

	Page 101		Page 103
1	Q. Is there a later conversation with	1	A. I only recall the CIS person's
2	Mr. Stamos?	2	first name was Aaron. I'm blanking on his last
3	A. I don't recall, but that's what I	3	name, at this point. I suspect there were other
4	think there was a fifth call. But again, I	4	people from CIS on the call, as well, but he
5	don't you know, this was several years ago,	5	was Aaron was my principal contact at CIS.
6	and my memory's a little foggy on timelines and	6	And that's Aaron, A-a-r-o-n.
7	everything that happened.	7	Q. And I take it the purpose of that
8	Q. But to the best of your	8	meeting was to set up a direct line of
9	recollection, at some point he asked for CISA's	9	communication between CIS and EIP?
10	assistance in connecting with state and local	10	A. Correct.
11	election officials; right?	11	Q. And then did you mention that you
12	A. Yeah.	12	facilitated other meetings, for example, between
13	Q. Is that when you put him in touch	13	EIP and NASED or National Association of
14	with the Center For Internet Security?	14	Secretaries of State?
15	A. I think they way initially put him	15	A. Yeah, my recollection is that we
16	in touch with the National Association, so the	16	did facilitate. We put them in contact. I
17	two I mentioned earlier, the National	17	don't I don't know if we were on the calls or
18	Association of Secretary's of State, and the	18	not, I don't recall, but but I seem to recall
19	National Association of State Election	19	we did put them in contact.
20	Directors. I'm not entirely I don't recall	20	Q. Okay. And specifically you mean
21	when, exactly, Center For Internet Security got	21	you put EIP
22	involved.	22	A. EIP in.
23	Q. At some point, did you put him	23	Q in contact with NASED and NASOS;
24	put him in touch with CIS?	24	is that what it's called?
25	A. So we put the Stanford Internet	25	A. Just NASS, but yes.
1 2	Page 102 Observatory in touch with them. I forget if it was Alex, himself, or if it was somebody from	1 2	Page 104 Q. Okay. And so, yeah, sorry, for clarity, you put EIP in contact with both NASED
3	the team there.	3	and NASS; correct?
4	Q. So at some point you put them in	4	A. And just to be clear, we put SIO
5	touch with CIS. And were you involved in	5	folks in contact with them.
6	further communications with CIS and anyone at	6	Q. Okay.
7	EIP?	7	A. But they were part of EIP, so
8	A. Yeah, so as I mentioned earlier, I	8	that's kind of the I don't know when EIP was
9	facilitated some meetings between them, involved	9	stood up in relation to the conversations,
10	between them and election officials.	10	because I don't really know when the
11	Q. What sort of can you unpack that	11	conversations occurred, either. So just so
12	a little bit, you facilitated some meetings	12	you're clear, we worked through the SIO when we
13	between was that both EIP and CIS?	13	made those connections.
14	A. Right. So I facilitated meetings,	14	Q. Got you. Do you remember who at
15	some meetings between EIP and CIS to make sure	15	the SIO was involved in those connections?
16	that they were they didn't have relationship	16	A. I don't.
17	before the they didn't know each other.	17	Q. And again, SIO is short for
18	So we just facilitated getting them	18	Stanford Internet Observatory; correct?
19	together to talk and figure out how they were	19	A. Correct.
20	going to work together.	20	Q. Do you know, what was the timeframe
21	Q. Got you. And who was at those	21	of those, you know, connections that you
22	meetings from EIP?	22	facilitated with, you know, Stanford Internet
23	A. I don't recall.	23	Observatory folks and CIS, NASED and NASS?
24	Q. How about CIS, who did you put them	24	A. I don't know for certain, but I
25	in touch with at CIS?	25	would guess they were late July or August.
		1	

26 (Pages 101 to 104)

	Page 105		Page 107
1	Q. So this would have been around the	1	back. So you're asking if we were familiar with
2	time that the EIP is kind of ramping up its	2	when EIP would send reports to the platforms,
3	activities?	3	were we aware of that?
4	A. Yeah, I don't I mean, I don't	4	Q. Correct.
5	know when they were ramping up their activities,	5	 A. Generally speaking, we were not
6	but I would assume it was around that time.	6	as far as I know we were not aware. I wouldn't
7	Q. Let me scroll down, so you can see	7	say generally.
8	this on the screen share, it's page 8. Is that	8	As far as I'm aware, we were not in
9	size on the screen share visible to you?	9	the loop when they were communicating with
10	A. Somewhat.	10	platforms.
11	Q. Do you see here on page 8 there's a	11	Q. And I apologize, I split the screen
12	kind of graphic where the EIP report lists four	12	on screen share. Actually, stay with that
13	major stakeholders, government, civil society,	13	graphic for a minute. Up here in the corner, it
14	platforms and media; right?	14	says, tier one: Detection intake. On-call data
15	A. Yep, I see that.	15	gathering, triage, and response; do you see
16	Q. You got an arrow from government, a	16	that?
17	black arrow that flows from government to intake	17	A. I do.
18	queue; correct?	18	Q. Do you know how the Election
19	A. Yep.	19	Integrity Partnership gathered data about what
20	Q. Do you know what that's referring	20	was being said on social media in 2020?
21	to, did the government do you know what	21	A. I don't know the specifics of how
22	governments as stakeholders submitting	22	they did that, no.
23	information for the intake queue for the EIP?	23	Q. Did you have any understanding at
24	A. I don't know if, specifically, what	24	all, other than obviously receiving reports from
25	that's in reference to, no. I mean, I would	25	CIS, NASED and NASS?
	Page 106		Page 108
1	think it was election officials, but I don't	1	A. My understanding was that they
2	I don't know.	2	monitored social media in some way.
3	Q. How about CISA, would CISA ever	3	Q. Yeah, do you have any idea how they
4	receive a report from election officials and	4	did it? I mean, there's different ways of doing
5	pass it along to EIP?	5	that, do you know how they did it?
6	A. I don't recall us doing that. It	6	A. I don't know what tools or
7	wasn't part of our process, and and we would	7	capabilities they used, no.
8	just send it to the platforms, ourselves, so I	8	 Q. Down here below the graphic, it
9	don't know that we would send it to EIP.	9	talks about tickets being submitted to the EIP,
10	Q. How about CIS, do you know if they	10	it says tickets were submitted both by trusted
11	did that on behalf of state and local officials?	11	expert stakeholders detailed in section 1.4 on
12	 A. Did CIS forward messages that 	12	page 11, an internal EIP analysts; correct?
13	election officials sent to them to EIP?	13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Yeah, about disinformation.	14	Q. Do you know who the trusted
15	A. I would think so, but I don't know	15	external stakeholders were?
16	for certain.	16	A. I don't.
17	Q. And you see there's a red arrow	17	Q. Do you know whether CISA, at least
18	down here at the bottom, from tier 3:	18	EIP considered CISA a trusted external
19	Mitigation, and then that flows back to	19	stakeholder?
20	government.	20	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
21	Were you aware of EIP reporting	21	separation.
22	back to CISA about what happened with	22	BY MR. SAUER:
23	disinformation or misinformation reports?	23	Q. Do you know.
		. 01	A Leuepact it was scroll down to page
24 25	A. I don't recall that there was communication when so just let me take a step	24 25	A. I suspect if we scroll down to page 11 we'll find out who the stakeholders were.

ı	Page 109		Page 111
1	Q. Good idea. So here at the bottom	1	A. Mm-mmm.
2	of page 11, section 1.4, discussing external	2	Q. And the next one is listed as the
3	stakeholders; do you see where we are?	3	GEC; right?
4	A. Getting there. And 11, external	4	A. Correct.
5	stakeholders. Yep.	5	Q. So do you know why CISA is listed
6	Q. It says: The EIP serve as a	6	there, why the EIP listed CISA as a major
7	connector for many stakeholders, who both	7	stakeholder group in the EIP?
8	provided inputs and received outputs; correct?	8	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
9	A. Yep.	9	speculation.
10	Q. Okay. And then flipping to the	10	A. Yeah, I don't know why.
11	next page, 12, first sentence: External	11	Q. Down at the bottom, it says: Four
12	stakeholders include government, civil society,	12	major stakeholder groups that collaborated with
13	social media companies, and news media entities;	13	the EIP. Do you believe that CISA collaborated
14	correct?	14	with the EIP?
15	A. Correct.	15	A. Did we have conversations with
16	Q. It says: Government and civil	16	representatives of the EIP? Yes. If that's
17	society partners could create tickets or send	17	considered collaboration then I guess we
18	notes to EIP analysts; right?	18	collaborated with the EIP.
19	A. That's what it says, yes.	19	Q. Tell me about those conversations.
20	Q. It goes on to say: They use these	20	I know you mentioned a couple of them or a few
21	procedures to flag incidents to be emerging	21	of them, already. I take it those included a
22	narratives to be assessed by EIP analysts;	22	call with Alex Stamos to talk about the gap;
23	correct?	23	right?
24	A. That's what it says, correct.	24	A. Yep.
25	Q. And do you know what government's	25	Q. And it included facilitating
	Page 110		Page 112
1	partners were creating tickets to flag incidents	1	meetings between the EIP and NASED and NASS;
2	or merging narratives to the EIP?	2	correct?
3	A. I don't.	3	A. Yes.
4	Q. Immediately below that paragraph,	4	Q. And it included in some I take
5			
_	they mention some government officials: right?	5	it, it included in some connection putting EIP
6	they mention some government officials; right? A Yen	5 6	it, it included in some connection putting EIP in touch with Center For Internet Security:
6 7	A. Yep.	6	in touch with Center For Internet Security;
7	A. Yep. Q. Right there, it says: Four major	6 7	in touch with Center For Internet Security; correct?
7 8	A. Yep. Q. Right there, it says: Four major stakeholder groups in that graphic in the middle	6 7 8	in touch with Center For Internet Security; correct? A. That's correct.
7 8 9	A. Yep. Q. Right there, it says: Four major stakeholder groups in that graphic in the middle of page 12; right?	6 7 8 9	in touch with Center For Internet Security; correct? A. That's correct. Q. And I take it were you kind of
7 8 9 10	 A. Yep. Q. Right there, it says: Four major stakeholder groups in that graphic in the middle of page 12; right? A. Yep. 	6 7 8 9 10	in touch with Center For Internet Security; correct? A. That's correct. Q. And I take it were you kind of putting them in touch with the EI-ISAC people
7 8 9 10 11	A. Yep. Q. Right there, it says: Four major stakeholder groups in that graphic in the middle of page 12; right? A. Yep. Q. And there's three that are listed	6 7 8 9 10 11	in touch with Center For Internet Security; correct? A. That's correct. Q. And I take it were you kind of putting them in touch with the EI-ISAC people for the Centers For Internet Security?
7 8 9 10 11 12	A. Yep. Q. Right there, it says: Four major stakeholder groups in that graphic in the middle of page 12; right? A. Yep. Q. And there's three that are listed there; right?	6 7 8 9 10 11 12	in touch with Center For Internet Security; correct? A. That's correct. Q. And I take it were you kind of putting them in touch with the EI-ISAC people for the Centers For Internet Security? A. I don't recall that we put them in
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couple conversations about that. 3	1	those public reports I believe we have had a	1	about earlier, the coordinated inauthentic
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those are kind of online tactics for spreading 23 I forget how we connected with them.		3		·
I 24 Social media misinformation and disinformation? I 24 O Did you already know Aley Stamos				9
	24	social media misinformation and disinformation?	24	Q. Did you already know Alex Stamos
25 A. Correct. Like we were talking 25 and Renée DiResta when these conversations	25	A. Correct. Like we were talking	25	and Kenee Dikesta when these conversations

29 (Pages 113 to 116)

	Page 117		Page 119
1	started happening in the summer of '20?	1	platforms and that there was coordination with
2	A. I knew Alex Stamos from previous	2	CIS and EIP on how they should be reported;
3	from when he was at Facebook. And then, as I	3	correct?
4	mentioned, Masterson and I went out to an event	4	A. No, that's not correct.
5	that Stamos hosted when he got to the Stanford	5	Q. Okay.
6	Internet Observatory. So I knew him. Renée, I	6	 A. So I believe what my testimony said
7	think I may have had a conversation or two with,	7	earlier is that you would receive generally
8	prior, but I didn't know her as well as Alex.	8	receive reporting through one of three ways, one
9	Q. You say you knew him when he was at	9	of those was through the Center For Internet
10	Facebook. What was your interactions with him	10	Security, two-fifths of that we would then
11	then?	11	forwarded to the platforms.
12	A. He headed the team at Facebook that	12	I don't recall any reporting
13	we did the coordination for some of the initial	13	directly coming from EIP. So generally
14	government industry meetings. So if you recall	14	speaking, that's, you know, adding EIP into your
15	back then, essentially the first meeting was	15	question I think is incorrect.
16	back in 2018, Alex was the Facebook lead for	16	Q. What were the other two ways, you
17	that meeting.	17	said there were three ways, one is you get
18	Q. So he was the contact person at	18	them
19	Facebook that would be in those meetings that	19	A. Yep.
20	involved CISA and ODNI and DOJ and the FBI?	20	Q through Center for Internet
21	A. Correct.	21	Security, what are the other two?
22	Q. I just want to flip one page in the	22	A. So the other two ways, sometimes
23	report. Up here on the screen share, do you see	23	election officials would send them in to CISA
24	up here they have a comment that says:	24	central, which is CISA's kind of ops center
25	Additionally, the Countering Foreign Influence	25	block room type setup. And then the third way
	Page 118		Page 120
1	Task Force, a subcomponent of CISA, aided in the	1	was they would just send direct to a CISA
2	reporting process and in implementing resilience	2	employee, often often Matt Masterson, who had
3	efforts to counter misinformation; do you see	3	relationships with many of the election
4	that sentence?	4	officials. So those were the principal ways we
5	A. Ido.	5	received reporting from election officials.
6	Q. I take it the counter countering	6	Q. So through the CIS, kind of
7	and foreign influence task force is now called	7	directly to was there a kind of e-mail
8	the MDM team that you lead; right?	8	address for reporting misinformation that CISA
9	A. Yeah, that's correct.	9	maintained?
10	Q. Were you the leader of that team	10	A. Not specific to misinformation. It
11	then called the CFITF in 2020?	11	was CISA central had their own e-mail
12	A. I was.	12	address, and obviously Matt had his. We had an
13	Q. Do you know what the report means	13	internal CFITF e-mail address, but I don't
14	when at it says that the CFITF, which was your	14	believe we we put that out for election
15	team, aided in the reporting process?	15	officials to send messages to, I don't recall us
16	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	16	doing that.
	speculation.	17	Q. And then sometimes they would go to
17	•		straight to Mr. Masterson?
17 18	A. Yeah, I I don't know,	18	
18			•
18 19	specifically, what they're referencing. My	19	A. Right.
18 19 20	specifically, what they're referencing. My assumption would be they're referencing a	19 20	A. Right.Q. And then I take it you did you
18 19 20 21	specifically, what they're referencing. My assumption would be they're referencing a switchboarding we discussed earlier.	19 20 21	A. Right. Q. And then I take it you did you coordinate with CIS on what you were reporting
18 19 20 21 22	specifically, what they're referencing. My assumption would be they're referencing a switchboarding we discussed earlier. Q. Tell me about that switchboarding.	19 20 21 22	A. Right. Q. And then I take it you did you coordinate with CIS on what you were reporting to social media platforms?
18 19 20 21	specifically, what they're referencing. My assumption would be they're referencing a switchboarding we discussed earlier.	19 20 21	A. Right. Q. And then I take it you did you coordinate with CIS on what you were reporting

30 (Pages 117 to 120)

	Page 121		Page 123
1	know, most of the reporting that I recall in	1	We didn't do analysis of what we received from
2	2020 came through CIS. And so we just wanted to	2	election officials. So we would not know what
3	let them know that we were acting on what they	3	percentage were foreign derived.
4	sent us.	4	Q. So you would receive reports and
5	For reporting that didn't come	5	you would forward them onto social media
6	through CIS, we would often let them know after	6	platforms, you know, for consideration under
7	we had shared it with the platforms that we had	7	their content moderation policies, without
8	shared something with the platforms for their	8	assessing whether they were originated from
9	arrangement.	9	foreign or domestics sources?
10	Q. And then I take it you said	10	A. That's correct.
11	earlier, your understanding is that CIS was	11	Q. In other words, a report would come
12	coordinating with EIP?	12	in, and you, like, didn't take steps to see
13	A. Again, they had a relationship. I	13	whether this came from a foreign or domestic
14	don't know how I would characterize what they	14	source?
15	were what they were doing with the EIP.	15	A. Correct.
16	Q. Do you know what interactions they	16	Q. You would just pass it along to the
17	had, at all, other than the ones we talked about	17	social media platforms?
18	between CIS and EIP?	18	A. Right.
19	A. I mean, I can't specifically say	19	Q. Are you familiar with the gateway
20	what they were doing. They had a relationship.	20	pundit?
21	They shared information. I don't know kind of	21	A. Am I familiar with it? Yeah.
22	the extent of that or kind of what their	22	Q. How do you know about it, what is
23	policies and procedures were for what they were	23	the gateway pundit, on your understanding?
24	doing. So I know they were sharing stuff. I	24	A. It's some sort of a website.
25	don't know what, how or when, towards the	25	Q. How do you know about it?
	Page 122		Page 124
1	questions.	1	A. I believe they've written some
2	Q. I'm going to jump ahead to page 35	2	articles about CISA.
3	of this report.	3	Q. How did that get on your radar
4	A. 35? All right.	4	screen?
5	Q. That's going to be on page 53 of	5	A. Articles probably in our clips.
6	the PDF?	6	Q. Do you remember hearing
7	A. Almost there, sorry. All right.	7	A. I don't I don't
8	I'm on 35.	8	Q. Go ahead.
9	Q. If you look here on the last	9	A. I don't recall specifically how
10	sentence before that heading on the page, it	10	they got on my radar.
11	says, according to the EIP, interestingly, just	11	Q. Do you remember hearing of them in
12	one percent of tickets related to COVID-19, and	12	any other connection, other than writing
13	less than one percent related to foreign	13	articles about CISA?
14	interference; do you see that?	14	A. I do think of the general kind of
15	A. I do.	15	recall. Yeah, I think probably just as a
16	Q. Is that consistent with your	16	general fact that it had news on it I think is
17	understanding of the reports that you were	17	probably the extent of what I know.
18	making to social media platforms in that	18	I'm sure I've just seen them, you
19	timeframe that only a small minority related to	19	know, in reading other stories and things like
20	before and afters?	20	that, I don't I don't honestly, I don't
1	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	21	know how I came to know them.
21		1	Q. Are you aware of anyone at CISA
21 22	foundation, calls for speculation.	22	Q. Ale you aware or arryone at OloA
	foundation, calls for speculation. BY MR. SAUER:	22 23	
22	BY MR. SAUER:		raising concerns that the gateway pundit might
22 23	•	23	

31 (Pages 121 to 124)

1	Page 125		Page 127
1	Q. I'm going to jump far down in this	1	campaigns kicked off and through the weeks after
2	document to page 196.	2	election day; correct?
3	A. Let me see if there's a quick way	3	A. Yes.
4	for me to get down there.	4	Q. And let me ask you this: Are you
5	Q. Yeah, it's page 213 of the PDF.	5	aware of social media platforms like Twitter and
6	MR. GARDNER: I think you can go	6	Facebook and YouTube and so forth changing their
7	here. That's a lot.	7	election integrity policies to limit
8	THE WITNESS: Sorry.	8	election-related misinformation and
9	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, you have to	9	disinformation during 2020?
10	scroll. All right, John, we're getting there.	10	A. I'm aware that they changed
11	THE WITNESS: It's two what in the	11	policies. I don't know again, I don't know
		12	-
12	PDF? I'm sorry.		that they needed mis and disinformation as their
13	BY MR. SAUER:	13	terminology, so I don't want to go there. But I
14	Q. It's page 214 of the PDF.	14	do recall that they changed policies in 2020
15	A. Okay. 196. Almost there. Sorry.	15	related to election security.
16	Okay. Yep.	16	Q. How did you know that, at the time,
17	Q. Okay. Do you see here, there's a	17	did they report it to you?
18	whole section that begins: The gateway pundit	18	A. They they did talk about some of
19	interval?	19	it in our regular sync meetings. And then I
20	A. I see that.	20	believe there's some media coverage and public
21	Q. In the first sentence of that says:	21	statements that they made about their changes.
22	The gateway pundit was among the most active	22	Q. In the sync meetings, were there
23	spreaders of election-related misinformation in	23	any questions on the government side? Did the
24	our analyses; correct?	24	government ask: What are you doing to change
25	A. That's what it says.	25	your policies?
1 2	Q. Does that ring a bell, at all? Do you recall anyone at CISA ever raising the	1 2	A. I don't recall that. I think, generally speaking, the platforms would just
	,		
3	concern that the gateway pundit was a spreader	3 4	talk, you know, on a regular course of the
4	of so-called election-related misinformation?		
5			conversation they would that would be one of
	MR. GARDNER: Objection. Asked and	5	their briefing points, that they were making
6	answered.	5 6	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential
6 7	answered. BY MR. SAUER:	5 6 7	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential part of the conversations, generally speaking.
6 7 8	answered. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you recall that?	5 6 7 8	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential part of the conversations, generally speaking. Q. Were you aware of anyone in the
6 7 8 9	answered. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you recall that? A. Yep. As I said earlier, I don't	5 6 7 8 9	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential part of the conversations, generally speaking. Q. Were you aware of anyone in the federal government kind of asking or encouraging
6 7 8 9	answered. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you recall that? A. Yep. As I said earlier, I don't recall any examples of that, no.	5 6 7 8 9	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential part of the conversations, generally speaking. Q. Were you aware of anyone in the federal government kind of asking or encouraging them to change their content moderation policies
6 7 8 9 10 11	answered. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you recall that? A. Yep. As I said earlier, I don't recall any examples of that, no. Q. Jump ahead to page 211. This is	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential part of the conversations, generally speaking. Q. Were you aware of anyone in the federal government kind of asking or encouraging them to change their content moderation policies to address election integrity?
6 7 8 9 10 11	answered. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you recall that? A. Yep. As I said earlier, I don't recall any examples of that, no. Q. Jump ahead to page 211. This is page 229 of the PDF.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential part of the conversations, generally speaking. Q. Were you aware of anyone in the federal government kind of asking or encouraging them to change their content moderation policies to address election integrity? A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	answered. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you recall that? A. Yep. As I said earlier, I don't recall any examples of that, no. Q. Jump ahead to page 211. This is page 229 of the PDF. A. Almost there. Okay. 211, policy. Q. Yeah, chapter six. A. Gotcha. Q. There at the introduction, at the very beginning, it says: Platform policies establish the rules of participation in social	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	their briefing points, that they were making significant changes. But it wasn't an essential part of the conversations, generally speaking. Q. Were you aware of anyone in the federal government kind of asking or encouraging them to change their content moderation policies to address election integrity? A. Not that I'm aware of, no. Q. Do you recall, was it placed on the agenda for the sync meetings? A. Was what placed on the agenda? Q. Changes in content moderation policies. A. Not that I recall.
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	Page 129		Page 131
1	those sorts of things during that portion of the	1	Q. Okay. What sort of work did you do
2	agenda.	2	with him?
3	 Q. Did they ever separately e-mail you 	3	A. Again, a majority of our work, as I
4	to notify you of a content policy update?	4	mentioned earlier, was resilience building, so
5	A. Not that I recall, though it's	5	trying to develop products, public education,
6	certainly possible. You know, I would get press	6	public awareness, product to help election
7	releases that they would put out sometimes, they	7	officials, those sort of things. And then I
8	would forward to me. But I don't recall	8	would have discussed with him he would have
9	specific e-mail on that.	9	been familiar with the switchboarding work that
10	Q. Do you know whether anyone at the	10	we were doing.
11	Center For Internet Security discussed content	11	Q. Did he participate in the
12	policy changes with the social media platforms?	12	switchboarding work?
13	A. I don't.	13	A. Not beyond when he would receive
14	Q. Do you know whether anybody at CISA	14	e-mails, he forwarded them to us.
15	did so during the 2020 election cycle?	15	Q. Well, he would send them to you to
16	A. Not that I'm aware of, no.	16	be switchboarded, so to speak?
17	Q. How about Mr. Masterson?	17	A. Yeah, I mean, he would send them to
18	A. Not that I'm aware of.	18	me or the team e-mail address.
19	Q. What was Mr. Masterson's title or	19	Q. Oh, and you mentioned earlier that
20	what was his role at CISA during this timeframe	20	he had close relationships with social media
21	in 2020?	21	platforms?
22	 A. He was the senior I don't know 	22	A. No, I don't think I ever said that.
23	what his exact title was, but he was a senior	23	He had close relationships with election
24	election security person at CISA.	24	officials.
25	Q. So did you report to him when you	25	Q. Oh, okay. Did you also mention
	130 Page 130		Page 132
	Page 130		Page 132
1	were the head the countering foreign influence	1	that he was in he had contacts with social
2	were the head the countering foreign influence task force?	2	that he was in he had contacts with social media platforms?
2 3	were the head the countering foreign influence task force? A. No. Matt was what I call a	2 3	that he was in he had contacts with social media platforms? A. Again, he would have participated
2 3 4	were the head the countering foreign influence task force? A. No. Matt was what I call a political appointee, so for organizational	2 3 4	that he was in he had contacts with social media platforms? A. Again, he would have participated in the sync meetings that I talked about, the
2 3 4 5	were the head the countering foreign influence task force? A. No. Matt was what I call a political appointee, so for organizational reasons I reported up to Geoff and Geoff	2 3 4 5	that he was in he had contacts with social media platforms? A. Again, he would have participated in the sync meetings that I talked about, the government industry syncs. If we had a briefing
2 3 4 5 6	were the head the countering foreign influence task force? A. No. Matt was what I call a political appointee, so for organizational reasons I reported up to Geoff and Geoff reported to a normal chain of command. So there	2 3 4 5 6	that he was in he had contacts with social media platforms? A. Again, he would have participated in the sync meetings that I talked about, the government industry syncs. If we had a briefing or something at other meetings he would likely
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	were the head the countering foreign influence task force? A. No. Matt was what I call a political appointee, so for organizational reasons I reported up to Geoff and Geoff reported to a normal chain of command. So there was something weird about Matt being a political appointee and where he could sit in the org chart, so none of us technically reported up to him. Q. So he was but he was as a political appointee is higher than you in the org chart? A. Yeah. Q. Okay. And did you coordinate with him on the sort of sort of disinformation and misinformation related activities that CISA was engaged in, in 2020? MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague. A. Yeah, could you be a little more clear in what you're asking, please? Q. Well, did you work with Matt	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that he was in he had contacts with social media platforms? A. Again, he would have participated in the sync meetings that I talked about, the government industry syncs. If we had a briefing or something at other meetings he would likely participate. Those are the only communications I'm aware of, but he may have had others. I'm not sure. Q. Are you aware of anyone at the Election Integrity Partnership communicating with the social media platforms about changing their policies to, you know, kind of restrict election-related misinformation? A. I am not, no. Q. Is that something, that idea of advocating to the social media platforms to adopt more restrictive policies on election-related misinformation, is that something that's that you recall coming up in any meetings or discussions you had in 2020? A. So did we ever have so one, if

33 (Pages 129 to 132)

Page 133	Page 135
1 A. Or the general did anyone at	1 Q. Was that
2 CISA meet to discuss changes in platform policy?	2 A. And to be honest, I'm not sure if
To the best of my recollection, the answer is	3 they sent them directly to me or if they went to
4 no, we never meant to discuss asking the	4 somebody else in government who forwarded it to
5 platforms to make any changes to their policies.	5 me .
6 Q. Do you recall I take it that was	6 Q. Okay. Was there did you have an
7 a response as to internal meetings, are you	7 oral conversation with anyone associated with
8 aware of any meetings with anyone external to	8 the Virality Project about what they do?
9 CISA to discuss, you know, changes in platform	9 A. Not specifically about what they
10 policies?	do, but I did have some conversations where they
11 A. I'm not aware of any external	11 were asking us for asking me, not us for
12 meetings along those lines.	any connections I had with HHS or CDC.
13 Q. Do you recall any communications of	13 Q. And did you provide them with
14 any kind that related to that in 2020?	14 connections?
15 A. Any communications that related to	15 A. I did not.
1 6 what? To to platforms changing their	16 Q. What did you what did you say in
17 policies? Any communications with I mean,	17 that conversation?
18 that's a very broad I mean, it's possible	18 A. I don't recall that I had any
19 that somebody at CISA, along the way, had a	any relevant points of contacts to provide them.
20 conversation about that, but I don't recall any	20 Q. Did you have any other
21 specific conversations where we sat down to talk	conversations with them relating to the Virality
22 specifically about that. I don't I don't	22 Project?
23 recall any of that. It's a very broad answer,	23 A. Not not substantial. I'm trying
24 so I don't want to say definitively that nobody	24 to think. I mean, I most of that work took
at CISA ever had any conversations in 2020 about	25 place when I was over at the National Security
Page 134 1 policy changes.	Page 136 Council, so I had substantially less
2 Q. How about you, do you recall	2 communication.
3 communicating with anyone outside of CISA about	3 But I believe there were some
4 social media platform policy changes in 2020?	4 informal kind of not work conversations that I
5 A. Idon't. Idon't.	5 may have had with Alex, in particular, and maybe
6 Q. Have you ever heard of the Virality	6 Renée, as well.
7 Project?	7 Q. You believe when you were detailed
8 A. I have.	8 to the National Security Council you had
9 Q. What is the Virality Project?	9 conversations with Alex Stamos and Renée DiResta
10 A. My understanding, it was Stanford's	10 about the Virality Project?
attempt to mimic the EIP for COVID.	11 A. Just in the sense that it was
12 Q. How do you know about that?	something that they were doing, and that was
13 A. Good question. I believe they sent	when I think Alex asked if I had any contacts is
14 me some of their public reports.	14 when I was at the National Security Council.
15 Q. The Virality Project did?	15 Q. Did you and Alex discuss anything
16 A. Yes.	16 else about it? And let me ask you this: Did he
17 Q. Who who would have sent those to	give you any kind of overview what they planned
18 you? Was it the same people involved in same	18 to do in the Virality Project?
19 people involved in the Election Integrity	19 A. Not beyond that it was similar to
20 Partnership?	20 what they did with the with the EIP, that was
21 A. I think Alex was involved, and I	21 the extent. We didn't get into any details or
22 believe Renée was involved. I don't know if the	22 anything like that.
23 rest were similar or not. I don't recall who	23 Q. And he asked you for contacts at
24 was sending it, the exact individual who was	24 at kind of federal kind of health agencies?
25 forwarding me their reports.	25 A. Yeah, that's my recollection of
,	

34 (Pages 133 to 136)

think to the extent was, you know, that conversation about that, and then, like I said, leading public reports. Q. And you say either they or someone different pounds in think it was same time as the conversations with Reneb DiResta? A. They were at the same time as the conversations with Alex. I believe it was similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation, it was just, hey, we're doing something, I believe. A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly public reports? A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly public reports. A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly public reports. A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly public reports. A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly project, itself, but I'm not a hundred percent certain of that. Q. And let me ask you this: Was CISA active in – in – or take any activities to follow or address information – misinformation relating to COVID-19? A. I believe we did at least one product for our critical infrastructure stakeholders related to COVID-19. Page 138 Page 138 Page 14 Q. How about — A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? A. Not that I recall, but I think she was with Alex when we had that conversation. Q. So you believe it was same time as the conversations with Alex. I believe to a similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation, with Alex. I believe it was similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation, with Alex. I believe it was similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation with Alex. I believe it was similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation with Alex. I believe it was similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation, with Alex. I believe it was similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation, it was similar content. And I don't – it wasn't a lengthy conversation with Alex. I believe it was saw to any or any context or anything like that? A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? A. Not that I recall, but I think ishe we with Alex. I believe		Page 137		Page 139
2 Q. And did you have any other discussions with him that related to Virality Project? A. Not that I recall. I don't know that we ever got briefed on their work, so I orn't think there was anything like that. So I think to the extent was, you know, that orn't think there was anything like that. So I think to the extent was, you know, that orn't think there was anything like that. So I think to the extent was, you know, that orn't think there was anything like that. So I think to the extent was, you know, that orn't think there was anything like that. So I think to the extent was, you know, that orn't excell the public reports. Q. And you say either they or someone within government forwarded you with their public reports? A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly how I got them. I think it was from — from the Virality Project. Isles, flut I'm not a hundred percent certain of that. Q. And let me ask you this: Was CISA active in — in — or take any activities to follow or address information — misinformation relating to COVID-19? A. I believe we did at least one product for our critical infrastructure stakeholders related to COVID-19. Page 138 Page 138 Page 138 Page 138 Page 14 Q. How about — A. It should be on our — sorry, It should be on our public website. Q. And again, the switchboarding that — when I use that term I'm using your term for kind of routing disinformation concerns and misinformation concerns to the social media misinformation concerns to the social media platforms; correct? A. Correct, yeah, as far as I'm aware there was no — there was none of that occurred related to COVID. A. Correct, yeah, as far as I'm aware there was no — there was none of that occurred related to CoviD, which is the Virality Project; spublic reporter.	1	what he was asking for.	1	V-i-r-a-l-i-t-y.
discussions with him that related to Virality Project? A. Not that I recall. I don't know that we ever got briefed on their work, so I don't think there was anything like that. So I think to the extent was, you know, that conversation about that, and then, like I said, I believe I received some of their reports, the public reports. Q. And you say either they or someone within government forwarded you with their public reports. A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly how I got them. I think it was from – from the Virality Project, listly, eah, I don't recall exactly how I got them. I think it was from – from the Portion of that. Q. And let me ask you this: Was CISA at I believe we well dat least one product for our critical infrastructure stakeholders related to COVID-19. Page 138 Q. How about A. It should be on our – sorry. It should be on our public website. Q. And again, the switchboarding that – when I use that term I'm using your term for kind of routing disinformation concerns? A. No. Q. And again, the switchboarding that – when I use that term I'm using your term for kind of routing disinformation concerns to the social media platforms; correct? A. C. And Jishould be on our public website. A. Correct, yeah, as far as I'm aware there was no – there was none of that occurred related to COVID. 19 Response of the social media platforms; correct? A. A. Correct, yeah, as far as I'm aware there was no – there was none of that occurred related to COVID. 19 Response of the social media platforms; correct? A. A. Correct, yeah, as far as I'm aware there was no – there was none of that occurred related to COVID. 19 Response of the social media platforms; correct? A. A. Correct, yeah, as far as I'm aware there was no – there was none of that occurred related to CoviD. 40 Response of the document, you menttoned that you menttoned that thy Alox and Renée DiRes about the Virality Project. What were the mature of the document, you menttoned that thy Alox and Renée DiRes about the Virality Project. What were et	2		2	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on, John.
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18 been e-mailed to you, which is the Virality 19 Project's public reporter. 18 Q. Did you notify people at the White 19 House about, you know, the briefing you got from	16	MR. SAUER: I'm going to pull up	16	A. I don't recall doing that, so I
19 Project's public reporter. 19 House about, you know, the briefing you got fro	17	Exhibit 2 on the screen share, which has also	17	don't think so.
	18	-	18	
20 (Exhibit No. 2 was marked for 20 them or the information you got from them?	19	Project's public reporter.		House about, you know, the briefing you got from
,	20	(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for	20	them or the information you got from them?
21 identification.) 21 A. So I'm sure I talked to my		•		•
22 MR. GARDNER: Hold on one second, 22 supervisor about the election briefing. I may			1	
23 John. 23 have mentioned, although I don't recall if I did			1	
24 MR. SAUER: Which is the Virality 24 or not, that they were going to do something				
25 Project's public report, Virality, 25 similar for for COVID.	25	Project's public report, Virality,	25	similar for for COVID.

35 (Pages 137 to 140)

	Page 141		Page 143
1	Q. What did you report back about the	1	A. I believe so, yeah.
2	election briefing? I take it that's the long	2	Q. Have you ever read this report
3	fuse report from the Election Integrity Project	3	before?
4	right, or partnership; right?	4	A. I think I read a little bit of it,
5	A. Yeah, just to the extent we just	5	but I don't think I read the whole I don't
6	in general, we met with them kind of shared kind	6	recall. I haven't read the whole thing. I
7	of their lessons learned, kind of what some of	7	shouldn't say I don't recall. I haven't read
8	their big takeaways were. I don't recall what	8	the whole thing.
9	the specifics were. It was a brief kind of	9	Q. Do you know when you read it?
10	conversation in passing.	10	A. I don't.
11	Q. Who was your supervisor at that	11	Q. Do you know why you read it?
12	time?	12	A. I mean, I would read it, generally
13	A. Kaitlin Gegovich (phonetic).	13	speaking, I'm interested in understanding what
14	Q. Looking at the Virality Project	14	researchers find related to mis, dis and
15	report, skipping ahead to page 4 of the report?	15	mal-information.
16	A. 4, 4, or Roman numeral four?	16	Q. I'm sorry, relating to what?
17	Q. Regular four.	17	 A. What researchers find, understand,
18	A. Gotcha.	18	what they're learning relating to mis, dis and
19	Q. Is there's recommendations	19	mal-information.
20	A. Okay. Okay.	20	Q. And did you have any takeaways from
21	Q. Is there a recommendation here to	21	this report, that informed your work at the MDM
22	implement misinformation and disinformation	22	team?
23	center of excellence housed within the cyber	23	A. I don't think there's anything
24	security infrastructure security agency; do you	24	specific that we took from this, from a product
25	see that?	25	standpoint or anything like that.
1 2	A. I do. Q. So Stanford recommends that the	1 2	Q. Do you know how do you know how the Virality Project tracked, you know,
3	government create a misinformation and	3	misinformation narratives about COVID vaccines
4	disinformation center of excellence housed	4	on social media?
5	within CISA; correct?	5	A. I don't.
6	MR. GARDNER: Objection. He said	6	Q. I'm going to jump ahead to page 30
7	it calls for speculation.	7	of the report, very usefully that's also page 30
8	A. That's what the sentence says.	8	of the PDF.
9	Q. Did they ever discuss	9	A. Making things easier.
10	A. What they meant by that, I don't	10	Q. I think they learned a lesson after
11	know what they meant.	11	the first report.
12	Q. Did they ever did Alex Stamos or	12	A. Yeah.
13	Renée DiResta ever discuss that with you, you	13	Q. Reference here to your
14	know, having CISA take on a new and more	14	A. Okay. Got you.
15	formalized roll with respect to misinformation	15	Q. There's a reference here to tiered
16	and disinformation?	16	ticket analysis, it says: Their analysis
17	A. Not that I recall. I don't think I	17	consisted of lateral lateral research that
18	was ever briefed on this report, so I don't	18	used Crowd Tangle and Google searches to assess
19	recall having that conversation.	19	the spread of the incident or content and so
20	Q. Do you know of anyone they	20	forth; do you see that?
21	talked to anyone else at CISA about that?	21	A. I do.
22	A. I don't know. I don't know.	22	Q. What Crowd Tangle is?
23	Q. By the time of this report, in	23	A. I believe Crowd Tangle was a
24	2021, Matt Masterson was actually working for	24	Facebook-owned social media monitoring service.
25	the Stanford Internet Observatory; correct?	25	Q. And is that something that's
1		1	

36 (Pages 141 to 144)

subscribe to Crowd Tangle? MR. GARDNER: Objection. BY MR. SAUER: MR. GARDNER: Objection. Sorry. Sorry, thought you were done, John, please, are you done? MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, 10 MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, 11 lack of foundation. 11 lack of foundation. 12 A. So I don't know - I don't know the 12 available or not. 13 A. I don't Mr. GARDNER: Objection have you heard of it? A. I are that, sah. 16 engagement data or video view data for links associated with each ticket is collected differently depending on the social media platform in question, colon; do you see that? A. I see that, yeah. 0. What is - do you know what API stands for? A. I - MR. GARDNER: Objection, 10 stakeholders across the states; right? A. I see that weak. 12 yeah. 13 before, but are you aware of the EI-ISAC sharing serving a critical role in sharing information with the EIP during 2020? A. I are many they used crowd that for links associated with each ticket is collected differently depending on the social media platform in question, colon; do you see that? A. I see that, yeah. 0. What is - do you know what API stands for? A. I - MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and answered. 17 A. Colon; the colon; the colon; the colon that answered. 18 A. Yeah, I don't know, that's a little answered. 19 answer		Page 145		Page 147
subscribe to Crowd Tangle? MR. GARDNER: Objection. BYMR. SAUER: MR. GARDNER: Objection. Sorry. Sorry, thought you were done, John, please, are you done? MR. GARDNER: Objection. Sorry. MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, 10 MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, 11 lack of foundation. A. So I don't know — I don't know the nature of Crowd Tangle, if it's publicly additionable or of it? A. I have you ever heard of it before? A. I have general, mis, dis, mal-information research community, I know it's a tool that some 21 cerear are searchers use. A. Just talking, you know, in the general, mis, dis, mal-information research there's a reference to ollecting video—there's a reference to ollecting on the social media platform in question, colon; do you see that? A. I do. Q. What is —do you know what API stands for? A. I do. Q. What is —do you know what API stands for? A. I do. Q. What is —do you know what API stands for? A. I do. Q. What is —do you know what API stands for? A. I do. Q. What is —do you know what API stands for? A. I don't Q. Okay. Same question, then, as to Twitter, it says Twitter API, YouTube, API, do you know what API feers to? A. Yeah, I don't know, that's a little above my technical knowledge. MR. GARDNER: Objection, sorry. Sorry, thought you toning is and disinformation arosa in the 2020 preside election, the Election Infrastructure in the Election Infra	1	available to the public? Can the public kind of	1	Q. And then there in this sentence it
BY MR. SAUER: Q. Or is it kind of a MR. GARDNER: Objection. Sorry. Sorry, thought you were done, John, please, are you done? MR. SAUER: Yeah. MR. SAUER: Yeah. MR. SAUER: Yeah. MR. SAUER: Yeah. MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, Indicate of Crowd Tangle, if it's publicly available or not. A. So I don't know I don't know the general, mis, dis, mai-information have you heard of it? A. I have. MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, Indicate of Crowd Tangle, if it's publicly available or not. A. I have. MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, Indicate of Crowd Tangle, if it's publicly available or not. A. I have. A. I have. A. I have. A. I have. Q. In what connection have you heard of it? A. I have. Q. I what is a tool that some research research year. Q. O kay. Next page of the report, there's a reference to collecting video — there's a reference to — it says: The Page 146 engagement data or video view data for links associated with each ticket is collected differently depending on the social media platform in question, colon; do you see that? A. I see that, yeah. Q. What is — do you know what API stands for? A. I don. Q. Okay. Same question, then, as to Twitter, it says Twitter API, YouTube, API, do you know what API refers to? A. I MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and answered. A. Yeah, I don't know, that's a little A. Yeah, I don't know, that's a direction is, my understanding is it's roughly, as you kind it's a direct little, liyat don't know what the distinction is, my understanding is it's roughly, as you kind it's a direction, liyation is a direction is, my understanding is it's roug	2		2	says or sorry, in this paragraph it says:
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above my technical knowledge. 20 Q. Let's jump ahead to page 143. 21 A. Okay. 22 Q. Okay. Here under: Maintain clear 19 Organization that has organizations under 20 it. I don't know what the operating 21 relationship is between the EI-ISAC and C 22 it's a direct line, I just don't know how they	17	answered.	17	understanding is it's roughly, as you kind of
20 Q. Let's jump ahead to page 143. 21 A. Okay. 22 Q. Okay. Here under: Maintain clear 20 it. I don't know what the operating 21 relationship is between the EI-ISAC and C 22 it's a direct line, I just don't know how they	18	A. Yeah, I don't know, that's a little	18	stated it, right, is CIS is an umbrella
21 A. Okay. 21 relationship is between the EI-ISAC and C 22 Q. Okay. Here under: Maintain clear 22 it's a direct line, I just don't know how they	19	above my technical knowledge.	19	organization that has organizations underneath
22 Q. Okay. Here under: Maintain clear 22 it's a direct line, I just don't know how they	20	Q. Let's jump ahead to page 143.	2.0	it. I don't know what the operating
, ,	21	A. Okay.	21	relationship is between the EI-ISAC and CIS. If
23 channels of communication across all levels of 23 operate that way	22	Q. Okay. Here under: Maintain clear	2.2	it's a direct line, I just don't know how they
25 Chain die di delinia industria di cotto di 125 operate mat may.	23	channels of communication across all levels of	23	operate that way.
24 government; do you see that? 24 But my understanding is that the	24	government; do you see that?	24	But my understanding is that the
25 A. I do. 25 CIS has its own staff, and that those staff	25	A. I do.	25	CIS has its own staff, and that those staff and

37 (Pages 145 to 148)

	Page 149		Page 151
1	their own funding, and that that staff and	1	repeat the question, just to make sure I
2	funding is what supported the 2020 election	2	understand it.
3	switchboarding work.	3	MR. SAUER: Let's break it down.
4	Q. So, in other words, you think the	4	BY MR. SAUER:
5	CIS was was switchboarding to EIP during	5	Q. Do you recall any discussions with
6	2020?	6	anyone outside of CISA about expanding CISA's
7	A. I'm not sure that's what I said. I	7	role in addressing misinformation and
8	mean, the relationship that I understood was	8	disinformation concerns on social media?
9	between CIS and EIP, what specifically they were	9	A. CISA's role, expanding CISA's role,
10	doing as part of that relationship I'm not	10	yeah. Yes.
11	again, I don't necessarily want to speak to,	11	Q. Okay. What conversations do you
12	because I'm not 100 percent sure how it worked.	12	remember about that?
13	Q. Well, is the EI-ISAC kind of a	13	A. So we were piloting a capability
14	vehicle in which CIS receives reports of	14	that would allow us to monitor narratives
15	misinformation and disinformation from state and	15	online.
16	local election officials?	16	Q. Now, when was this piloted?
17	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	17	A. I believe it was we did one
18	foundation, calls for speculation.	18	short pilot, I believe, in summer 2020, so I
19	A. Yeah, I don't know how how the	19	believe it was all 2020.
20	EI-ISAC played in this switchboarding role.	20	Q. What what what sort of
21	Q. Down here at the bottom of the same	21	pilighting can you explain what you mean by
22	page there's another reference to the	22	pilighting I'm sorry piloting something to
23	recommendations to implement a misinformation	23	track mis and disinformation online?
24	and disinformation center of excellence housed	24	A. So it wasn't necessarily to track,
25	within the federal government; correct?	25	it was to understand the information
	Page 150		Page 152
1	A. Yeah.	1	environment, what narratives were were kind
		_	Children, what harratives were were kind
2	Q. And that there in that paragraph it	2	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure
2 3	Q. And that there in that paragraph it specifically recommends that it be housed within		
		2	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure
3	specifically recommends that it be housed within	2 3	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive
3 4	specifically recommends that it be housed within the federal government at CISA; correct? See	2 3 4	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive privacy rules around that sort of work, and so
3 4 5	specifically recommends that it be housed within the federal government at CISA; correct? See where I've highlighted?	2 3 4 5	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive privacy rules around that sort of work, and so it was just kind of piloting it to see if it
3 4 5 6	specifically recommends that it be housed within the federal government at CISA; correct? See where I've highlighted? A. Yeah, I'm just reading that now.	2 3 4 5 6	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive privacy rules around that sort of work, and so it was just kind of piloting it to see if it would work, if it did what we wanted it to do.
3 4 5 6 7	specifically recommends that it be housed within the federal government at CISA; correct? See where I've highlighted? A. Yeah, I'm just reading that now. Yeah, that's what the sentence	2 3 4 5 6 7	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive privacy rules around that sort of work, and so it was just kind of piloting it to see if it would work, if it did what we wanted it to do. In particular, we were trying to
3 4 5 6 7 8	specifically recommends that it be housed within the federal government at CISA; correct? See where I've highlighted? A. Yeah, I'm just reading that now. Yeah, that's what the sentence says, yeah.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive privacy rules around that sort of work, and so it was just kind of piloting it to see if it would work, if it did what we wanted it to do. In particular, we were trying to predict the likely impact of narratives on
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	specifically recommends that it be housed within the federal government at CISA; correct? See where I've highlighted? A. Yeah, I'm just reading that now. Yeah, that's what the sentence says, yeah. Q. Do you have any recollection let me ask you this: I think you testified earlier you don't remember discussing that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive privacy rules around that sort of work, and so it was just kind of piloting it to see if it would work, if it did what we wanted it to do. In particular, we were trying to predict the likely impact of narratives on stakeholders. And so we weren't sure if the predictive activity that we were doing actually worked, so we wanted to test that, and then we
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	specifically recommends that it be housed within the federal government at CISA; correct? See where I've highlighted? A. Yeah, I'm just reading that now. Yeah, that's what the sentence says, yeah. Q. Do you have any recollection let me ask you this: I think you testified earlier you don't remember discussing that recommendation with anyone; correct? A. Correct. Q. Okay. How about any discussions of changing or increasing CISA's role in in kind	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure you're aware, there was extensive extensive privacy rules around that sort of work, and so it was just kind of piloting it to see if it would work, if it did what we wanted it to do. In particular, we were trying to predict the likely impact of narratives on stakeholders. And so we weren't sure if the predictive activity that we were doing actually worked, so we wanted to test that, and then we wanted to just get a sense of the privacy and other kind of rules that might be in play and if it's something that we could we could do. Q. What exactly was the pilot? I
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38 (Pages 149 to 152)

process privilege only applies when there is no indication of any government wrongdoing. Our court has already found that there's at least a substantial concern that there were significant first amendment violations, here, so I ask you to withdraw the objection. MR. GARDNER: I understand your position and I decline your invitation. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Sorry, can you spell that? A. L-i-m-b-i-k. And then there was a separate pilot, that's more generically around situational awareness of potential narratives online, that didn't feed into the into the predictive modeling. Q. Was that a Limbik product, too, that second pilot? A. Yes. Q. So in that case, can you kind of explain more generally what this pilot project involved in 2020, to track social media on the internet? MR. GARDNER: To the extent that that calls for the disclosure of information subject to the deliberative process privilege I instruct the witness not to answer. To the extent that you can answer that question at a high level of generality, you may do so. A. Yeah, so as I mentioned, our mission is to build the variance to MDM Dagge 154	
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Page 154 Pag	je 156
1 targeting critical infrastructure. 1 of deliberative process privilege. I instruct	
2 So essentially what we were trying 2 the witness not to answer.	
3 to understand is if we could predict the likely 3 MR. SAUER: To be clear, I'm asking	J
4 impact of MDM narrative in terms of increasing 4 for the conclusion, not the deliberation.	
5 risks to critical infrastructure by a better 5 BY MR. SAUER:	
6 understanding the information environment, so G. Did you conclude that they would be)e
7 the pilot was essentially trying to test that 7 useful?	
8 theory out. 8 MR. GARDNER: Same objections, s	same
9 Q. Yeah, kind of, again, at a high 9 instructions.	
10 level of generality, how do you test that theory 10 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I'm not going	J
11 out? 11 to answer.	
12 A. So the predictive model essentially 12 MR. SAUER: I've e-mailed around	
13 was to say say you had an image, it would 13 Exhibit 9.	
pull particular components of an image out and 14 (Exhibit No. 9 was marked for	
15 based on I don't want to get too I don't 15 identification.)	
16 know that I understand the black box that they 16 BY MR. SAUER:	
17 used all that well, if I were trying to test it, 17 Q. And if you have a minute to look at	
but there was a methodology that they used to do 18 it, I'm also putting on the screen share, it's a	3
that, and so we were just trying to see if that 19 collection of e-mails from October of 2020,	
20 methodology, in fact, worked from a 20 produced by the government, involving CIS.	
21 disinformation standpoint. 21 I think they relate to the switchboarding you	1
22 Q. When you say: They, who's they? 22 testified there about earlier.	
23 Is this people at CISA or is there a contractor 23 Do you see the the document?	
24 that created a product? 24 A. I do.	
25 A. It was a contractor. 25 Q. Just look here on the first page,	

39 (Pages 153 to 156)

Page 157	Page 159
there's an e-mail, if you look here, kind of on	1 A. So as I mentioned earlier, we did
Thursday, October 1st, at 4:23 p.m., it shows	2 get some briefs from them when they were setting
misinformation reports sending an e-mail to you,	3 things up, to let us know how they would work,
to CISA central, which I think you mentioned	4 and there was mention of a ticketing system
earlier, to CFITF e-mail address, and and	5 during that, those conversations.
6 misinformation reports; do you see that?	6 Q. When you received this report you
7 A. I do .	7 forwarded it onto Facebook, correct, directly
Q. And this is a I take it, some	8 above?
report that relates to misinformation in social	9 A . I did .
media from CIS; correct?	10 Q. And you said
A. Let me just scroll to the beginning	11 A. Correct.
of the e-mail chain.	12 Q. And you said: This is not
Yeah, this is a report I received	13 Facebook-related reporting, but thought it would
4 from CIS.	14 be of interest to your team; right?
Q. And when CIS e-mailed you this	15 A. Right.
report, if you look here, towards the top or	1 6 Q. Why did you forward it onto
7 right in the middle of the first page, CIS	17 Facebook if it appears to relate to tweets or
first of all, it's signed by Walter Oberes and	18 Twitter, as opposed to Facebook?
9 Aaron Wilson; correct?	19 A. Well, it related to Twitter and I
O A. Yeah.	20 believe YouTube, if I'm reading this correctly.
Q. And that Aaron, is that the Aaron	21 Q. Yeah, why did you forward it onto
you talked about earlier, as your CIS contact?	22 Facebook?
A. It is, correct.	A. There's a lot of ways that people
Q. And how about who's Walter	2 4 generate traffic to YouTube, in particular, but
5 Oberes?	25 Twitter, as well, is by posting it across
Page 158	Page 160
1 A. I don't know.	1 platforms.
Q. Okay. And he they say:	2 So something like this, it would
Brian referring to you we know many are	3 sometimes share across other platforms that we
already aware of this case, but the impact seems	4 thought there might be it might be relevant
to be escalating. Our hope is the platforms can	5 content showing up on their platforms.
do more to take down the misinformation;	6 Q. In other words, if the
7 correct?	7 disinformation or misinformation might be
A. That's what this says, correct.	8 spreading to other platforms you would notify
Q. And then it goes on to say: The	9 not just the platform reported, but other
EIP has been tracking this spread under ticket	10 platforms, as well, so that they could be aware
EIP-243, and has more examples; correct?	of this content; is that what you did?
2 A. Correct.	12 A. Yeah. So if I'm reading this
Q. Did they commonly tell you when the	13 correctly, it sounds like it literally jumped
4 EIP was tracking online misinformation, as well	14 platforms. So maybe I'm misreading. And so,
5 as CIS?	15 yeah, sometimes we would just we would share.
6 A. I don't think that was common, no.	16 Q. When you say: We would share, you
7 Q. Okay. Were you aware, at the time,	mean you would share it with other platforms
of what an EIP ticket was?	18 than the one that was currently hosting the
9 A. I understood that EIP was using a	19 reported content?
	20 A. Correct.
ticketing system. That's the extent of it so	
ticketing system. That's the extent of it, so that's what I assumed it was.	21 Q. Okay. Just scrolling down a few
that's what I assumed it was.	, ,
that's what I assumed it was. Q. And how did you know that?	pages, there a page with a Bates number 9676 at
that's what I assumed it was.	pages, there a page with a Bates number 9676 at

40 (Pages 157 to 160)

	Page 161		Page 163
1	A. Let me just make sure I got the	1	A. Mm-hmm.
2	right one. Got it.	2	Q. And that was the platform that was
3	Q. And again, on this one, here's	3	directly affected; right?
4	another e-mail, and you said: Hi Richard, this	4	A. Correct.
5	is not Google-specific reporting, but thought it	5	Q. And then talking to Twitter, at the
6	might be of interest to your team; correct?	6	very top, there, you said, you know, good
7	A. Correct.	7	afternoon, suspect you are you all are
8	Q. And there's this other situation	8	already aware of these issues, we wanted to pass
9	where a misinformation report had come in that	9	along this reporting from Sonoma County,
10	related to a content of other platforms, and you	10	California, to see if there's anything you can
11	shared it with a different platform; right?	11	share on how you're approaching; right?
12	A. This looks like the same example we	12	A. Mm-hmm.
	•		
13	talked about above.	13	Q. Is that sorry, can you answer it
14	Q. Oh, yeah, because this is the one	14	with a yes or no?
15	being tracked under ticket EIP243?	15	A. Oh, I'm sorry.
16	A. I believe it's the same. Reading	16	Yes.
17	the e-mail it looks the same.	17	Q. Is that something you did when you
18	Q. Is this something that was kind of	18	were serving the switchboarding function was ask
19	a common practice when you were performing this	19	the social media platforms to report back how
20	switchboarding function that you described in	20	they had addressed the contents reported?
21	2020, that you would report misinformation	21	 A. Generally we would do that if the
22	concerns, not just platform directly affected,	22	election official asked.
23	but other platforms, as well, to get ahead of	23	Q. Why did you do that?
24	it, so to speak?	24	A. Well, the the election official
25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and	25	reported something, they just wanted to know if
	Page 162		Page 164
1	answered. You can answer.	1	a decision was made often, not often, sometimes.
2	A. I wouldn't say it was a common	2	And so if the platform was open to
3	practice, but we did do it period do it	3	sharing if they had made a decision or not, we
4	periodically.	4	would just push that back to the election
5	Q. Let me jump ahead to Bates number	5	officials so they were aware
6	8356.	6	Q. So
7	A. Which PDF page is that?	7	A of where the platform landed.
8	Q. That looks like it's going to be	8	Q. So CISA would, if the state or
9	page 12 of the PDF.	9	local official wanted to know, you know, whether
10	A. Okay. All right. Just so you	10	the reported misinformation had been actioned in
11	know, for the e-mail, the PDF page numbers are	11	some way, CISA would ask the social media
12	going to be a lot more helpful.	12	platform to report that back, and then CISA
13	Q. Sure.	13	would relay that to the social media sorry
	A. So 8357, is that what I'm looking		to the state or local official; is that right?
14 15	•	14	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
13	at?		A. Yeah, we did that periodically,
16	Q. 56, I think it's the page before.	16	where we would ask if the decision was made and
16		17	if we can share back.
17	A. Oh, the one above? I got you.	1 1 1	
17 18	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still	18	Q. Did you do
17 18 19	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still relates to the same ticket; right? If you look	19	A. The platforms got better, along the
17 18 19 20	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still relates to the same ticket; right? If you look at the middle of the page, you're still dealing	19 20	A. The platforms got better, along the way, of communicating directly with the election
17 18 19 20 21	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still relates to the same ticket; right? If you look at the middle of the page, you're still dealing with the same report from CIS that has that same	19 20 21	A. The platforms got better, along the way, of communicating directly with the election officials, themselves.
17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still relates to the same ticket; right? If you look at the middle of the page, you're still dealing	19 20	A. The platforms got better, along the way, of communicating directly with the election officials, themselves. Q. Sometimes they would report back
17 18 19 20 21	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still relates to the same ticket; right? If you look at the middle of the page, you're still dealing with the same report from CIS that has that same	19 20 21	A. The platforms got better, along the way, of communicating directly with the election officials, themselves.
17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still relates to the same ticket; right? If you look at the middle of the page, you're still dealing with the same report from CIS that has that same EIP ticket number; correct?	19 20 21 22	A. The platforms got better, along the way, of communicating directly with the election officials, themselves. Q. Sometimes they would report back
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still relates to the same ticket; right? If you look at the middle of the page, you're still dealing with the same report from CIS that has that same EIP ticket number; correct? A. Yeah, it appears correct.	19 20 21 22 23	A. The platforms got better, along the way, of communicating directly with the election officials, themselves. Q. Sometimes they would report back directly, later in the process, especially?

	Page 165		Page 167
1	Q. Did you do anything else with that	1	Q. And then I think you said Rob
2	information, about whether and how the reported	2	Schaul did that, S-c-h-a-u-l; corrects?
3	misinformation had been actioned by the social	3	A. Correct, and then Alex Zaheer, who
4	media platform?	4	also should be on the org chart.
5	A. Did we do anything else with it?	5	Q. How do you spell letter name?
6	No. No. I mean, if it came to CIS	6	A. His name, Alex, A-I-e-x,
7	we would push the response from the platform	7	Z-a-h-e-e-r.
8	back up to CIS. If the information we received	8	Q. Okay. Anyone else?
9	from the election official came direct to us we	9	A. There's an intern.
10	would push that back, just back to the election	10	Q. Can you name the intern, please?
11	official.	11	A. No, I'm not going to name the
12	Q. How about anyone else, would anyone	12	intern.
13	else be notified how they acted?	13	Q. Are you refusing to answer that
14	A. I think we may have put a notation	14	question without an instruction, again?
15	in the tracking spreadsheet we kept, if a	15	A. Yes.
16	platform said something returned. But that was	16	Q. Okay. Anyone else?
17	an internal set of documents that would go to	17	A. I feel like there was, but I'm
18	normally our attorneys, the privacy folks, would	18	forgetting names, right now. But those would
19	let you see the tracking list review,	19	have been the principal oh, John Stafford,
20	periodically.	20	sorry.
21	Q. So there was an internal	21	Q. What's his role at CISA?
22	spreadsheet created by CISA to track these	22	A. He is not at CISA any longer. He
23	reports?	23	left sometime in 2021.
24	A. Yes.	24	Q. Okay. What was his role?
25	Q. And did you enter, you know, all of	25	A. He was an analyst by like the
	Page 166		Dogo 160
	1 age 100		Page 168
1	your switchboarding activity reports into that	1	others.
1 2	•	1 2	•
	your switchboarding activity reports into that		others.
2	your switchboarding activity reports into that spreadsheet?	2	others. Q. And would all those people be
2 3	your switchboarding activity reports into that spreadsheet? A. Yeah, we did the best we could to	2	others. Q. And would all those people be involved in e-mails like the ones we're looking
2 3 4	your switchboarding activity reports into that spreadsheet? A. Yeah, we did the best we could to make sure everything was captured in there.	2 3 4	others. Q. And would all those people be involved in e-mails like the ones we're looking at here in October 9 sorry in Exhibit 9,
2 3 4 5	your switchboarding activity reports into that spreadsheet? A. Yeah, we did the best we could to make sure everything was captured in there. Q. Does that spreadsheet still exist?	2 3 4 5	others. Q. And would all those people be involved in e-mails like the ones we're looking at here in October 9 sorry in Exhibit 9, where word would come in from, you know, CIS or
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42 (Pages 165 to 168)

	Page 169		Page 171
1	conversations, not about the switchboarding, I	1	switchboarding.
2	wouldn't think.	2	Q. Okay. So should we add intern
3	Q. You say the intern worked both, you	3	number two is also a a person who engages in
4	mean the intern part of the time was working for	4	switchboarding e-mails?
5	CISA and part of the time was working for EIP?	5	A. Correct.
6	A. So my understanding so the	6	Q. Are you declining to disclose the
7	intern was a Stanford student, so he worked part	7	name of intern number two, as well?
8	time for us. On election day, when he would	8	A. Intern number two is on our staff
9	have been on the agenda, he was just working for	9	now.
10		10	Q. What's his name?
11	US.	11	
	And my understanding is he also did		A. Alex.
12	some work for the Stanford Internet Observatory.	12	Q. Alex what?
13	I don't know what that work entailed, if it was	13	A. Zaheer.
14	EIP-specific or not. But yeah, he was he did	14	Q. So Alex Zaheer was was he one of
15	do some stuff with the Stanford Internet	15	the interns who originated the idea of the EIP?
16	Observatory, I'm just not a hundred percent	16	A. Correct.
17	certain of the nature of it.	17	Q. What's his role in CISA now?
18	 Q. Do you know whether he was involved 	18	 He is an analyst on the MDM team.
19	in tracking misinformation and disinformation	19	Q. What does he do for CISA?
20	for the Stanford Internet Observatory?	20	 A. He works on the MDM team. He
21	A. I don't know if that intern was	21	does we talked about him earlier in the org
22	responsible for that or doing that work.	22	chart discussion.
23	Q. Was that the only intern during	23	Q. I'm sorry, I don't remember, what
24	2020 who was simultaneously working part time	24	does he do?
25	for CISA, and also working with Stanford	25	A. So he steps across the range of
1 2	Internet Observatory?	1	
_	A. No. There was one other, as I	2	work, he does some analysis, he does some engagement, he does some product development
3	A. No. There was one other, as I mentioned earlier, there were two.		work, he does some analysis, he does some engagement, he does some product development work.
	mentioned earlier, there were two.	2	engagement, he does some product development work.
3 4	mentioned earlier, there were two. Q. And so, I see, in other words, it	2 3 4	engagement, he does some product development work. Q. What's engagement? Does he talk to
3 4 5	mentioned earlier, there were two. Q. And so, I see, in other words, it wasn't sequential. Those two interns, did they	2 3 4 5	engagement, he does some product development work. Q. What's engagement? Does he talk to social media platforms for CISA?
3 4 5 6	mentioned earlier, there were two. Q. And so, I see, in other words, it wasn't sequential. Those two interns, did they maintain their part-time internship at CISA	2 3 4 5 6	engagement, he does some product development work. Q. What's engagement? Does he talk to social media platforms for CISA? A. He does not, no.
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I	Page 173	Page 17
direct your attention back to or actu	ally, 1	meddling of the night.
let's jump ahead in the Exhibit 9. Actu	ally, 2	A. No. I mean, technically, you would
let me let's stay on this page.	3	be on for a day, if you're on your shift. But
A. Which page?	4	there wasn't an expectation, if something came
Q. I think we're on page 11 of the	e 5	in at 3:00 in the morning, that you were
6 PDF.	6	forwarding it on.
7 A. Okay.	7	Q. How because between 11:00 and 12:0
Q. Or actually, I'm sorry, let's jur	mp 8	at night?
ahead to page 10603 Bates, and then	-	A. Yeah, I mean if you were awake at
to be page 18 of the PDF.	10	11:00 or 12:00 at night, I think that we would
1 A. All right. Okay. I'm on page		push it on, and then obviously on election
Q. Okay. If you look here, this is		election night we were we were up until at
reporting chain of a misinformation co		least midnight. So if we received anything we
you to Twitter, on October 10th; corre		would push it forward.
5 A. Yes, that's what it appears to		But again, it was more when we got
6 Q. And you're making this repor		into kind of off hours you just ask people to
on the Saturday afternoon; right? Or i		monitor their phones, if they could, and if
early Saturday morning? It looks like		something came in just to push it forward. But
9 Saturday afternoon, at 12:52 p.m., the		the expectation that, as per this e-mail, that
bottom of the page; do you see that?	20	they would be responsible for forwarding
1 A. I do.	21	something.
Q. So you talked about this bein		Q. Let me ask you this: If you look
resource intensive. Were you guys st	•	at this e-mail chain we're looking at, where it
know, the misinformation reports and		says you would forward on a concern at 12:52
	-	
switchboarding on nights and weeken	ius: 25	p.m., and looks like about 20 minutes later, on
	Page 174	Page 176
A. So we ramped up as we got c	loser to 1	a Saturday afternoon, maybe Saturday morning,
the election. At this stage I think it was	, 2	for them, Twitter responds and says: Thanks,
primarily me that would receive them o	ver the 3	Brian, we will escalate; do you see that?
weekends. I forget when we started	when I 4	A. Yes.
started handing some of that off to my	team to 5	Q. So it looks like the people at
also pick it up over the weekends.	6	Twitter are monitoring their phones to respond
7 But at some point, we did have	9 7	promptly to your reports; is that right?
people on the schedule. It didn't mean	that 8	A. I mean, that would I don't know
they were 24/7 waiting for things, they j		what their monitoring behavior was, in this case
needed to monitor their phones in case	something 10	she certainty responded relatively quickly on a
came in.	11	Saturday.
Q. How so somebody was kind	d of 12	Q. And that's not the only case, it
tasked with I think you called them s		happens again and again and again, where you get
earlier someone was tasked with co		almost immediate responses from not just
shift at all times, not at all times, but a	·	Twitter, but Facebook and others; correct?
times over the weekend?	16	A. I mean, don't know. I'd have to
7 A. Yeah, particularly as we got c	loser 17	I'm sure you could show me documents that would
to the election. I wouldn't say it was the		who that, but I honestly don't know the
entire election cycle, it was I don't kn		timelines of sends and returns.
when it started, but probably sometime		Q. Well, you remember them pinging you
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		back promptly and being very responsive when you
1 mid-October when when we started in	-	
mid-October when when we started j so that people could review, before that	titwas 22	would make reports like this?
so that people could review, before that		would make reports like this? A. They were generally responsive in
•	n CIS . 23	A. They were generally responsive in making sure that we knew that they received it,

	Page 177		Page 179
1	Q. And not just received it, for	1	that you talked about, between the USG and the
2	example, in this case, not long after that, at	2	industry, was it ever brought up that, hey, you
3	6:30 p.m. the same day, she notifies you: These	3	know, we're going to have people standing by and
4	tweets have actioned for violations of our	4	watching for misinformation reports so we can
5	policies; right?	5	move quickly on them?
6	A. That's what the e-mail says, yep.	6	A. Not that I recall. I believe on
7	Q. And was that timeframe typical,	7	election night several of the platforms set up
8	were they turning around, you know, content that	8	their own operations center. But I don't know
9	was flagged and taking action on it within hours	9	that there's ever a conversation about from
10	of your reports?	10	the government expecting platforms to have any
11	A. It's hard to say, because they	11	particular timeline.
12	didn't always get back to us if they hadn't	12	Q. Again, these sort of e-mail
13	taken any action. So I don't know if I would	13	e-mails that we're looking at here in Exhibit 9,
14	say that's typical.	14	from you to the platform and the platforms
15	You know, sometimes they would let	15	responding back about misinformation that you
16	us know, sometimes they wouldn't. Generally	16	guys have switchboarded to them, I take it
17	speaking, I think they made their decisions	17	there's a set of e-mails like this, for not just
18	relatively quickly. So I would assume if they	18	you, but also for Chad Josiah, Rob Schaul, Alex
19	did get back to me it would be relatively	19	Zaheer, John Stafford, and an intern that you
20	quickly. But I can't speak to their timing or	20	haven't named yet; right?
21	their processes or any of that stuff. A lot of	21	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.
22	times they just didn't let us know	22	A. So if I'm understanding your
23	Q. But the more response	23	question, would you find e-mails from those
24	A to be honest, if they received	24	individuals to platforms notifying them or
25	it.	25	forwarding information from an election
	Page 178		Page 180
1	Q. Sorry to interrupt.	1	official, so yes.
2	A. Yeah, I just wanted to say,	2	Would there likely be it's hard
3	normally we would get a note that they received	3	for me to know if if they always responded
4	the messages I forwarded to them. We often	4	back, beyond the received, which I think was
5	didn't receive any kind of notification that	5	pretty standard.
6	they had taken action, no action, or what their	6	So I would assume that you would
7	decision was, so it's hard to say kind of what	7	find change with other members of the team,
8	their typical timeline was for making decisions.	8	where they sent something over to a platform and
9	Q. Let me ask you this: Were they	9	the platform said received, so yeah, if that's
10	more responsive to you, as a representative of a	10	your question.
11	federal national security agency, than they were	11	Q. So in other words, at least those
12	to ordinary people who made such reports, if you	12	five individuals I just listed were involved,
13	know?	13	separate from the e-mails that we're looking at
14	MR. GARDNER: Objection.	14	that involved you, they were sending their own
15	Objection, lack of foundation, calls for	15	e-mails, when it was their shift, to social
16	speculation.	16	media platforms, flagging disinformation
17	A. Yeah, I have no clue. I don't know	17	concerns?
18	what the timeline was, generally.	18	A. Yeah, that's correct. But keep in
19	Q. Were there ever discussions between	19	mind, over the entire course of the election I
20	you or anyone at CISA and any one of the	20	think we forwarded about 200 e-mails, total. So
21	platforms about making sure the platforms are	21	I would imagine the vast majority of them are
22	monitoring their e-mails for the the	22	mine, because for a period of time I was the
23	government's reports of misinformation?	23	principal one relaying it.
24	A. No.	24	But then to answer your question,
1	O Harrish and by the armah mandimus	1	

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Fax: 314.644.1334

yes, there's probably other e-mail chains with

25

Q. How about in the synch meetings

25

	Page 181		Page 183
1	those five representatives on it.	1	MR. SAUER: Why don't we take a
2	MR. GARDNER: So we've now been	2	break there.
3	going almost two hours. I think now would	3	MR. GARDNER: Okay. I mean, it is
4	probably be a good time for a break.	4	now oh, let's go off the record.
5	MR. SAUER: Let me ask one more	5	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
6	question, that's right on this topic, and how	6	12:34. We're off the record.
7	about that or one little set of questions.	7	(Recess.)
8	MR. GARDNER: Sure.	8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
9	BY MR. SAUER:	9	1:41 p.m. We are back on the record.
10	Q. Did you ever discuss with Alex	10	MR. GARDNER: Thank you. And as I
11	Zaheer what he did for the Election Integrity	11	had mentioned before we got back on the record,
12	Partnership?	12	the witness wanted to say something before we
13	A. I'm sure I had conversations with	13	began.
14	Alex about his work with SIO, which was part of	14	THE WITNESS: So the intern that
	•	15	
15	the larger integrity partnership.		did both SIO and CISA push forwarding was Pierce Lowary.
16	Q. What did you discuss with him about his work for SIO?	16 17	,
17		1	BY MR. SAUER:
18	A. I think he just talked about that	18	Q. And is that L-o-w-a-r-y?
19	he was participating in it, I don't know the	19	A. I believe so, yeah.
2.0	specifics of the conversation, but that he was	20	Q. And that intern worked
21	participating in it, and he was one of the	21	simultaneously with CISA and the EIP?
22	people that were working with the ticketing	22	A. And SIO was a member of the EIP.
23	system.	23	Q. Right. What did he do for SIO
24	Q. When you say: Working with the	24	while this was going on, do you know?
25	ticketing system, what did he say he was doing	25	A. I don't.
	Page 182		Page 184
1	with the ticketing system?	1	Q. What did he do for CISA while this
2	A. I don't recall. I mean, I was I	2	was going on?
3	don't know how the ticketing system works, so I	3	A. Again, he was part-time in the
4	don't know, kind of, how his role would have	4	fall, so he would support the analytic stuff,
5	played in there, what it was.	5	and then, as I mentioned, he did some work in
6	Q. When you refer to the ticketing	6	terms of the switchboarding. I'm not
7	system, is that the system that Stanford had for	7	obviously not sure the extent of the e-mails or
8	receiving reports of disinformation that they	8	anything like that, that he would have forwarded
9	would analyze?	9	over to the platforms.
10	A. Correct.	10	Q. Now, Pierce Lowary was involved in
11	Q. How about the other intern, the one	11	forwarding e-mails over to the platforms?
12	you haven't named yet, did you ever discuss with	12	A. Correct.
13	that intern the work he did for the Stanford	13	Q. And that's in addition to Chad
14	Internet Observatory?	14	Josiah, Rob Schaul, Alex Zaheer, John Stafford,
15	A. I don't I don't recall. I don't	15	and yourself; correct?
16	think certainly not in the level of detail	16	A. Correct.
17	with Alex. Obviously Alex came to work for us,	17	Q. Anyone else, in 2020, who would
18	so I have a little more familiarity with what he	18	engage in those switchboarding e-mails?
19	did with SIO. So I don't I didn't have a	19	A. I believe that was all.
20	clear understanding of the other intern's role.	20	Q. Was Pierce
21	5	21	
	Q. What did the other intern go on to		A. From my recollection.
	do?	22	Q. Was Pierce Lowary one of the four
22		2.2	interne who originated the idea of the FIDO
22 23	A. I don't know. As far as I know,	23	interns who originated the idea of the EIP?
22		23 24 25	interns who originated the idea of the EIP? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Who were the other two?

46 (Pages 181 to 184)

Page 185	Page 187
1 A. I don't	1 A. I don't believe so, but I'm not
2 Q. Well, let me what about Alex	2 sure kind of their arrangement in the SIO front.
3 Zaheer, was he one of the ones?	3 I think SIO was I think SIO may have been
4 A. Alex was one.	4 I'm not sure how that worked with SIO when
5 Q. The idea	5 they're interns, but she did not work for us in
6 A. It got	6 the fall, when she was working for SIO, that I'm
7 MR. GARDNER: Hold on, guys, you	7 certain of, so I don't know what the
8 keep talking over each other. So let Mr. Sauer	8 relationship was over the summer internship.
9 ask the question and then please answer.	9 Q. What what did she do for CISA?
10 John, can you re-ask it?	10 A. Again, like the other analysts,
11 BY MR. SAUER:	11 typical intern stuff, supporting product
12 Q. Was Alex Zaheer one of the four	12 development, helping with, you know, any
13 interns who originated the idea of the EIP?	13 research projects, standard kind of intern work
14 A. He was.	14 across the three panels I mentioned before,
15 Q. And he went on, like Mr. Lowary, to	engagement, product development, and analysis
1 6 simultaneously work for CISA and for Stanford	16 research.
17 Internet Observatory during the 2020 election	17 Q. Who is Ayelet Drazen, D-r-a-z-e-n,
18 cycle?	18 first name A-y-e-l-e-t?
19 A. Correct.	19 A. I don't know.
20 Q. Who were the other two interns who	20 Q. Who is Ashwin Ramaswami?
21 originated the idea?	21 A. I believe he was one of the
22 A. The fourth intern I do not know who	22 election security interns.
23 they're referring to, so I'm not sure who that	23 Q. During 2020 at CISA?
24 is.	24 A. At least the summer of 2020. I
25 The first intern is Isabella	25 don't I don't know, kind of, how long he
Camargo, I forget the rest of her last name, I'm	1 stuck around. I didn't really work with him.
2 sorry. I'd have to look.	2 Q. Is he another Stanford intern?
3 Q. Is it Isabella Garcia-Camargo?	A. Yeah, I believe so.
4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Okay. When did she intern for	4 Q. Did he go on to work for the
5 Q. Okay. When did she intern for 6 CISA?	5 Stanford Internet Observatory? 6 A. I don't know. I don't know.
	6 A. I don't know. I don't know. 7 Q. How about Jack Cable, C-a-b-I-e?
7 A. Over the summer of 2020. 8 Q. Did she do that into the fall?	
	8 A. He was a Stanford intern. I
	9 don't I don't know what he did, after, just
	10 for the summer, that I'm aware of, but I'm not
11 for Stanford Stanford Internet Observatory?	entirely sure. He didn't work on the MDM stuff
12 A. Yes. 13 Q. And did she work for Stanford	12 with me.
	13 Q. What did he do at CISA, do you
14 Internet Observatory during the summer, when she	14 know?
15 was also working for CISA?	15 A. He was more cyber-focused, so I'm
16 A. Yes.	16 not entirely sure, really, what his projects
17 Q. Who is Ayelet Drazen, D-r-a 18 A. Hold on a second, I'm sorry, can	17 are.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	18 Q. Just a second, I'm e-mailing you
19 you repeat that last question?	19 two new exhibits.
20 Q. Which question, who is Ayelet	20 Let me ask this: Were you involved
21 Drazen?	in Mr. Scully, were you involved in preparing
A. No, the one before.	22 CISA's discovery responses to written discovery
Q. Did she work for Stanford Internet	23 in this case?
24 Observatory during the time she was also working	A. I believe I provided names of the
25 for CISA?	25 team. And the IT folks searched my records for

47 (Pages 185 to 188)

me. Q. You provided names? A. Don't ask Q. Names of the team, what does that mana? A. So I believe I provided names of the provi		Page 189		Page 191
A. Don't ask— Q. Names of the team, what does that mean? A. So I believe I provided names of the people who are part of the MDM team or the CFITF. Q. So you provided names of key custodians, for example, who might have relevant e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right. A. Right. A. Right. A. Right and the inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right and the stuff like to take a look of them. C. In the look of them. C. In there, at the bottom of page 19, you see where it says: CISA, bas identified the following custodians as having relevant communications response to our discovery requests. C. Sa thas identified the following custodians as having relevant communications as produced in the response to requests two and three corrects and produced in the response to requests two and three corrects and produced in the response to request two and three corrects and produced in the response to that a produced in the response to that a produced in the response to that a produced in the response to request two and three corrects and produced in the response to request two and three corrects and produced in the response to request two and three corrects and produced in the response to request two and three corrects and produced in the response to request two and three corrects and produced in the response to urdiscovery in the correct and produced in the response to the seal and produced in the response to pour seal and produced in the response to produced in forwarding sealing the communication	1	me.	1	THE WITNESS: Okay.
document? I've also got it up on the screen share. A. So I believe I provided names of the people who are part of the MDM team or the CFTF. CFTF. Q. So you provided names of key custodians, for example, who might have relevant e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right. Q. In here, at the bottom of page 19, you see where it says: CISA, colon? A. Yes. Q. In here, at the bottom of page 19, you see where it says: CISA, colon? A. Yes. Q. In here, at the bottom of page 19, you see where it says: CISA, colon? A. Yes. Q. In here, at the bottom of page 19, you see where it says: CISA, colon? A. Yes. Q. It's identifying people with relevant communications response to our discovery requests. CISA has identified the following custodians as having relevant communications as produced in the response to requests two and three; correct? Do you see that? A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed submitted on behalf of CISA? A. Yeah, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. D. Did you review the ones that were and only ones I reviewed. D. Did you review the ones that were and three; correct? Do you see that? A. I do. Q. Before the break, you mentioned that there were about 200 -mails that CISA for reviewed of routing disinformation concerns to the social media platforms in 2020; right? Page 190 A. Yeah, give or take a few. I don't know the exact number, but it's about 200. A. A Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Would you consult that tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Would you consult that tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. I don't recall that I did, it's possible, but I don't recall that I did, it's possible, but I don't recall that I did, it's possible, but I don't recall that I did, it's possible, but I don't recall doing it. C. Cishibit No. 12 was marked for identif	2	Q. You provided names?	2	BY MR. SAUER:
smean? A. So I believe I provided names of the people who are part of the MDM team or the CFITF. Q. So you provided names of key custodians, for example, who might have relevant e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right. A. Right. A. Right. A. Right. A. Right. Co. Okay. Were you involved in drafting interrogatory responses? A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed some of them. Co. Did you review the ones that were submitted on behalf of CISA? A. Yeah, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. D. Defore the break, you mentioned that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA forwarded to serve this switchboarding function of roruting disinformation concerns to the social media platforms in 2020; right? A. Yeah, give or take a few. I don't know whe exact number, but if is about 200. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. I don't recall that I did, It's possible, but I don't recall doing it. (Exhibit No. 12 was marked for identification.) B. W. M. SAUER: A. Rob Carba. All right. Page 197 Okay. I'm at 19. A. A lathink it pous croid that the sound 200. A. Veah, draft file bottom of page 19, you see where it says: CISA, colon? A. Yes. CISA has identified the following custodians as having pilovant communications as produced in the response to requests two and three; correct? Po you see that? A. I don't preceived. A. Yea. A. Yea. C. CISA custodians listed are Jesterity, Christopher Krebs, Matt Masterson, Geoff Hale, Brian Scully, and Lauren Protentis; right? A. Yep. C. CISA custodians listed are Jesterity, Christopher Krebs, Matt Masterson, Geoff Hale, Brian Scully, and Lauren Protentis; right? A. Yep. C. Low	3	A. Don't ask	3	Q. Can you go to page 19 of that
A. So I believe I provided names of the people who are part of the MDM team or the CFTF. Q. So you provided names of key custodians, for example, who might have relevant e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right. Q. Okay. Were you involved in drafting interrogatory responses? A. Right. A. Right. A. Right. A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed some of them. C. Did you review the ones that were some of them. A. Yeah, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. A. Seah, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. A. Seah, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. A. Seah, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Would you consult that tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. A. Would you consult that tracking opposable, but I don't recall doing it. Exhibit No. 12 was marked for identification.) A. C. Lit should be amended interrogatory in this case? A. C. Lit me show you Exhibit 12. A. C. Rape 190 A. Yes, that's who is listed there. A. C. It should be amended interrogatory responses that have also been filed publicly with the Court as document 86-3? A. The WITNESS: I don't know.	4	Q. Names of the team, what does that	4	document? I've also got it up on the screen
the people who are part of the MDM team or the CFITF. O. So you provided names of key custodians, for example, who might have relevant the e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right. A. Right. A. Right. C. D. Were you involved in 13 do. O.	5	mean?	5	
CFITF Q. So you provided names of key custodians, for example, who might have relevant e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right. Q. In hore, at the bottom of page 19, you see where it says: CISA, colon? A. Yes. Q. It's identifying people with relevant communications response to our discovery requests. G. Neav. Were you involved in drafting interrogatory responses? 14 drafting interrogatory responses? 15 A. If I recal correctly, I reviewed 15 some of them. 17 Q. Did you review the ones that were submitted on behalf of CISA? 19 A. Yesh, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. Q. Before the break, you mentioned that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA forwarded to serve this switchboarding function of routing disinformation concerns to the social media platforms in 2020; right? Page 190 A. Yesh, give or take a few. I don't know the exact number, but it's about 200. Q. How do you know how many there were. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we kee kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent over we logged. Q. Would you consult that tracking spreadsheet when you were preparing or working on responding to written discovery in this case? A. I don't recall that I did, it's possible, but I don't recall don't rec	6	A. So I believe I provided names of	6	A. All right. Page 19? Okay. I'm at
9 Q. So you provided names of key 10 custodians, for example, who might have relevant 11 e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? 12 A. Right. 13 Q. Okay. Were you involved in 14 drafting interrogatory responses? 15 A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed 16 some of them. 17 Q. Did you review the ones that were 18 submitted on behalf of CISA? 19 A. Yeah, those would have been the 20 only ones I reviewed. 21 Q. Before the break, you mentioned 22 that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA 23 forwarded to serve this switchboarding function 24 of routing dislinformation concerns to the social 25 media platforms in 2020; right? Page 190 1 A. Yeah, give or take a few. I don't 2 know the exact number, but it's about 200. 3 Q. How do you know how many there 4 were. 5 A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we 6 kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent 7 over we logged. 6 Q. Would you consult that tracking 9 spreadsheet when you were preparing or working 10 on responding to written discovery in this case? 11 A. I don't recall idnel; it's 12 possible, but I don't recall idnel; it's 13 plant in the involved in didnersing function 14 identification.) 15 PAR MR. SAUER: 16 Q. Lot me show you Exhibit 12. 17 A. Okay. That's a complaint. 18 Q. It should be amended interrogatory 19 responses that have also been filed publicly 19 with the Court as document 86-3? 20 It should be amended interrogatory 21 Rhe WITNESS: I don't know. 21 Indication. 22 Indication in the court and the relevant communications are relevant communications. We discovery requests: 22 Indication in the following discovery requests: 23 CISA tasidentified the following 24 three; correct? Do you see that? 25 A. I do. 26 CiStà custodians a shaving relevant communications as produced in the response to requests two and three; correct? 29 Distource the response to requests two and three responses to requests two and three responses to our discovery requests; 29 Distource the following discovery requests; 21 Distource the following discovery requests; 21 Distou	7	the people who are part of the MDM team or the	7	19.
custodians, for example, who might have relevant e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? A. Right. A. Right. C. Okay. Were you involved in drafting interrogatory responses? A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed Some of them. D. Did you review the ones that were submitted on behalf of CISA? A. Yeah, those would have been the only ones I reviewed. C. Before the break, you mentioned that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA for or routing disinformation concerns to the social media platforms in 2020; right? Page 190 A. Yeah, give or take a few. I don't know the exact number, but it's about 200. G. How do you know how many there were. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we exerce. A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we rove we logged. A. Would you consult that tracking speadsheet when you were preparing or working on responding to written discovery in this case? A. I don't recall that I did, it's possible, but I don't recall doing it. (Ekhibit No. 12 was marked for idid identification.) BY MR. SAUER: M. Ca. I think if you scroll down another sore well organd. E. Would you consult that tracking speadsheet when you were preparing or working on responding to written discovery in this case? A. I don't recall doing it. (Ekhibit No. 12 was marked for idid identification.) BY MR. SAUER: M. Ca. I think if you scroll down another responses that have a also been filed publicly with the Court as document 86-3? M. Mel Will with the Court as document 86-3? M. He Will will be amended interrogatory responses that have also been filed publicly with the Court as document 86-3? M. He Will will be amended interrogatory responses that have also been filed publicly with the Court as document 86-3? M. He Will will will be amended interrogatory responses that have also been filed publicly with the Court as document 86-3? M. He Will will will will will will will will	8	·	8	Q. In here, at the bottom of page 19,
e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that? 12	9	Q. So you provided names of key	9	you see where it says: CISA, colon?
12	10	custodians, for example, who might have relevant	10	A. Yes.
13 Q. Okay. Were you involved in drafting interrogatory responses? 14 14 15 A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed 15 Same of them. 16 Some of them. 17 Q. Did you review the ones that were 17 I three; correct? Do you see that? 18 Submitted on behalf of CISA? 18 A. I do. 19 A. Yeah, those would have been the 19 Q. CISA custodians listed are Jen 20 only ones I reviewed. 21 Q. Before the break, you mentioned 21 that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA 22 that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA 23 forwarded to serve this switchboarding function 24 for outing disinformation concerns to the social 25 media platforms in 2020; right? 25 Rob Schaul, Alex Zaheer, John Stafford, Pierce 27 A. Yeah, give or take a few. I don't 2 know the exact number, but it's about 200. 2 disclosed in this part of the interrogatories; correct? A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we 4 kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent 7 over we logged. A. I don't recall that I did, it's 10 possible, but I don't recall doing it. 12 possible, but I don't recall that I did, it's 12 possible, but I don't recall doing it. 13 (Exhibit No. 12 was marked for identification.) 14 identification.) 15 BYMR. SAUER: 16 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 12. 16 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 12. 17 A. Okay. That's a complaint. 17 I dentification. 18 Q. It should be amended interrogatory 18	11	e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that?	11	Q. It's identifying people with
13 Q. Okay. Were you involved in drafting interrogatory responses? 14 14 15 A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed 15 Same of them. 16 Some of them. 17 Q. Did you review the ones that were 17 I three; correct? Do you see that? 18 Submitted on behalf of CISA? 18 A. I do. 19 A. Yeah, those would have been the 19 Q. CISA custodians listed are Jen 20 only ones I reviewed. 21 Q. Before the break, you mentioned 21 that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA 22 that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA 23 forwarded to serve this switchboarding function 24 for outing disinformation concerns to the social 25 media platforms in 2020; right? 25 Rob Schaul, Alex Zaheer, John Stafford, Pierce 27 A. Yeah, give or take a few. I don't 2 know the exact number, but it's about 200. 2 disclosed in this part of the interrogatories; correct? A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we 4 kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent 7 over we logged. A. I don't recall that I did, it's 10 possible, but I don't recall doing it. 12 possible, but I don't recall that I did, it's 12 possible, but I don't recall doing it. 13 (Exhibit No. 12 was marked for identification.) 14 identification.) 15 BYMR. SAUER: 16 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 12. 16 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 12. 17 A. Okay. That's a complaint. 17 I dentification. 18 Q. It should be amended interrogatory 18	12	A. Right.	12	
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23 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 23 A. I have no idea what this indicates.				
24 MR. GARDINER: Hold on one sec. 24 Q. Well, let me ask you this: You			1	
OF Veels the the state of the Arministra				
25 Yeah, that's right. 25 testified before the break that those four	25	rean, that's right. I hat's right.	25	testified defore the dreak that those four

48 (Pages 189 to 192)

	Page 193		Page 195
1	people there, plus Pierce Lowary, who you just	1	identification.)
2	disclosed, all forwarded disinformation reports	2	BY MR. SAUER:
3	to social media platforms as part of the	3	Q. Here's Jack
4	switchboarding function; isn't that right?	4	A. Is it the sorry, go ahead.
5	A. They were all part of the	5	Q. This is Jack Cable's publicly
6	switchboarding function. I don't know who sent	6	available online LinkedIn profile; do you see
7	e-mails or how many e-mails or any of that.	7	that?
8	Q. But you testified that they took	8	A. I do.
9	shifts and sent e-mails to social media	9	Q. If you scroll down, a fifth page of
10	platforms reporting this information; correct?	10	this document, it looks like he was a research
11	A. They took shifts, and if they	11	assistant at Stanford Internet Observatory from
12	received something they would have sent an	12	2019 to 2021; correct?
13	e-mail. But without going through the	13	A. That's what it says, yep.
14	spreadsheet that I mentioned I wouldn't know if	14	Q. And that he ended in June of 2021,
15	an actual individual was on a shift, sent one,	15	correct, at SIO?
16	but that would be my expectation that they did.	16	A. That's what it says, yeah.
17	Q. What was the last	17	Q. And immediately below that, it
18	A. There were generally two people	18	looks like he was an election security technical
19	per there were generally two people per	19	advisor at CISA from June 2020 to January 2021;
20	shift, so it's possible that just one of those	20	correct?
21	two people were sending e-mails.	21	A. That's what he says.
22	Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified	22	Q. So he also overlapped, for an
23	anywhere in these discovery responses, is he?	23	entire year, in working simultaneously for CISA
24	A. I mean, he's not identified in	24	and for the SIO; correct?
25	these. This is a small section. I don't know	25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
1	Page 194 if he is elsewhere.	1	Page 196 foundation.
2	Q. Well, you said you reviewed them	2	BY MR. SAUER:
3	when they were being prepared. Do you remember	3	Q. According to his LinkedIn profile?
4	seeing his name anywhere anywhere in the	4	MR. GARDNER: Same objection.
5	government's discovery responses?	5	 A. LinkedIn profile says he worked at
6	A. I don't recall, but I wouldn't	6	CISA for eight months.
7	have I don't think I would have reviewed the	7	(Reporter admonition.)
8	entire document, so I don't know.	8	THE WITNESS: Sorry.
9	Q. Who would have	9	A. The LinkedIn profile said he worked
10	A. Obviously, I didn't see the final	10	at CISA for eight months.
11	document.	11	Q. Right. Does the LinkedIn profile
12	Q. Who would have reviewed the final	12	also indicate that during those same eight
13	document?	13	months, from June of 2020 to January of 2021, he
14	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	14	also was an intern a research assistant at
15	speculation.	15	Stanford?
16	BY MR. SAUER:	16	A. It appears that way, yep.
17	Q. If you know.	17	Q. Were you aware that Jack Cable was
18	A. Yeah, I don't know.	18	working for Stanford Internet Observatory while
19	MR. SAUER: Exhibit 62, which I've	19	he was also interning for CISA?
20	also e-mailed you.	20	A. No. Jack didn't work for me, so I
21	MR. GARDNER: John, did you say 62?	21	didn't really pay attention to what he was
22	MR. SAUER: 62, should be the most	22	doing.
	the state of the s	1 22	Q. He shares this simultaneous
23	recent one in your inbox.	23	
	recent one in your inbox. THE WITNESS: Okay. Okay. (Exhibit No. 62 was marked for	24 25	employment with SIO and CISA, along with Alex Zaheer and Pierce Lowary; correct?

49 (Pages 193 to 196)

1	Page 197		Page 199
1	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	1	realize it wasn't up. Can you see it on the
2	foundation.	2	screen share?
3	BY MR. SAUER:	3	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, we got it now.
4	Q. Correct?	4	Thank you.
5	A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the	5	BY MR. SAUER:
6	question?	6	Q. Alex Zaheer, on October 30th, sends
7	Q. Pierce Lowary and Alex Zaheer also	7	an e-mail to CFITF; correct?
8	simultaneously worked for CISA and SIO; correct?	8	A. Yep.
9	A. They did.	9	Q. And he's actually
10	Q. And then, if you scroll up a little	10	A. Yes.
11	bit, to the page before, it looks like he went	11	Q. He says: FYSA, EIP has reported
12	on to work for the Krebs-Stamos Group; were you	12	the following to EI-ISAC and Twitter from EIP,
13	aware of that?	13	and then he reports on an EIP ticket; correct?
14	A. No, I don't think so.	14	A. Correct.
15	Q. And then he went on to work for the	15	Q. And then this you responded to
16	senate; correct? Does that ring a bell?	16	him, Thanks Alex; do you see that on the page
17	A. I mean, it's what it says here.	17	before?
18	Q. So you didn't know what Jack Cable	18	A. Yes.
19	went on to do after he left CISA?	19	Q. And then you sent an e-mail, it's
20	A. No, I didn't really pay attention	20	not clear to whom, saying: FYI, the EIP,
21	to what like I said, he didn't work for me,	21	submitted the below to Twitter, no need to
22	so I didn't really follow him. In fact, I'm	22	respond. But it looks like you were saying that
23	a couple of my interns I'm not sure what they're	23	to Twitter; right?
24	doing, either.	24	A. Yeah, there's no header there, so
25	Q. Let's go back to Exhibit 9.	25	I'm not certain, but that's what it appears.
1	Page 198 Is it possible that Jack Cable was	1	Page 200 Q. It appears that from your intern,
2	another one of the interns who originated the	2	who was simultaneously working for EIP, you
3			who was simultaneously working for Eir, you
	EIP? You mentioned there's one, and you're not	3	received a report of alleged misinformation and
4	EIP? You mentioned there's one, and you're not sure if it was them?	3 4	
			received a report of alleged misinformation and
4	sure if it was them?	4	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right?
4 5	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	4 5	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah.
4 5 6	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation.	4 5 6	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an
4 5 6 7	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't	4 5 6 7	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an EIP-specific report; correct?
4 5 6 7 8	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. Q. Let's go to page 8769 in this document, Exhibit 9.	4 5 6 7 8	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an EIP-specific report; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then Twitter responded and said, thanks Brian, we received that report from
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. Q. Let's go to page 8769 in this document, Exhibit 9. A. Do you know what the PDF page is, John? Q. I'm scrolling down to it, so I'll tell you as soon as I know the answer. A. Okay. Q. I think it's PDF page 62. A. All right. Q. All right. If you see here, it	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an EIP-specific report; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then Twitter responded and said, thanks Brian, we received that report from the EIP and escalated it; correct? A. Yes. Q. And then she goes on to specify to you the action they took against that; correct? A. Yeah, on a contextual label pursuant to their policy on civic integrity, yeah. Q. Were there other instances where
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. Q. Let's go to page 8769 in this document, Exhibit 9. A. Do you know what the PDF page is, John? Q. I'm scrolling down to it, so I'll tell you as soon as I know the answer. A. Okay. Q. I think it's PDF page 62. A. All right. Q. All right. If you see here, it looks like Alex Zaheer, on October 30th, sends a	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an EIP-specific report; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then Twitter responded and said, thanks Brian, we received that report from the EIP and escalated it; correct? A. Yes. Q. And then she goes on to specify to you the action they took against that; correct? A. Yeah, on a contextual label pursuant to their policy on civic integrity, yeah. Q. Were there other instances where this occurred, where an EIP report was forwarded
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. Q. Let's go to page 8769 in this document, Exhibit 9. A. Do you know what the PDF page is, John? Q. I'm scrolling down to it, so I'll tell you as soon as I know the answer. A. Okay. Q. I think it's PDF page 62. A. All right. Q. All right. If you see here, it looks like Alex Zaheer, on October 30th, sends a report about misinformation to CFITF, which is the CISA reporting e-mail address; correct? MR. GARDNER: John, I'm sorry, are	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an EIP-specific report; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then Twitter responded and said, thanks Brian, we received that report from the EIP and escalated it; correct? A. Yes. Q. And then she goes on to specify to you the action they took against that; correct? A. Yeah, on a contextual label pursuant to their policy on civic integrity, yeah. Q. Were there other instances where this occurred, where an EIP report was forwarded to you, and you forwarded it onto to a social
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. Q. Let's go to page 8769 in this document, Exhibit 9. A. Do you know what the PDF page is, John? Q. I'm scrolling down to it, so I'll tell you as soon as I know the answer. A. Okay. Q. I think it's PDF page 62. A. All right. Q. All right. If you see here, it looks like Alex Zaheer, on October 30th, sends a report about misinformation to CFITF, which is the CISA reporting e-mail address; correct?	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an EIP-specific report; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then Twitter responded and said, thanks Brian, we received that report from the EIP and escalated it; correct? A. Yes. Q. And then she goes on to specify to you the action they took against that; correct? A. Yeah, on a contextual label pursuant to their policy on civic integrity, yeah. Q. Were there other instances where this occurred, where an EIP report was forwarded to you, and you forwarded it onto to a social media platform?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	sure if it was them? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. Q. Let's go to page 8769 in this document, Exhibit 9. A. Do you know what the PDF page is, John? Q. I'm scrolling down to it, so I'll tell you as soon as I know the answer. A. Okay. Q. I think it's PDF page 62. A. All right. Q. All right. If you see here, it looks like Alex Zaheer, on October 30th, sends a report about misinformation to CFITF, which is the CISA reporting e-mail address; correct? MR. GARDNER: John, I'm sorry, are	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	received a report of alleged misinformation and submitted it onto Twitter; right? A. Yeah. Q. And then and that was an EIP-specific report; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then Twitter responded and said, thanks Brian, we received that report from the EIP and escalated it; correct? A. Yes. Q. And then she goes on to specify to you the action they took against that; correct? A. Yeah, on a contextual label pursuant to their policy on civic integrity, yeah. Q. Were there other instances where this occurred, where an EIP report was forwarded to you, and you forwarded it onto to a social media platform? A. As I said earlier, it's possible,

50 (Pages 197 to 200)

Page 20	1	Page 203
1 Q. How about the other five people who	1	tips@2020partnership e-mail?
2 were monitoring these misinformation reporting	ig 2	A. I'm not sure that I paid that much
3 e-mails, did they ever review that, do you know	/? 3	attention to it, no.
4 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	4	Q. You didn't notice
5 speculation.	5	A. Again, yeah, I wasn't I guess
6 A. Yeah, I don't know. Again, it	6	that I wasn't aware of what processes they were
7 wasn't part of our normal process, so I'm not	7	following.
8 sure.	8	Q. So you didn't know they were
9 Q. Would that be reflected in this	9	looping in the EIP on their reports; is that
spreadsheet you referred to multiple times?	10	what you're saying?
11 A. Yeah, it should be.	11	A. I don't recall it, but again, as we
12 Q. So if there was if the EIP is	12	discussed earlier, it could have been part of
13 referenced or is the originator of the report	13	the effort to deconflate for the platforms.
you would note that in the spreadsheet?	14	Q. Up here on page 51 of the PDF,
15 A. I believe so. I believe we would	15	scrolling to the bottom of that page down to 52,
16 have the case number.	16	here's another CIS report. Once again, it's
17 Q. Can you scroll back up to page 33	17	sent to you at to CISA e-mails and
18 of the PDF?	18	tips@2020partnership@atlassian.net; correct?
	1	A. Yeah. I see the e-mail address in
19 A. Yep.	19	•
20 Q. It's Bates 8349.	20	there.
21 A. 8349, yep.	21	Q. And you don't recall that being
Q. You see at the top of this page	22	you getting copied that being copied on
there's a misinformation report from Oregon,	23	e-mails of this nature?
that's being sent on by the CIS, Center For	24	A. I don't.
25 Internet Security, reporting e-mail; do you see	25	Q. Really briefly, jumping ahead to
Page 20	2	Page 204
1 that?	1	page 10539, page 55, once again, CIS is copying
2 A. Yes.	2	you and tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net;
3 Q. And it's sent to you and a couple	3	correct?
4 other CISA e-mails or CISA e-mails, there in	4	A. That's the e-mail, yes.
5 the first line; right?	5	Q. Jumping ahead to page 7565, here's
6 A. Yep.	6	a report from the Colorado secretary of state's
7 Q. In the second line it's sent to	7	office. Do you see, we're on page 59 of the
8 tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; do you se	e 8	PDF, where they're reporting it to EI-ISAC,
9 that?	9	CISA, and Stanford Partners; correct?
10 A. I do.	10	A. That's what the e-mail says, yep.
11 Q. What is that?	11	Q. It says Stanford is presumably
12 A. I don't know.	12	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
13 Q. Is that the reporting e-mail for	13	speculation.
14 tips to the 2020 Election Integrity Partnership?	I .	A. Yeah, I don't know what they mean
15 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	15	by Stanford.
16 speculation, also, asked and answered.	1	Q. Do you think Stanford might be some
•	16	,
•	17	other Stanford entity to which state and local
Q. Is it your testimony that you're	18	election officials are reporting disinformation
not aware whether or not that's the reporting	19	CONCERNS
e-mail for the EIP?	20	MR. GARDNER: Objection.
A. Yeah, I'm not aware the answer	21	BY MR. SAUER:
is, I'm not aware of what e-mail that is.	22	Q during the 2020 cycle?
	1 00	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
Q. Were you aware that did you	23	•
Q. Were you aware that did you notice that CIS was commonly forwarding thes reports to both you and that		speculation, lacks foundation.

	Page 205	Page 207
1 BY MR. SAUER:	1	things that the FBI and CISA warned us may
2 Q. Do you know?	2	warrant reporting; right?
3 A. I don't know.	3	A. I mean, I don't want to speak for
4 Q. Scrolling above this, a	gain, CIS 4	the secretary of state, but that's kind of how
5 forwards this to you and tips220)20partnership, 5	the account sentence reads.
6 that reporting e-mail or that e-m	ail address; 6	Q. Did you in fact, were you
7 correct?	7	involved in warning state and local election
8 A. Are you up on what p	age are you 8	officials about impersonation accounts spreading
9 on now?	9	false information about the election?
10 Q. Page 58 of the PDF, im	mediately 10	A. I'm sure I would have reviewed a
11 above, shows CIS forwarding th	at report from 11	document that went out along those lines. I'm
12 Colorado secretary of state's of	fice to both you 12	not aware of the document, but I'm sure if it
13 and tips@2020partnership.atlas	sian.net? 13	went out I would have reviewed it.
14 A. So Colorado sends to C	IS, CIS sends	Q. Do you remember reviewing it?
15 to me, CISA, and atlassian.net, o	okay. 15	A. They put out in 2020 we put out
16 Q. And you forward this o	nto to 16	a couple of joint FBI and CISA products. I
17 Twitter; correct, immediately ab	ove that? 17	don't remember specifically which one this is,
18 A. So again, there's no hea	ader, but 18	but it certainly sounds like something we would
19 the response is from Twitter, so the second of the response is from Twitter.	hat's what I 19	do.
20 assume.	20	Q. Okay. Scrolling down, there's
21 Q. And you they say y	ou say: 21	another one they're flagging here, that if you
22 Please see below reporting from	Colorado. These 22	didn't know, it has two followers; correct?
23 do not appear to be connected t	o the imposter 23	A. So it appears.
24 parody accounts previously sha	red; correct? 24	Q. And you forwarded that onto
25 A. Correct.	25	Twitter, and Twitter said: We'll escalate;
1 Q. And Twitter responds v		3
2 minutes: We will escalate. Tha		, ,
3 A. Correct.	3	
4 Q. Okay. And if you scrol		, , ,
5 couple pages, you see that Colo		
6 state's office has flagged some		A. Okay.
7 imposter accounts, including or		Q. Do you see here in the middle,
8 followers; correct?	8	here, it's an inquiry from Twitter, and she
9 A. What page are you on?		says: Hey Brian, can we talk about CIS
10 Q. 59 of the PDF.	10	misinformation reporting duplicate reports to
11 A. 59 of the PDF? I don't s		
12 you're talking about there. This i		
13 e-mail chain we were just talking		•
14 Q. Maybe look up at the s	·	. ,
15 can you see where secretary of 16 has forwarded a screen shot of		
16 nas forwarded a screen shot of account, it's got 14 followers?		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
· •	17	
	s office in	Ç .
19 Q. And secretary of state's		
20 Colorado says: These are conc 21 in Colorado because of their red		, ,
		•
 warnings about impersonation a A. That's what it says, yep. 	·	
23 A. That's what it says, yep. 24 Q. So they say that we're		•
25 this because it because it's th		
25 tillo bootade it because it s til	23	reports from ole and Ell :

52 (Pages 205 to 208)

Page 209		Page 211
A. I remember Twitter, in particular,	1	numbers were; right?
having that concern.	2	A. I don't know. I don't know if
Our screen is screwy again.	3	that's true.
	4	Q. Were you aware that EIP was using
record?	5	CIS's case numbers, because you said it in this
MR. SAUER: Yeah, we can go off the	6	e-mail?
record.	7	A. Yep, I mean, if that's what I
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now	8	wrote, that's probably what they were doing.
2:11 p.m. We're off the record.	9	Q. Okay. Do you remember discussing
(Recess.)	10	that with CIS or EIP that they were going to,
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now	11	you know, kind of share case numbers?
2:13 p.m. We are back on the record.	12	A. I don't recall any such
BY MR. SAUER:	13	specificity. I know we had a conversation. I
Q. Okay. So and then, Mr. Scully,	14	recall that we had conversations about how to
you responded to this: So here's the deal, EIP	15	de-duplicate, make sure we weren't overtaxing
will only report something to Twitter if they	16	Twitter, in particular.
have additional context to provided based on	17	Q. And that de-duplication process
their research; correct?	18	involved some kind of coordination between you,
A. That's what I wrote, yes.	19	EIP and CIS; correct?
Q. How did you know that was going to	20	A. Again, reading this, it appears we
be their policy or their practice, did you talk	21	are just making sure we are sending something
to EIP?	22	over and everybody is aware of it.
A. I would imagine I did.	23	Q. Right. So everybody would tell
Q. Who did you talk to?	24	everybody else that they were sending something
A. I don't recall.	25	over, and there was an attempt to avoid sending
Page 210		Page 212
		duplicative reports to Twitter?
		MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.
		BY MR. SAUER: Q. Correct?
• •		
•		A. Yeah, can you can you break that can you start that over again?
-		Q. Was there an agreement for EIP and
		CIS and CISA to coordinate and let each other
		know what they were reporting to platforms like
		Twitter?
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		A. I think that's generally right,
		yeah.
		MR. SAUER: Let me send you a
•		couple more exhibits, 10 and 11. I'm going to
• •		pull up 10 on the screen share while you're
one e-mail that did that. I don't remember it	16	waiting.
being a common thing but, again, I don't I	17	MR. GARDNER: John, do you John,
don't know. It's possible.	18	did you send them over?
Q. Okay. And then it says: EIP will	19	MR. SAUER: Yeah. They should be
continue to use the CIA CIS case number to	20	in your inbox.
		MR. GARDNER: Yeah, I'm looking.
facilitate identifying duplicative reports;	21	MIX. GARDINER. Tearl, Till looking.
facilitate identifying duplicative reports; correct?	22	MR. SAUER: They're in my sent box.
		_
correct?	22	MR. SAUER: They're in my sent box.
	THE REPORTER: Can we go off the record? MR. SAUER: Yeah, we can go off the record. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 2:11 p.m. We're off the record. (Recess.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 2:13 p.m. We are back on the record. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Okay. So and then, Mr. Scully, you responded to this: So here's the deal, EIP will only report something to Twitter if they have additional context to provided based on their research; correct? A. That's what I wrote, yes. Q. How did you know that was going to be their policy or their practice, did you talk to EIP? A. I would imagine I did. Q. Who did you talk to? A. I don't recall. Page 210 Q. And that he goes on or you go on to say, they will not send Twitter reporting unless it has that additional context that would help you make a decision; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then it says: EIP will also let CISA know when they are reporting something to you so I can give you a heads up; correct? A. Yep. Q. Is that what happened after this e-mail, did EIP report to you when they were reporting something to the social media platforms? A. I don't recall that, in practice. Although, obviously, we just went through each one e-mail that did that. I don't remember it being a common thing but, again, I don't I don't know. It's possible.	THE REPORTER: Can we go off the record? MR. SAUER: Yeah, we can go off the record. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 2:11 p.m. We're off the record. (Recess.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 2:13 p.m. We are back on the record. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Okay. So – and then, Mr. Scully, you responded to this: So here's the deal, EIP will only report something to Twitter if they have additional context to provided based on their research; correct? A. That's what I wrote, yes. Q. How did you know that was going to be their policy or their practice, did you talk to EIP? A. I would imagine I did. Q. Who did you talk to? A. I don't recall. Page 210 Q. And that he goes on – or you go on to say, they will not send Twitter reporting unless it has that additional context that would help you make a decision; correct? A. Yep. Q. And then it says: EIP will also let CISA know when they are reporting something to you so I can give you a heads up; correct? A. Yep. Q. Is that what happened after this e-mail, did EIP report to you when they were reporting something to the social media platforms? A. I don't recall that, in practice. Although, obviously, we just went through each one e-mail that did that. I don't remember it being a common thing but, again, I don't I don't know. It's possible.

53 (Pages 209 to 212)

	Page 213		Page 215
1	identification.)	1	Q. Do you see @FBI, if you look on the
2	BY MR. SAUER:	2	screen share, @FBI.gov?
3	Q. Let me ask this: Can you see it on	3	MR. GARDNER: Same objections.
4	the screen share?	4	BY MR. SAUER:
5	A. I can.	5	Q. With the handle omitted, three
6	MR. GARDNER: You haven't shared it	6	e-mails?
7	yet, John.	7	A. Okay.
8	THE WITNESS: Trick question.	8	Q. Were you aware of the FBI being
9	BY MR. SAUER:	9	involved in receiving misinformation reports
10	Q. Now can you see it on the screen	10	from state and local elections officials?
11	share?	11	A. Generally speaking, we tell
12	A. Yes.	12	election officials to report what they saw to
13	Q. Just looking here at the first	13	either DHS or the FBI, and it would end up where
14	page, you know, this exhibit is a collection of	14	it needed to be.
15	your switchboarding e-mails from November of	15	Q. So you told them to report it to
16	2020, do you see you, are copied here on	16	either DHS or the FBI?
17	misinformation report from CIS on November 2nd	17	A. Correct.
18	of 2020?	18	Q. Who at the FBI was receiving those
19	A. Yes.	19	kinds of reports?
20	Q. Once again, CIS continues to copy	20	A. I don't know. I think it
21	tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; do you see	21	Q. Go ahead.
22	that?	22	 A. Generally speaking, the FBI has
23	A. I do.	23	field offices, and so the idea was if they
24	 Q. Does that ring a bell for you about 	24	were election officials had established
25	what that e-mail is, after we talked about that	25	relationships with the FBI field office and the
	Page 214		Page 216
1	last e-mail, where you were arranging to	1	elections coordinator in that office, and that's
2	coordinate with EIP about de-duplicating reports	2	where they wanted to report it, that they could
3	to social media platforms?	3	do so.
4	A. I forget. I don't recall the	4	Q. So there was these FBI officials
5	e-mail. If you tell me that that was the tips	5	tended to be FBI field officers officers?
6	for the 2020 EIP I would believe you.	6	A. I don't want to speculate, but
7	Q. Okay. Let me scroll down a page to	7	but again, that was, you know, us trying to
8	Bates 13603.	8	to help the election officials, just if they had
9	A. What page was that? I'm sorry.	9	something they needed to report, if they had as
10	Q. Bates 13603, 10 of the PDF.	10	many different options to do that as possible.
11	A. Okay.	11	Q. Okay. Do you know what FBI did
12	Q. You see here there's a report from	12	with its misinformation reports, was it
13	the lowa secretary of state's office on November	13	switchboarding them like you guys were doing?
14	2nd, that's sent to CIS; do you see that?	14	A. I don't know, to be honest.
15	A. Just scrolling through it, sorry.	15	Q. Is that notion that you could
16	Give me a second. Yes.	16	forward things to the FBI, is that something
17	Q. And then it looks like the lowa	17	that was discussed in those USG
18	secretary of state's office also sent this to	18	industry-specific meetings you talked about?
19	three FBI e-mail addresses; right, with the	19	A. I not that I recall, but it's
20	recipients redacted, FBI number two, FBI number	20	possible we we talked to them about the
21	three, and FBI number four; correct?	21	guidance we gave to election officials, that
22	MR. GARDNER: Lack of objection,	22	election officials could it either way, but I
		1 00	don't recall specific conversations along those
23	lack of foundation.	23	don't recall specific conversations along those
23 24	A. I don't see the e-mail addresses	23	lines.

54 (Pages 213 to 216)

	Page 217		Page 219
1	of the PDF.	1	poll worker, or B, that he did not, in fact,
2	A. Let's go. Okay.	2	destroy ballots or at least there's no evidence
3	Q. If you look here, kind of at the	3	he did.
4	bottom of this text chain, Aaron Wilson, he's	4	So Facebook asked you, Brian Scully
5	your contact at CIS; right?	5	and Matt Masterson, for that clarification;
6	A. Correct.	6	right?
7	Q. And he's forwarding something to	7	A. They did.
8	November 3rd, with a report about alleged	8	Q. Yeah, and then you responded: Not
9	election misinformation; right?	9	sure I understand the distinction you're trying
10	A. Well, poll worker Erie PA says	10	to make, but both components of the narrative
11	announces on Instagram they will throw away	11	are false. The person is not a poll worker and
12	Pro-Trump votes, that's what you're talking	12	no ballots were destroyed. I suppose that makes
13	about?	13	the entire thing a hoax; correct?
14	Q. Yeah.	14	
	•		A. Yeah, that was my response.
15	A. That's the subject of the e-mail.	15	Q. What was your basis for concluding
16	Q. He uses the EIP case number for	16	that both components of the narrative were false?
17	this report; correct?	17	
18	A. He does.	18	A. I believe the statements from
19	Q. And he sent it to CISA at the CFITF	19	Pennsylvania. I assume if you have that
20	e-mail; correct?	20	document we can take a look and confirm.
21	A. He does, correct.	21	Q. You read the statement from
22	Q. And the CFITF e-mail forwards it to	22	Pennsylvania and reported its content back to
23	you, and you forward it to Matt Masterson at	23	Facebook?
24	Facebook; correct?	24	A. Correct.
25	A. No, that's not correct. I Matt	25	Q. Okay. Did you did that happen
	Page 218		Page 220
1	was still at CISA at the time. I forwarded it	1	from time to time, where you wouldn't just
2	to Saleela Salahuddin at Facebook.	2	forward the disinformation concern, but then you
3	Q. Copying Matt Masterson?	3	would provide, you know, information that would
4	A. I'm sorry?	4	help debunk it through the social media network?
5	Q. Copying Matt Masterson?	5	A. I think I frame it a little
6	A. Yeah, who was at CISA. You said he	6	differently, if social media platforms needed
7	was at Facebook. I just wanted to make sure	7	additional information from an election official
8	that that was clear that he was still	8	we would try to support that. There was also
9	Q. I'm sorry, I meant to say and	9	one time when I believe it was Facebook had a
10	Facebook, not at Facebook?	10	question about DHS immigration and customs
11	A. Gotcha.	11	enforcement having agents going places where we
12	Q. And then Facebook came back to you	12	also provided a response back on a specific
13	for clarification; right? Do you recall that?	13	piece.
14	A. So we sorry, go ahead.	14	But generally speaking, we would do
15	Q. Go ahead, what were you going to	15	what we did here, which is if the if the
16	say?	16	jurisdiction made a public statement or if there
17	A. I said, just to be clear, we	17	was additional information the jurisdiction
18	forwarded the statement from Pennsylvania about	18	could provide, and the platforms asked for it,
19	that incident to Facebook and Matt Masterson.	19	that we would try to facilitate getting the
	Q. And so	20	information they asked for.
20			•
21	A. That's what is here.	21	Q. Did you merely relay that
22	Q. And they and it looks like	22	information, the sort of debunking information
23	Facebook asked you, could you please confirm	23	from the election official, would you sometimes
24	that, A, the worker in question who was	24	find it on your own and helpfully supply it to
25	supposedly destroying Pro-Trump ballots is not a	25	the social media platform?

	Page 221		Page 223
1	A. If it was a public statement, I'm	1	Q. And here in this e-mail chain it
2	sure we pulled it ourselves. If there was not a	2	looks like it's another situation where Twitter
3	public statement, I would imagine we would go	3	asked for some clarification, for example, she
4	back to the election official.	4	says, on November 6th, have Pennsylvania state
5	Q. But you might	5	officials provided initial information to you on
6	A. I don't know	6	the authenticity of the video or the
7	Q. Go ahead.	7	circumstances under underpinning it; do you
8	A. Sorry, I don't want to say that	8	see that?
9	every case was exactly like that, but again, if	9	A. I do.
10	there was a public statement that was put out by	10	Q. And then you respond, scrolling
11	the jurisdiction, we would we would defer to	11	back up, you say: There are two reports in the
12	that.	12	e-mail chain, and you explain what you
13	Q. Did you take any steps to find	13	understand what Pennsylvania is saying about the
14	out for example, suppose there's a public	14	disputed information; right?
15	statement that disputes what a private citizen	15	A. Sorry, I'm just scrolling down to
16	has said on Facebook or Twitter, would you do	16	make sure I understand the context of the chain.
17	further research to figure out who was telling	17	Okay. Sorry. Could you repeat the
18	the truth or would you just relay the official	18	question?
19	government explanation of the incident to the	19	Q. Sure. My question is: You
20	social media platforms?	20	provided clarification to the social media
21	A. We would relay the the official	21	platform about what you believe the Pennsylvania
		22	reporter meant; correct?
22	statement from the jurisdiction.	23	A. I don't believe that is correct.
23	Q. I take it sometimes you would go		
24	find that official statement on your own, and	24	Q. Well, did you say, for example, on
25	sometimes you would reach out to the state or	25	the authenticity Pennsylvania states in the very
	Page 222		Page 224
1	local jurisdiction to see if they issued a	1	first e-mail that they believe the videos are
2	statement?	2	false and we're reaching out to our partners to
3	A. Yeah, we would find, I think it	3	validate; correct?
4	implies that we were doing a rigorous search.	4	A. Correct.
5	Generally, we would be aware if a jurisdiction	5	Q. Okay. And then, later that day, if
6	put out a statement and we would just pull it	6	you scroll up, you say: Hey, to Twitter, just
7	ourselves.	7	came across this debunk of the video on Twitter;
8	Q. Look ahead to	8	correct?
9	A. And sometimes	9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Go ahead.	10	Q. And then so you are looking
11	A. Sorry.	11	around to find information that would debunk it;
12	Sometimes we would reach out to the	12	correct?
13	jurisdiction and they would just provide the	13	A. I don't know if that's correct.
14	statements that they had already made public, as	14	It's possible somebody just let us know that
15	well.	15	there was something there.
16	Q. Would you relay that to the social	16	Q. And then 17 minutes later Twitter
17	media platform?	17	responds, thank you so much, we applied a label
18	A. Yeah, if they were asking for	18	to the tweet; correct?
19	additional information we would.	19	A. Yes, that's what they said back,
20		20	correct.
	Q. Here's another one, page 35 of the PDF, Bates 8663. Do you see that on the screen	21	
21			Q. Scroll down to page 8669.
22	share?	22	A. What page of the PDF?
23	A. I'm scrolling down to it. 8663? Q. Yeah.	23	Q. 46.
~ ^	11 4030	24	A. 46?
24 25	A. Yep.	25	Q. Yes. And here you've got a

56 (Pages 221 to 224)

	Page 225		Page 227
1	misinformation report from the secretary of	1	BY MR. SAUER:
2	state of Arizona's office; do you see that?	2	Q. Timeframe?
3	A. Yes.	3	A. So was Twitter working on it well
4	Q. It says: This post is on a private	4	into the evening? I mean, I guess. Were we?
5	Facebook page, above. I've included a screen	5	Again, if somebody was checking the phone, most
6	shot; correct?	6	of the post-election stuff would have been me.
7	A. That's what the Arizona e-mail	7	We would have done something with it, but it
8	says, yep.	8	wasn't a requirement.
9	Q. How did they was that unusual	9	(Exhibit No. 11 was marked for
10	for them to report statements on a private	10	identification.)
11	Facebook page?	11	BY MR. SAUER:
12	A. I don't I don't know. We didn't	12	Q. And showing you Exhibit 11, which
13	do any analysis of that kind.	13	<u> </u>
			should be in your inbox.
14	Q. Okay. So you don't know whether someone was monitoring how posts appeared on a	14	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, I think that's
15	•	15	right.
16	private Facebook page containing alleged	16	A. Okay.
17	misinformation?	17	Q. On the last page of this PDF,
18	A. I don't know how Arizona secretary	18	there's an e-mail from Aaron Wilson?
19	of state came across that information, no.	19	MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, John, do
20	Q. Dropping ahead to page 864, now.	20	you want to post it on the screen?
21	Here at 954	21	MR. SAUER: Oh, thank you.
22	A. I'm sorry.	22	MR. GARDNER: You don't need to, if
23	Q. Sorry.	23	you don't want to, I mean, we have the
24	A. 54?	24	MR. SAUER: I got it, I mean, I
25	Q. Oh, sorry, page 54 of the PDF, yes,	25	thought it was up.
	Page 226		Page 228
1	sorry. Actually, no, I'm sorry, that's not the	1	BY MR. SAUER:
2	right page.	2	Q. Last see it, last page of the
3	A. Okay.	3	PDF, there's a report from CIS.
4	Q. No, sorry, page 59 of the PDF?	4	A. Yeah.
5	A. 59? Okay.	5	Q. Actually, this is, interstingly, a
6	Q. Here's a chain on Tuesday, November	6	report from CIS to Gwinnet County; right? Where
7	10th, at 7:23 in the evening, you forwarded a	7	they say: Hi Kristi, the EI-ISAC and our
8	report of information misinformation to	8	partners at the Election Integrity Partnership
9	Twitter; correct, at 7:23?	9	are tracking a social media post that's getting
10	A. Yeah, that's what appears, there's	10	traction very quickly; right?
11	no he header on the e-mail, but considering the	11	A. Yes, that's what the e-mail reads,
12	responses is from Twitter, I assume that's who I	12	yeah.
13	sent it to.	13	Q. So this is a situation where the
14	Q. And Twitter responds in two	14	reporting was actually originated by CIS or EIP
15	minutes, we will escalate; right?	15	or actually, according to this e-mail, both of
16	A. Yep.	16	them. They're the ones who noticed the
17	Q. And then Twitter responds here a	17	misinformation, online, first; right?
18	few minutes later, after midnight, at 12:11	18	MR. GARDNER: Objection to form.
Τ 0	•		BY MR. SAUER:
1 0	a.m., hey, we labeled all the tweets except two;	19	
19		20	Q. Correct?
20	right?		A Thousands at the standard the
20 21	A. Yes.	21	A. That's what that's what the
20 21 22	A. Yes. Q. So Twitter was working on this well	21 22	e-mail appears to say, yeah.
20 21 22 23	A. Yes. Q. So Twitter was working on this well into the evening, along with were you guys	21 22 23	e-mail appears to say, yeah. Q. And they reached out, you know,
20 21 22	A. Yes. Q. So Twitter was working on this well	21 22	e-mail appears to say, yeah.

57 (Pages 225 to 228)

Page 229	Page 231
1 A. Yeah, they're just trying to get	1 Q. Then you forward this on, having
2 what was actually going on, yeah.	2 received the report from CIS; right?
3 Q. Yeah, they say: We're tracking a	3 A. Yep.
4 social media post that's gaining traction very	4 Q. And then @Twitter reports back to
5 quickly. It's likely a misunderstanding, but	5 you, and says, they labeled the tweet and are
6 being portrayed as a nefarious act. If you can	6 taking steps to limit trending; right?
7 clarify for us what is being shown, if it even	7 A. Yes.
8 happened, we can work with the social media	8 Q. What does that mean to take steps
9 platforms to try to have the post removed as	9 to limit trending; do you know?
10 misinformation; correct?	10 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
11 A. Yeah, that's what he wrote.	11 speculation.
12 Q. And then Gwinnett County comes back	12 A. Yeah, I don't know. Twitter has a
with a a an explanation of the post;	13 range of tools that they use. I couldn't
14 correct?	possibly speculate on what they were doing here.
15 A. Yes.	15 Q. Let's put Exhibit 12 back up.
	16 These are the interrogatory
16 Q. And that's forwarded to Twitter by 17 CIS, along with their explanation; correct?	
, ,	17 responses.
18 Well, actually, before they report	18 MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on one
it to Twitter they report it to you; right?	19 second, John. You said 12?
Here's there's an e-mail that says	20 MR. SAUER: Yeah.
A. Yeah.	MR. GARDNER: Hold on one second.
22 Q Brian and EIP	MR. SAUER: Go to page 38.
23 A. Yes.	23 THE WITNESS: 38.
24 Q. Right? So Brian	MR. SAUER: Yeah, if you would.
25 A . Yep .	25 THE WITNESS: Okay. I'm on page
Page 230	Page 232
1 Q. And EIP is Election Integrity	1 38, John.
2 Partnership; right?	2 BY MR. SAUER:
3 A. Yep .	3 Q. Oh, sorry, I'm on page 28. My
4 Q. And that's what CIS says, and they	4 mistake.
5 sent this to	5 A. All right.
6 A. Yes.	6 Q. 38 asks that here, you see where it
7 Q your e-mail, two CISA e-mails,	7 says CISA, and it says: CISA responds that
8 their own e-mail and	8 meetings taking place with the social media
9 tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; right?	9 platforms relating to misinformation include,
10 A. Yep.	10 but are not limited to, and then there's a
Q. So they sent this e-mail, where	11 bullet list; right?
12 they say: Brian and EIP, to you, two CISA	12 A. I think that is 38, not 28.
13 accounts, their own account, and	13 Q. Yeah, it should be on page 38?
14 tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; right?	14 A. Sorry. I thought you said 28. Let
15 A. Yep.	15 me get back down there.
16 Q. So it appears that that	16 Q. Oh, I meant I was mistaken.
17 tips@2020partnership e-mail is an EIP e-mail;	17 A. Okay. So there's a table, am I
18 right?	18 looking below the table or above the table?
ı ±∪ II y III.	19 Below the table?
_	
MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and	1 20 O Yeah
MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and answered, multiple times.	20 Q. Yeah.
MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and answered, multiple times. BY MR. SAUER:	21 A. Got you. Okay.
19 MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and 20 answered, multiple times. 21 BY MR. SAUER: 22 Q. Does that refresh your memory?	21 A. Got you. Okay. 22 Q. Okay.
 MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and answered, multiple times. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Does that refresh your memory? A. I wouldn't say refreshes my memory, 	A. Got you. Okay. 22 Q. Okay. A. I'm sorry, what am I looking for?
19 MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and 20 answered, multiple times. 21 BY MR. SAUER: 22 Q. Does that refresh your memory?	21 A. Got you. Okay. 22 Q. Okay.

58 (Pages 229 to 232)

	Page 233		Page 235
1	relating to misinformation in responding to	1	that say we're having, speaking along those
2	discovery requests?	2	lines, the other federal partners, if they had
3	A. Yes, I believe I was.	3	any, again, kind of strategic, unclassified.
4	Q. What meetings did you identify?	4	Intelligence reporting that they felt was
5	 A. Certainly these, the recurring 	5	relevant, they might share that. And then the
6	meetings listed here, that we talked about, the	6	platforms, I don't know what they were sharing
7	preparation meeting we talked about, going	7	generally. I don't probably just general
8	through the list, MDM, joint MDM working group,	8	trends that they might be seeing on the
9	I think I missed those are the ones I would	9	platforms, but I don't recall specifically what
10	have identified.	10	they talked about.
11	Q. Start with the first one, first	11	Q. And all these things that they
12	bullet point, a recurring meeting usually	12	share are related to election misinformation and
13	entitled USG industry meeting, which has	13	misinformation on social media platforms?
14	generally had a monthly cadence; right?	14	 A. No. It also included cyber
15	A. Yep.	15	security, in fact, I would say most of it I
16	Q. And that is the one that you refer	16	wouldn't say most of it a lot of it was cyber
17	to as the sync meeting between industry and	17	security. And then there was a little bit on
18	social media platforms; correct? I'm sorry,	18	any physical threats that were occurring.
19	industry	19	Q. So that that's if someone was
20	A. Right. Yes, that's correct.	20	actually threatening poll workers, something
21	Q. And you list there, I think seven	21	like that?
22	or eight social media platforms, and the	22	A. Correct.
23	response, Google, Facebook, Twitter, Reddit,	23	 Q. And so in addition to physical
24	Microsoft, and then Verizon Media, Pinterest,	24	threats, there were cyber security and issues
25	LinkedIn and Wiki Media Foundation; correct?	25	related to misinformation and disinformation?
1	Page 234 A. Right, that's correct.	1	Page 236 A. Correct.
2	Q. And when you say this generally has	2	Q. Is anything else discussed in these
3			
	a had a monthly cadence, in fact, far away	3	meetings?
4	a had a monthly cadence, in fact, far away from elections it was only quarterly, and then	3 4	meetings? A. I mean, I think those are the
			•
4	from elections it was only quarterly, and then	4	A. I mean, I think those are the
4 5	from elections it was only quarterly, and then it became monthly close to elections, and became	4 5	A. I mean, I think those are the main main topics that I recall.
4 5 6	from elections it was only quarterly, and then it became monthly close to elections, and became weekly before the 2020 election; right? A. I would say from summer of 2018 to	4 5 6	A. I mean, I think those are the main main topics that I recall. Q. Was was the risk of hack and
4 5 6 7	from elections it was only quarterly, and then it became monthly close to elections, and became weekly before the 2020 election; right?	4 5 6 7	A. I mean, I think those are the main main topics that I recall. Q. Was was the risk of hack and leak operations or hack and dump operations
4 5 6 7 8	from elections it was only quarterly, and then it became monthly close to elections, and became weekly before the 2020 election; right? A. I would say from summer of 2018 to 2020 they were to early 2020 they were	4 5 6 7 8	A. I mean, I think those are the main main topics that I recall. Q. Was was the risk of hack and leak operations or hack and dump operations discussed in these meetings?
4 5 6 7 8 9	from elections it was only quarterly, and then it became monthly close to elections, and became weekly before the 2020 election; right? A. I would say from summer of 2018 to 2020 they were to early 2020 they were quarterly. Sometime in 2020 they became monthly	4 5 6 7 8 9	A. I mean, I think those are the main main topics that I recall. Q. Was was the risk of hack and leak operations or hack and dump operations discussed in these meetings? A. I don't I don't recall a
4 5 6 7 8 9	from elections it was only quarterly, and then it became monthly close to elections, and became weekly before the 2020 election; right? A. I would say from summer of 2018 to 2020 they were to early 2020 they were quarterly. Sometime in 2020 they became monthly and then as we got closer to the election in	4 5 6 7 8 9	A. I mean, I think those are the main main topics that I recall. Q. Was was the risk of hack and leak operations or hack and dump operations discussed in these meetings? A. I don't I don't recall a specific incident of that, but it's definitely
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	from elections it was only quarterly, and then it became monthly close to elections, and became weekly before the 2020 election; right? A. I would say from summer of 2018 to 2020 they were to early 2020 they were quarterly. Sometime in 2020 they became monthly and then as we got closer to the election in 2020 they became weekly. Q. Why did they become weekly close to the election? A. They were mostly just touch points	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	A. I mean, I think those are the main main topics that I recall. Q. Was was the risk of hack and leak operations or hack and dump operations discussed in these meetings? A. I don't I don't recall a specific incident of that, but it's definitely possible. It's a tactic that had been used in the past. Q. Did you remember you raising concerns about hack and leak operations?
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	Page 237		Page 239
1	A. Not specifically, no.	1	misinformation and disinformation issues?
2	Q. How about on the industry side,	2	A. Yeah, again, I don't know if that's
3	anyone from the social media platforms	3	what they called it, but that was kind of our
4	discussing hack and leak operations?	4	interpretation of it. I think they used
5	A. Yeah, unfortunately, I just don't	5	coordinated and in-authenticated or so, but I
6	have that kind of recollection of conversations.	6	don't recall if Twitter if Twitter
7	So no, I don't specifically remember that.	7	articulated it.
8	Again, it's possible, and I wouldn't be	8	Q. You would view those briefings in
9	surprised.	9	those bilateral meetings with Twitter as
10	Q. How about Elvis Chan, you know who	10	relating to misinformation and disinformation on
11	he is; right?	11	social media?
12	A. I do.	12	A. Yeah, some of that, and some of it
13	Q. Did he ever do you remember him	13	I'm sure kind of talking him through how
14	ever talking about hack and leak issues in these	14	elections work, because a lot of education they
15	meetings in 2020?	15	weren't super familiar with the election
16	A. Again, I don't have any specific	16	administration, how they worked, and a different
17	recollection of that, but it's always possible,	17	role and responsibility, you know, about
18	for sure.	18	elections. So again, we tried to educate as
19	Q. How about Matt Masterson?	19	much as we could.
20	A. Same answer, you know, it's	20	Q. Were there bilateral meetings with
21	possible, but I don't recall specific	21	other social media platforms, like this, where
22	conversations.	22	misinformation was discussed in any way?
23	Q. Let me e-mail you a couple more	23	A. Yeah, again, generally, from a
24	exhibits.	24	relationship-building standpoint, particularly
25	A. Sure.	25	early on in the process, we would meet we met
1	Page 238 Q. Do you know Yoel Roth is?	1	Page 240 with the platforms just to talk about kind of
2	A. Yes, I know who Yoel Roth is.	2	what our role, what we would do, kind of how the
3	Q. Do you know him personally?	3	relationship should act.
4	A. Only in the fact that I've met him	4	So just as an example, we could
5	a couple times. He was at meetings, you know,	5	relate to the K-theoretical. You know, in those
6	some of these synch meetings he would be at.	6	meetings we wanted to make sure that the
7	Q. Were these meetings related to	7	platforms understood we would never ask them to
8	misinformation with CISA?	8	undertake any specific actions. So we would
9	A. Again, these are regular sync	9	reiterate that in all of our meetings. And, you
10	meetings that we talked about, it's also I do	10	know, that was something we continued throughout
11	recall we had some Twitter-only calls, as well,	11	the process.
12	that he participated in, so again, it's general	12	We would educate them on on
13	meetings would be of conversations.	13	elections, as I mentioned. We would talk to
14	Q. What was what was discussed in	14	them a little bit about our resilience-building
15	the Twitter-only meetings?	15	work, as I discussed. They would just kind
16	A. Similar, basic	16	of again, relationship-building type stuff,
17	relationship-building stuff would be some of it,	17	very general kind of conversations.
1.8	so, you know, just going and making sure we know	18	Q. What you describe as the process,
19	who's who, and having conversations about, you	19	is that the process of, you know, referring
20	know, just relationship-building sides. I also	2.0	disinformation concerns to them, that we've been
21	believe we had some briefings from them on some	21	talking about today?
	of their public reports, if I recall correctly,	22	A. We did have conversations, but I
22			
23	so things like that. There wasn't a ton of	23	think I was referring to the election processes,
	so things like that. There wasn't a ton of them. Q. Is this public reporting related to	23 24 25	think I was referring to the election processes, how the election processes worked. Q. You said early, when you said early

60 (Pages 237 to 240)

	Page 241		Page 243
1	in the process, you meant early in the election	1	BY MR. SAUER:
2	process?	2	Q. There's a list of five bullet
3	A. Oh, yeah, sorry.	3	points.
4	Q. You would have you had meetings	4	A. Okay. I'm sorry, what was your
5	with bilateral meetings with Twitter and	5	question?
6	Facebook and other social media companies?	6	Q. Can you show me where on this
7	A. Right. So in 2018 we didn't have	7	interrogatory response you disclosed, for
8	any relationships with the platforms, at all.	8	example, bilateral meetings between CISA and
9	So in our initial stages of trying to build	9	Twitter or CISA and Facebook relating to the
10	those relationships we would go meet with each	10	misinformation reporting that we've been talking
11	platform one-on-one, just to make sure we could	11	about?
12	kind of talk to, understand what their concerns	12	A. So I don't want to speak on behalf
13	are, and then, you know, basic	13	of whoever submitted the final product, but my
14	relationship-building stuff.	14	assumption would be that they would be on the
15	Q. Did those bilateral meetings happen	15	preparation meeting. But I'm not I'm not
16	in 2020, as well?	16	sure how they captured those in here.
17	A. I would say they probably	17	Q. Were those the same as preparation
18	probably had bilateral meetings in 2020. I'm	18	meetings for the USG industry meeting?
19	not remembering any specific, off the top of my	19	 A. I probably wouldn't consider them
20	head, but I believe prior to starting the	20	to be the same, but there's there are similar
21	switchboarding work, in 2020, we had	21	types of meetings.
22	conversations with each platform individually.	22	(Exhibit No. 13 was marked for
23	Q. Those would be when you talk about	23	identification.)
24	what you would be doing in the switchboarding	24	BY MR. SAUER:
25	area; right?	25	Q. Let's get Exhibit 13 back up.
	Page 242		Page 244
1	Yeah, kind of what we would be	1	Do you see this as a document filed
2	doing, and again, to reaffirm our position that	2	before the FEC, entitled: Declaration of Yoel
3	we would never ask them to take any specific	3	Roth?
4	actions, that they should make decisions based	4	A. Okay.
5	on their term of service.	5	Q. And scrolling, have you seen this
6	Q. So you're specifically talking	6	document before?
7	about the fact that you would be sending them	7	A. I have not.
8	reports about disinformation during the election	8	Q. Scroll down to paragraph 11. Start
9	cycle?	9	with paragraph 10. Mr. Roth says in this
10	A. Yeah, we would be forwarding them	10	declaration, he says, since 2018 I have had
11	reports from different election officials, yeah.	11	regular meetings with the office of the director
12	Q. Just putting Exhibit 12 back up,	12	of National Intelligence, the Department of
13	here.	13	Homeland Security, the FBI, and industry peers
14	Let me show you where in your	14	regarding election security; right?
15	interrogatory responses you disclosed those	15	A. Yep.
16	bilateral meetings with social media platforms	16	Q. Was this a description of the
	here in	17	the sync meetings that we talked about today,
17		18	between US government and social media
18	MR. GARDNER: Hold on. We're	1	=
	MR. GARDNER: Hold on. We're we're pulling 12 back up, John. Hold on.	19	platforms?
18			platforms? MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
18 19	we're pulling 12 back up, John. Hold on. MR. SAUER: Page 38 to 39, it	19	•
18 19 20	we're pulling 12 back up, John. Hold on.	19 20	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
18 19 20 21	we're pulling 12 back up, John. Hold on. MR. SAUER: Page 38 to 39, it actually goes onto 40.	19 20 21	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of foundation, calls for speculation.
18 19 20 21 22	we're pulling 12 back up, John. Hold on. MR. SAUER: Page 38 to 39, it actually goes onto 40. MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on. Whoa	19 20 21 22	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of foundation, calls for speculation. BY MR. SAUER:
18 19 20 21 22 23	we're pulling 12 back up, John. Hold on. MR. SAUER: Page 38 to 39, it actually goes onto 40. MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on. Whoa whoa, whoa, whoa, yeah, almost there. You said	19 20 21 22 23	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of foundation, calls for speculation. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you see that?

61 (Pages 241 to 244)

	Page 245		Page 247
1	certain what he's talking about.	1	Q. Do you recall that being
2	Q. No? Since 2018 has the Department	2	communicated in any of these sync meetings?
3	of Homeland Security had regular meetings with	3	A. Again, it's I don't remember
4	social media platforms	4	specifics, but it would not surprise me if this
5	A. Yep.	5	was discussed.
6	Q ODNI and the FBI?	6	Q. Next sentence, Mr. Roth says:
7	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	7	These expectations of hack and leak operations
8	foundation.	8	were discussed throughout 2020.
9	A. Yes.	9	Does that ring a bell? Do you
10	Q. Yes, it has, because you've	10	recall this being raised multiple times and
11	testified about them repeatedly today, so there	11	repeatedly in these sync meetings?
12	obviously is a foundation, isn't there?	12	A. Again, it's the same response. I
13	You have been personally involved	13	don't have specific memories of every item that
14	in multiple meetings, these sync meetings,	14	was requested or very good memory of the
15	between USG and industry, and they involve seven	15	conversations, in general. But I would
16	or eight social media platforms, ODNI, the	16	definitely not be surprised if these were
17	Department of Homeland Security, specifically	17	included in those conversations.
18	CISA, and the FBI, didn't they?	18	Q. Okay. And then the very next
19	A. We had regular meetings, as I	19	sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned
20	talked about. Whether or not that is what Yoel	20	in these meetings that there were rumors that a
21	is also talking about, here, I can't say. But I	21	hack and leak operation would involve Hunter
22	don't think that's a bad inference to make.	22	Biden; do you see that?
23	Q. Okay. Scroll down to paragraph 11:	23	A. I do.
24	During these weekly meetings the federal law	24	Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter
25	enforcement agencies communicated that they	25	Biden in any of these meetings with social media
	Page 246		Page 248
1	expected hack and leak operations by state	1	platforms?
2	actors might occur in the period shortly before	2	A. I don't.
3	the 2020 presidential election, likely in	3	Q. So you don't know do you do
4	October; do you see that?	4	you dispute that Mr. Roth remembers it
5	A. Yes.	5	correctly?
6	Q. Do you recall that kind of	6	A. I mean, I have no basis to dispute
7	communication occurring in any of these sync	7	or not dispute.
8	meetings that occurred in 2020?	8	Q. Okay.
9	A. Again, I don't specifically recall.	9	A. These aren't topics that CISA would
10	But as I said earlier, it's certainly possible,	10	be briefing on, so it's possible another agency
11	because it was a common tactic.	11	did brief on them.
12	Q. But you don't remember any federal	12	Q. How about the FBI, do you remember
13	agencies talking about hack and leak operations	13	the FBI, Laura Dehmlow and Elvis Chan, saying
14	in these meetings, but you don't dispute that it	14	anything about Hunter Biden during these
15	could have happened?	15	meetings?
16	A. That's correct, yes.	16	A. I don't.
17	Q. Okay. Next sentence, Mr. Roth	17	Q. How about ODNI?
18	says: I was told in these meetings that the	18	A. I don't, no.
19	intelligence community expected that individuals	19	Q. How about DOJ, national security
20	associated with political campaigns would be	20	division?
21	subject to hacking attacks, and that the	21	A. I don't, no.
22	material obtained through those hacking attacks	22	Q. This is dated December 17th, 2020,
23	would likely be disseminated over social media	23	so that would have been within a couple of
24 25	platforms, including Twitter; do you see that? A. I do.	24 25	months of these meetings, a month or two of the last meeting; is that right?
	0 100	1 75	iaet mooting, is that tight?

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1 A. I'm sorry, what was could you	_
**	1 Q. And then he was asked, how about
2 repeat that? I just want to make sure I	2 any other agency, not law enforcement. And he
3 understand what you're asking.	3 answered, as I mentioned, I believe CISA would
4 Q. I was just scrolling down to the	4 have had the same concern as the FBI; right?
5 fourth page of the document, where it's dated	5 A. That was his response, yep.
6 December 17th, 2020.	6 Q. And I asked him: That was relayed
7 A. Oh.	7 through Mr. Masterson and Mr. Scully, I think
8 Q. Do you see that?	8 you said, correct? And he answered, correct;
9 A. Yep.	9 right?
10 Q. So this declaration would be	10 A. Okay. Yep.
11 executed close in time to the meetings that are	11 Q. Do you remember either you or
12 being discussed; correct?	12 Mr. Masterson relaying a concern about hack and
13 A. Correct.	13 leak operations in those meetings?
14 MR. SAUER: I'm going to e-mail you	14 A. I don't.
15 Exhibit 14.	15 Q. Next page of the document, page
	16 222, fourth page of the PDF, you testify: I
16 MR. GARDNER: John, did you say 14? 17 MR. SAUER: Exhibit 14, yeah, do	17 believe that the senior election official from
18 you have that?	18 ODNI would also flag flag that as a concern;
19 MR. GARDNER: Yeah, we already have	19 correct?
20 that, the deposition of Elvis Chan.	20 A. Yes. That's what he says, yes.
21 MR. SAUER: Yeah. Sorry, guys.	21 Q. Do you remember anyone from ODNI
22 (Exhibit No. 14 was marked for	22 raising a concern about hack and leak operations
23 identification.)	23 in these meetings?
24 BY MR. SAUER:	24 A. Again, as I said in your previous
25 Q. This is the third page of this	25 questions, I don't recall specifics, but it
20 Q . This is the unit page of the	
Page 250	Page 252
1 document.	1 wouldn't surprise me if if they were
2 A. Okay.	2 mentioned.
3 Q. There's an exchanges here where Mr.	3 MR. SAUER: I'm sending you Exhibit
4 Chan is asked he refers to the federal law	4 15 by e-mail.
5 enforcement agencies, plura, in that sentence,	5 (Exhibit No's. 15, 16 and 17 were
6 do you see that answer, yes; do you see where	6 marked for identification.)
7 that is?	7 MR. GARDNER: John, are you
8 A. Line four?	8 intending to screen share?
9 Q. Yeah.	9 MR. SAUER: Yeah, I'm doing that
10 A. Is that what you're referring to?	10 right now.
11 Yeah, you're referring to the	11 MR. GARDNER: We're still waiting
12 question at line four?	12 for the exhibit.
13 Q. Right.	13 MR. SAUER: Sorry. I think I got
14 A. Okay. Yeah, I see that.	14 my exhibits switched up. Yeah, here, I'm
15 Q. And Mr. Chan was asked the question	15 showing you exhibit I think it will be
16 on line eight, whether other federal law	16 Exhibits 15, 16 and 17. You know, the one that
17 enforcement agencies, other than the FBI, talked	17 I thought was 15 is 16, the one that I thought
18 about hack and leak operations; do you see that?	18 was 16 is 15, so I'm showing you Exhibit 16.
19 A. Ido.	19 MR. GARDNER: So when we receive
20 Q. And he says he doesn't think of any	20 your e-mail do you want us to pull up the
21 other federal law enforcement agencies, there at	21 document marked 16?
22 line 15. The only federal law enforcement	MR. SAUER: Yeah, you should have
agency I remember conveying our concern about	23 received it already.
24 hack and leak operations was the FBI; right?	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, not yet.
25 A. That's his response, correct.	25 MR. SAUER: There should be an

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	Page 253		Page 255
1	e-mail with 15, 16 and 17 all attached.	1	Q. Does that refresh your memory, at
2	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, not yet.	2	all, about hack and leak operations being raised
3	MR. SAUER: Really? Well	3	at these sync meetings in 2020?
4	MR. GARDNER: Oh, here we go.	4	A. Again, I don't have any specific
5	Do you want us to pull up 16 first?	5	recollections of the conversations. But as I
6	MR. SAUER: Yeah.	6	said a few times, now, it doesn't surprise me
7	MR. GARDNER: Okay. John, I have	7	that they would discuss the common tactic used
8	15 here, and I got set up I see what's	8	globally.
9	happening. Hold on. Yeah, sorry.	9	Q. Were you aware of any pending
10	MR. SAUER: It's a one-page e-mail,	10	investigations, at that time, into possible
11	it should be up.	11	hack actual possible hack and leak
12	MR. GARDNER: Yep. Yeah.	12	operations?
13	BY MR. SAUER:	13	A. No.
14	Q. Here's a Mr. Scully, you see an	14	Q. I'm showing you what should be
15	e-mail here from Facebook to you and	15	Exhibit 15.
16	Mr. Masterson, as well as Allison Snell and	16	MR. GARDNER: Got it.
17	Geoff Hale; correct?	17	THE WITNESS: Okay.
18	A. I do.	18	BY MR. SAUER:
19	Q. And there it indicates that there	19	Q. And here's an e-mail from Lauren
20	it's called today's industry statement; right?	20	Protentis to people at Facebook and CISA, that
21	A. Joint industry statement.	21	refers to the prep USG industry called monthly,
22	Q. Right. And they say and	22	in the subject line; correct?
23	Facebook says to you, I wanted to ensure you had	23	A. Yes, correct.
24	the statement we will look to release following	24	Q. And I think you testified earlier
25	today's meeting; right?	25	that Facebook was kind of the point for the
2 3 4 5 6 7	Q. And then, under the joint industry statement, it talks about how there are these meetings that have been going on; right? A. Yes. Q. And then it says the majority of the statement says: At today's meeting we	2 3 4 5 6 7	meetings between CISA and Facebook to kind of set the agenda for the big monthly meeting that involved all the platforms and at least four agencies; right? A. That's correct, yeah. Q. Okay. Here it says, among other
8	specifically discussed three things; right?	8	things, industry prompts, themes, narratives,
9	A. Yes.	9	approaches you anticipate for races you think
10	Q. And the second one of those says:	10	will be targeted, right, is number two?
11	Ways to counter targeted attempts to undermine	11	A. Yes.
12	election conversation before, during, and after	12	Q. Okay. What's that talking about,
13	the election; right?	13	are they asking that industry to report back on
14	A. It does.	14	what themes and narratives on social media they
15	Q. And the industry statement goes on	15	anticipate may happen in certain election races?
16	to say: This includes preparing for possible	16	A. So I'm not I'm not sure what,
17	so-called hack and leak operations, attempted to	17	specifically, they were talking about here.
18	use platforms and traditional media to amplify	18	It's possible they were trying to understand if
19	unauthorized information drops; correct?	19	they were particularly they were being targeted
20	A. Correct.	20	by foreign actors, but I don't know, that's
21	Q. Does that and so the industry	21	Q. How about themes and narratives?
22	prepared a public statement saying that hack and	22	A. Yeah, I think that would be
23	leak operations were discussed at one of these	23	pretty
	4 .		
24	meetings; correct? A. Correct. Yes.	24 25	Q. Go ahead.A. I think that would be the same kind

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	BRIAN J. SCC	, L L 1	1/12/2025
	Page 257		Page 259
1	of idea. Again, as I mentioned earlier, in a	1	Q. How about do you remember themes
2	lot of these calls the intelligence community	2	and narratives being discussed, like, hey, we
3	would provide kind of high-level assessments of	3	expect people to be, you know, talking about
4	unclassified reporting that they had done.	4	expect, you know, social media postings to
5	Q. What does industry prompts mean?	5	reflect this theme or that narrative?
6	A. Generally speaking, it would be the	6	A. So I think there are two components
7	questions that industry had for government.	7	to this one. I believe there are some
8	Q. So industry	8	discussion about would we have seen historically
9	A. For	9	in the past, and may see going forward. So
10	Q. Go ahead.	10	so I believe there might have been some
11	A. Actually, let me rephrase. Sorry.	11	discussion around that.
12	I think in this case it's	12	And then if again, if the intel
13	it's I'm not sure, that's how I would have	13	communities had reporting talked about foreign
14	interpreted it, but based on where it is in the	14	actor efforts, they would share those.
15	agenda I'm not sure that's what Warren meant.	15	I don't recall, specifically, what
16	Q. In other words, these questions of	16	was discussed. So I I don't know if what
17	government for industry say, hey, social media	17	level of detail, if any, they got down to in
18	platforms tell us what themes, narratives,	18	those conversations.
19	approaches you're anticipating for the upcoming	19	And I'm not even to be honest,
20	election?	20	I'm not even sure if I attended this meeting. I
21	A. No, my my interpretation of this	21	think I either just got back from my detail or
22	is that it's industry questions for government,	22	it was right before I got back to my detail, so
23	because the government portion of the agenda.	23	I'm not sure I attended this one.
24	So industry, if possible, would like to hear	24	Q. I'm going to share Exhibit 17.
25	government's perspective on these questions.	25	A. Okay.
	Page 258		Page 260
1	Q. Did government share that with the	1	Q. And this is a collection of
2	social media platforms in these meetings? Did,	2	e-mails, again.
3	you know, the federal agencies talk about what	3	Here on the first page, in April of
4	themes and narratives and approaches they	4	2022, this year, Lauren Protentis is sharing the
5	anticipated on social media for election races?	5	agenda for one of these USG sync meetings. And,
6	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.	6	among other things, she says: One-pager
7	THE WITNESS: Yeah, can you just	7	reminder; do you know what she's talking about?
8	kind of break that question down for me?	8	A. Yeah, she we had asked industry
9	BY MR. SAUER:	9	to provide a one-page summary of their content
10	Q. In the actual meetings did the	10	moderation rules that we could share with
11	federal agencies provide information to the	11	election officials.
12	social media platforms about the themes and	12	Q. What's the purpose of that, a
13	narratives they anticipated seeing on social	13	one-page summary of their content moderation
14	media for particular races, election races?	14	rules?
15	A. I don't think it was ever broken	15	A. So we we would receive a lot of
16	down by particular races. I think there were	16	questions from election officials about how
17	again, there was intelligence. If there's	17	different platforms made decisions about their
1 /	5	18	terms of service. And we thought this was a way
18	intelligence that was unclassified they could be		
	intelligence that was unclassified they could be shared about, targets and things like that, the	19	to help the platforms be more transparent with
18 19	shared about, targets and things like that, the	1	to help the platforms be more transparent with election officials. So we asked them to just
18 19 20	shared about, targets and things like that, the intelligence community would share that.	19	
18 19 20 21	shared about, targets and things like that, the intelligence community would share that. But generally speaking, I don't	19 20 21	election officials. So we asked them to just
18 19 20	shared about, targets and things like that, the intelligence community would share that. But generally speaking, I don't think that we would necessary get down to the	19 20	election officials. So we asked them to just put together kind of a one-page summary.
18 19 20 21 22	shared about, targets and things like that, the intelligence community would share that. But generally speaking, I don't	19 20 21 22	election officials. So we asked them to just put together kind of a one-page summary. Q. A one-page summary of basically

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	Page 261		Page 263
1	election officials.	1	A. It's more of a so just taking a
2	Q. I take it, then, the election	2	step back, right, essentially what CISA does is
3	officials when they see something on social	3	it invites key stakeholders to CISA to
4	media that they view as disinformation or	4	facilitate information sharing about what's
5	misinformation would be educated on whether or	5	going on within the elections.
6	not it violates that platform's policy; is that	6	Most of it is cyber related, but
7	right?	7	the NAV and NAFTA that we talked about earlier
8	A. I'm not sure that was the full	8	were there, and so if they heard reporting up
9	expectation, but I think it was just to try to	9	through their members, they might mention it.
10	provide some transparency and some understanding	10	Generally speaking, you might
11	of how the platforms make a decision.	11	have in 2020 it was a little different,
12	Q. And why is it useful? I take it	12	because of COVID. But generally speaking, we
13	this was your idea, CISA's idea, not it	13	would have somebody from our team there who we
14	wasn't something that the election officials	14	would have a team kind of working on the chats.
15	have asked for?	15	And so the switchboard reporting
16	A. To be honest, it asks of maybe	16	might come in and in 2018, for example, our guy
17	before I returned, so I'm not entirely certain,	17	was sitting in the room, in 2020 I think I was
18	but I suspect it was some combination of	18	the only one in the room, maybe one other from
19	election officials asking. We got a lot of	19	our team. And then they would you know, so
20	questions over the years about that, and us	20	that's I don't know if that helps clarify.
21	just, you know, raising it with the platforms	21	think I just talked in mode right there.
22	the way they're trying to help the election	22	Q. When you say in the room, is there,
23	officials.	23	like, a physical location where CISA and NASED
24	Q. Jumping ahead, 15743, should be on	24	and NASS and social media platforms all have
25	the 7th page of the PDF, there's a discussion in	25	people or what room are we talking about?
23	the 7th page of the 1 DI , there 3 a discussion in	25	people of what room are we taking about:
	Page 262		Page 264
1	the April	1	A. Yeah, so in 2020, CISA had a room
2	MR. GARDNER: Are you at that now?	2	where we had some of our stakeholders attend in
3	THE WITNESS: Sorry, I just	3	person. I don't have a full list of who was
4	accidentally got out. I'm going to the page. I	4	
5	think I'm there.	1 7	there. It was obviously not substantial, due to
		5	there. It was obviously not substantial, due to COVID restrictions. But we would have federal
6	BY MR. SAUER:		COVID restrictions. But we would have federal
6 7		5	•
	BY MR. SAUER: Q. There's a discussion, a bullet point in the agenda for the August 2020 USG	5 6	COVID restrictions. But we would have federal partners, and we have NASS and NASED there. I don't know who else was there,
7 8	Q. There's a discussion, a bullet point in the agenda for the August 2020 USG	5 6 7 8	COVID restrictions. But we would have federal partners, and we have NASS and NASED there. I don't know who else was there, but I believe there was a couple other, you
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	Page 265		Page 267
1	they would handle them themselves, with the	1	A. So I didn't have a conversation,
2	platforms, but I'm sure there were examples of	2	myself, with CIS about it, so I'm not sure who
3	where they sent it to us.	3	told them not to do it.
4	Q. And then would you guys perform the	4	Q. Turning back to the 2022 election
5	same misinformation routing function and pass	5	day operation, was that another case where CISA,
6	that along to the platforms?	6	NASED, NASS, and other federal agencies all had
7	A. Yeah, correct.	7	representatives in one room?
8	Q. Okay. This happened again in 2022,	8	A. I I think there was some federal
9	was there an election-day operation?	9	representative there, like I said, most of that
10	 A. It was an election operation center 	10	would would be in the ops center. There were
11	in 2022. We didn't do switchboarding in 2022,	11	other nongovernment partners there, like like
12	as we discussed earlier.	12	I said, like the the vendors, election
13	Q. You say you didn't do	13	security, election system vendors and folks like
14	switchboarding in 2022, did you relay	14	that.
15	A. Correct.	15	Q. What what's the ops center?
16	Q misinformation or disinformation	16	A. That's essential, that's kind of
17	concerns to social media platforms at any time	17	the 24/7 situational awareness that CISA runs.
18	during the 2022 election cycle?	18	And my understanding is that it has liaisons
19	A. Not that I recall, no.	19	from across the federal agencies.
20	Q. How did the state and local	20	Q. And were you there at the at the
21	election officials relay those concerns to the	21	ops center in 2022 election day?
22	social media platforms, did they do a	2.2	A. So the room we would be in would be
23	A. Yeah, my understanding was	23	a separate room. We wouldn't actually be on the
24	two-fold, one, I think some of the platforms	24	ops center floor. We called it a situational
25	developed a little more robust infrastructure to	25	awareness room.
	Page 266		Page 268
1	engage with election officials, themselves. And	1	Q. On election were you there?
2	then I also believe that CIS was up and running,	2	A. I was in the situational awareness
3	but I'm not certain what kind of how it all	3	room on election day in 2022, yep.
		1	room on election day in 2022, yep.
4	worked.	4	Q. Any misinformation or
4 5	worked. Q. So you believed that CIS continued		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
	Q. So you believed that CIS continued to receive disinformation/misinformation reports	4	Q. Any misinformation or
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67 (Pages 265 to 268)

	Page 269		Page 271
1	social media platforms?	1	that changed.
2	A. I don't I don't know for	2	Q. Oh, you don't think she gave
3	certain. I would I would guess they did.	3	that that that briefing?
4	Q. Jumping ahead in Exhibit 17, page	4	A. I don't believe so, no.
5	14545, it's page 12 of the PDF, and here's an	5	Q. What kind of domestic adversarial
6	agenda from one of these sync meetings from July	6	actors is the FBI's foreign influence task force
7	of 2022; do you see that?	7	concerned about?
8	A. Is it 14545?	8	A. I don't know.
9	Q. Yeah, page 12 of the PDF.	9	Q. Let's jump ahead to page 7599.
10	A. Just making sure. Sorry, it's	10	MR. GARDNER: John, before we go
11	weird how it shows the pages here. Yeah, okay.	11	on, we've been going about two hours, again. I
12	Yep.	12	think now would probably be a good time for a
13	Q. And then Lauren Protentis, here, is	13	break.
14	circulating an agenda for a sync meeting;	14	MR. SAUER: I just got a few more
15	correct?	15	questions about this document. Can you keep
16	A. This looks like it's for a prep	16	going for a couple more minutes.
17	meeting.	17	MR. GARDNER: Sure, we can do that.
18	Q. Prep meeting? Okay.	18	BY MR. SAUER:
19	And then here in item four, it	19	Q. Let's just here, 7599.
20	says: CISA elections infrastructure risks,	20	A. What page are we on?
21	Scully; correct?	21	Q. That is page 16 of the PDF?
22	A. Yep.	22	A. Okay.
23	Q. So is that referring to the plan	23	Q. Do you see here on the bottom half
24	that you and do you have a briefing on	24	of the page, on July 1st, 2020, Facebook sends
25	election infrastructure risks at the big sync	25	e-mail to you and Matt Masterson, Matt and
	D 0=0		5 070
	Page 270		Page 272
1	meeting?	1	Brian, thank you so much for the outreach on our
2	A. Yeah, I believe normally Geoff Hale	2	next sync; right?
3	would do that, I believe this meeting Geoff was	3	A. Yep.
4	going to be unavailable, so they asked me to	4	Q. And then she gives a proposed
5	cover the election infrastructure portion of the	5	agenda for a meeting that she proposes having on
6	agenda.	6	July 15th of 2020; correct?
7	Q. Now, what you said about them, what	7	A. Yes.
8	does that mean, election infrastructure risks,	8	Q. And then, in that agenda, there's
9	does that refer to informational infrastructure?	9	an item here, under number two, that says:
10	A. No, that's again, that's kind of	10	Hack/leak and USG attribution speed/process; do
11	the broader understanding of how elections	11	you see that?
12	function, so the systems, physical security,	12	A. Yep.
13	things like that. It would just be an update on	13	Q. What was that referring to?
14	kind of where things stand across kind of the	14	A. I I don't recall. You know, I
15	broader election infrastructure community.	15	would have to speculate based on what it says
16	Q. Below that, item six, it says:	16	here.
17	FBI, domestic, adversarial actor update, down	17	Q. So you don't remember hack/leak
18	below; do you see that?	18	being put on the agenda for one of these
19	A. Ido.	19	meetings?
20	Q. Do you recall Laura Dehmlow giving	20	A. Again, as I said earlier, I don't
21	a briefing at that meeting you were at about a	21	remember all the agenda items on the meetings or
22	domestic adversarial actor?	22	specific discussion points. But I'm not
23	A. I don't, and I I if I recall	23	surprised that it's on here, no.
	and the same and t		
24	correctly, and I don't know if you have the actual agenda for the meeting, I think the	24 25	Q. Do you know why Facebook would have put that on?

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	Page 273		Page 275
1	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	1	A. I don't know for certain. I mean,
2	speculation.	2	I would have to go back. Do you have the actual
3	BY MR. SAUER:	3	agenda that we used for the meeting or just the
4	Q. If you know.	4	proposed one by by Facebook?
5	A. I don't know.	5	Q. No, let me ask you this: I take it
6	Q. And then what is	6	you you interpret, in the context of hack and
7	A. I mean, again	7	leak, USG attribution, USG is United States
8	Q. Go ahead.	8	government; right?
9	A. Sorry, just as I said, you know, a	9	A. Yeah, that's what I would assume it
10	few times, right, it's not surprising, it was a	10	is.
11	common tactic that was used globally. But I	11	Q. Attribution, I take it, is having
12	don't know why they if there was a specific	12	the USG, the government, figure out who did the
13	reason that they put it on here.	13	hack and the leak; right? That's what
14	Q. What how about that, in the	14	attribution means in this context?
15	second half of that line, USG attribution	15	A. Assuming I was connected to hack
16	speed/process; right? Do you know what that	16	and leak, I obviously don't know what this is
17	means?	17	specifically referring to, but if I were reading
18	A. I don't, CISA doesn't do	18	that bullet point that's how I would read it,
19	attributions, so I'm not sure what that could be	19	that the attribution was USG attributing a hack
20	related to.	20	and leak.
21	Q. Attribution, when you say CISA does	21	Q. Okay. And then the question is
22	not do attribution, what does that mean?	22	how how fast speed and how USG would go about
23	A. Well, the way I would look at	23	doing it; right, speed/process?
24	attribution would be attributing specific actors	24	A. Again, that's what the agenda says.
25	to something.	25	I don't know exactly what that means.
_	Page 274		Page 276
1	Q. That was	1	MR. SAUER: Let's take a break
2	A. In the MDM context CISA does not do	2	there.
3	attribution.	3	MR. GARDNER: 10 minutes good?
4	Q. So attribution is figuring out who is the actual source of the social media	4	MR. SAUER: Yeah. How long have we
			h
5		5	been on the record.
6	posting?	6	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
6 7	posting? A. I mean, if you're talking about a	6 7	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:34 p.m. We are off the record.
6 7 8	posting? A. I mean, if you're talking about a social media posting, that would be attribution.	6 7 8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:34 p.m. We are off the record. (Recess.)
6 7 8 9	posting? A. I mean, if you're talking about a social media posting, that would be attribution. If you're talking about hack and leak, I assume	6 7 8 9	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:34 p.m. We are off the record. (Recess.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
6 7 8 9 10	posting? A. I mean, if you're talking about a social media posting, that would be attribution. If you're talking about hack and leak, I assume that would be known as the attribution to who	6 7 8 9 10	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:34 p.m. We are off the record. (Recess.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:50. We are back on the record.
6 7 8 9 10 11	posting? A. I mean, if you're talking about a social media posting, that would be attribution. If you're talking about hack and leak, I assume that would be known as the attribution to who the hacker and leaker was.	6 7 8 9 10 11	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:34 p.m. We are off the record. (Recess.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:50. We are back on the record. MR. SAUER: Before we go back to
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. I mean, if you're talking about a social media posting, that would be attribution. If you're talking about hack and leak, I assume that would be known as the attribution to who the hacker and leaker was. Q. So this, then, could be a discussion of you know and by the way, this is listed there under 40 minutes deep dive topics; right? A. Mm-hmm. Q. Do you know if you participated in that July 15th, 2020 meeting? A. I would imagine I did, but I you know, I would have to go back and look at my calendar. I don't know for certain. Q. You don't know sorry.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:34 p.m. We are off the record. (Recess.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 3:50. We are back on the record. MR. SAUER: Before we go back to questioning, I'm formally requesting, on the record, a supplementation of the document production directed to CISA custodians. If you look at those pages where the key custodians are disclosed, we've had testimony today that that list of custodians at ESI should have been searched, should have included the five names that the witness has testified to today, Chad Josiah, Rob Schaul, Adam Zaheer, John Stafford and Pierce Lowary. And, in fact, I think it's

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	Page 277		Page 279
1	searched.	1	A. Yes.
2	So I request supplementation by	2	Q. How do you interact with them?
3	tomorrow, which is the close of fact discovery.	3	A. In a couple ways. So one, they do
4	We were entitled to that going back to August.	4	a lot of reporting on what they're seeing
5	And this is the first time we've heard about	5	overseas, particularly as it relates to actions.
6	this, one day before the close of discovery.	6	So it's a good source of understanding tactics
7	So I'm asking for those e-mails	7	and things like that, that are occurring
8	from those custodians, including their	8	overseas.
9	communications with social media platforms, and	9	We often see what happens overseas
10	it now appears there were communications with	10	end up showing up domestically. So it's a good
11	the EIP, potentially, those be produced by	11	source of information for that.
12	tomorrow.	12	They also have a tech demo program
13	MR. GARDNER: I understand your	13	that they run, where they bring in different
14	request. We'll take it back.	14	tech companies that work in the information
15	MR. SAUER: Thanks.	15	operations space. So we'll go we have
16	(Exhibit No. 18 was marked for	16	members of the team that will go and watch some
17	identification.)	17	of the demo.
18	BY MR. SAUER:	18	So I think those are the two main
19	Q. Let's go to Exhibit 18, it should	19	ones. We trying to think if there's others.
20	be in your e-mail.	20	Q. Do you know George Beebe,
21	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on one	21	B-e-e-b-e?
22	second.	22	A. Do I know George? I'm sorry, could
23	BY MR. SAUER:	23	you spell that again?
24	Q. This document is another one of	24	Q. B-e-e-b-e.
25	these collective exhibits of a bunch of CISA	25	A. The name does not sound familiar.
	Page 278		Page 280
1	e-mails involving you.	1	Q. Do you know if the GEC was involved
2	If you look at the first page, in	2	in the Election Integrity Partnership in any
3	the middle, here, it indicates there's reporting	3	way?
4	that you are forwarding from the state	4	A. I don't. I know you showed me a
5	department's global engagement centers about	5	document earlier, that they were listed, but I
6	disinformation on YouTube, and you're forwarding	6	don't know what they did.
7	it onto to social media platform; do you see	7	Q. Okay. Second page, here, where
8	that?	8	this lists information report, you said it
9	A. Yes.	9	indicates, in the last sentence there, the
10	Q. Yeah. Let me ask this: What role	10	journalist tells me there's a YouTube channel
11	does the state department's global engagement	11	run by Americans falsely claiming that this
12	center have in addressing misinformation and	12	diplomatic officer is patient zero for COVID-19;
13	disinformation on social media?	13	correct?
14	A. I don't know what the specific	14	A. I'm sorry, what page are you on?
15	authorities are.	15	Q. Second page of the PDF.
16	Q. Do you know what they do,	16	A. Okay. Yes, that's what the e-mail
17	generally?	17	says.
18	A. Yeah, but also, just to be clear,	18	Q. So you said well, maybe
19	that this e-mail is regarding a State Department	19	overseas, it looks like the thing they're
	employee that was targeted overseas, I believe.	20	challenging is something posted by Americans;
20		١	correct?
20 21	So I to answer your to answer your	21	
	So I to answer your to answer your question, I believe they they have a mandate	21	A. I I don't know. I mean, that's
21			
21 22	question, I believe they they have a mandate	22	A. I I don't know. I mean, that's

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1 A. I believe that's true, yes.	1	A. Yeah.
2 Q. Scrolling down to page 10718 by	2	Q. Okay. Do you know do you
3 the way, did you flag these accounts? If you	3	remember having a call with them about your
4 look here on the 11th page of the PDF for a	4	process reporting election disinformation on
5 section	5	that date?
6 A. Sorry, page 11 of the PDF?	6	A. I don't.
7 Q. Yeah, here there's a screen shot of	7	Q. Next page, 9703, tenth page of the
8 unofficialcogov, and the Twitter handle, says:	8	PDF, there's an e-mail from Twitter to you and
9 DM us your weed store location, open	9	
•		Matt Masterson, in September of 2020, where it says: Hi Matthew and Brian, hope you're doing
parentheses, hoes be mad, but this is a parody	10	
11 account; correct?	11	very well. We want to give you an update today.
A. It appears I forwarded it to	12	We're updating our civic integrity policy. Our
13 Twitter, yes.	13	existing policy does such and such, and it says,
14 Q. Okay. And then that was the only	14	starting next week we will label or remove false
one, and the next page there's one you forwarded	15	or misleading information intended to undermine
to Twitter that says: Smoke, weed, erry day, I	16	public confidence in an election or other civic
think they mean every day. The official	17	process; right?
18 (unofficial) Twitter account of the State of	18	A. Yep.
19 Colorado; right?	19	Q. Do you know why they gave you this
A. Yeah, it seems to be part of the	20	report?
same e-mail in Colorado.	21	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
22 Q. Those two accounts you forwarded to	22	speculation.
23 Twitter, you forward those to Twitter for	23	 A. Yeah, I don't know why they
24 consideration; correct?	24	specifically it looks like there's ways to
25 A. Yeah .	25	public information about it, so as I mentioned
Page 282	1	Page 284
1 Q. And then, sorry, moving back a	1	earlier, sometimes they would they're putting
2 little bit of the document, I apologize, on the	2	things out publicly they would just give us a
3 9th page there's an e-mail on September 25th of	3	heads up.
2020, from you to Twitter, saying, good morning,	4	Q. Now, have you ever asked them to
5 do you all have five minutes for a quick call	5	give you a heads up or Matt Masterson ask them
6 today. I'd like to give you a quick update on	6	to give you a heads up about changes in their
our reporting process this year. Do you know	7	content moderation policies?
8 what that was about?	8	A. Not that I recall.
9 A . I don't	9	Q. Page 8519, sorry, I'm in the wrong
10 Q. It looks like	10	spot on the document.
11 A know specifically what it's	11	Let me ask you this: Do you
12 about, no.	12	remember sharing a with Facebook, a
13 Q. It looks like the specific subject	13	disinformation report about CISA and Director
14 you mentioned was: Election disinfo reporting;	14	Krebs, does that ring a bell, where the
15 correct?	15	disinformation was disinformation about your own
16 A. Let me scroll down. Do you have	16	agency?
the rest of the e-mail chain? Obviously it	17	A. I don't recall that, specifically,
appears to be a reply to something. Am I	18	no.
19 missing something, here?	19	Q. Here it is, 19th page of the PDF.
Q. Well, this is all we've got. It	20	A. 19?
21 says	21	Q. Yeah, page 19 of the PDF.
A. Oh, there's no there's no	22	A. Okay.
23 header, again.	23	Q. And it says: Good afternoon you
≥ ⊂ noador, again.	1	-
24 Q. But but Twitter's response to	24	sent an e-mail on November 5th of 2020 to
. 5	24 25	sent an e-mail on November 5th of 2020 to Facebook, saying, good afternoon Facebook,

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1	wanted to share this disinfo report about CISA	1	the rounds. I don't recall.
2	and Director Krebs; do you know what that was	2	Q. Okay. Well, your next sentence
3	about?	3	says: Wanted to see if you all, meaning
4	A. I don't.	4	Facebook, have been tracking this narrative and
5	Q. And your second	5	if there's anything you can share around
6	A. I don't recall.	6	amplification; right?
7	Q. The second line says: IG disinfo	7	A. Yep.
8	report; do you know what IG means?	8	Q. What does amplification mean?
9	A. It appears, based on the link in	9	A. If a particular narrative is being
10	the e-mail, that it was referring to Instagram.	10	amplified.
11	Q. By you don't remember you don't	11	Q. So, in other words, you wanted to
12	remember a specific anything specific	12	know you're asking Facebook to tell you
13	relating to Director Krebs, do you?	13	whether or not that narrative is being amplified
14	A. No, I don't.	14	on its platform?
15	Q. Let's scroll ahead a few pages, to	15	A. Correct. That's how I read that,
16	10394.	16	yeah.
17	Well, let me ask this: Do you	17	Q. Okay. And then Facebook responds
18	remember disinformation about Director Krebs	18	by saying: Our teams are actively actively
19	circulating in that timeframe, just after the	19	monitoring developments on this at this time and
20	2020 election?	20	to the extent you or USG have information about
21	A. I recall that he was named on an	21	confirmed misinformation or other information of
22	Iranian-driven enemies of the people list.	22	note, we absolutely welcome that; correct?
23	Beyond that, I don't I don't recall any other	23	A. Yep, that's what they wrote.
24	specific MDM related to the director, no.	24	Q. And they follow up by saying:
25	Q. Okay. Scroll down to the 22nd page	25	Wanted to follow up on the below to say that our
	Page 286		Page 288
1	of the PDF.	1	teams have confirmed that we have third-party
2	A. Okay. Okay.	2	fact checker verification that the "hammer and
3	Q. Do you see here, you sent an e-mail	3	scorecard" narrative is false; right?
4	to Facebook on November 10th, 2020, saying:	4	A. Yes, that's what they say.
5	Good morning, Director Krebs is particularly	5	Q. And they go on to report to you:
6	concerned about the hammer and scorecard	6	Our systems are labeling and downranking the
7	narrative that is making the rounds; do you see	7	contents as identified; correct?
8	that?	8	A. Yes.
9	A. Yep.	9	Q. Is that consistent with other
10	Q. Do you know what that was, the	10	e-mails, where they report back to you on how
11	hammer and scorecard narrative?	11	they've taken action against a content that you
12	A. If I remember correctly, it was	12	have flagged?
13	something about the NSA, and maybe a different	13	A. Yeah, generally consistent, I
14	federal agency, conspiring to change votes or	14	think.
15	something along those lines. Like there's new	15	Q. Let's jump ahead to the 10390, that
16	technology that the NSA developed. I forget the	16	is going to be page 24 of the PDF, and here at
17	specifics of the narrative, itself, but it's	17	the bottom of the page you sent the very same
18	something along those lines.	18	e-mail to Twitter, as well; right?
19	Q. So this is a narrative on social	19	A. Yep.
20	media suggesting that the federal government is	20	Q. Director Krebs is very concerned
21	engaging in intellectual or sort of election	21	about the hammer and scorecard narrative, and
22	interference in some way?	22	I'm wondering if you have been tracking this
23	A. I think it could have been social	23	one, if there's anything you can share in terms
		1 0 1	-f -li
24 25	media, it could have been other media. I'm not sure what I was referring to when I said making	24 25	of sharing and amplification; correct? A. Yeah, that's what I wrote.

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1	Q. The usual context says: We have	1	Twitter, were following the page and using it to
2	been tracking this issue. I will allow Yoel to	2	fact check, essentially, things that people were
3	follow up with detailed information; right?	3	posting on their platforms?
4	A. Yes.	4	A. Yeah. So the platforms are looking
5	Q. And that's Yoel Roth; right?	5	for a place to get accurate information about
6	A. I believe so, yeah, that's let's	6	different things that they were seeing on their
7	see, yep.	7	platforms. And I know some of them used the
8	Q. He was then the chief content	8	universe reality page to do that.
9	modulation officer for Twitter, right, ahead of	9	Q. And, in fact, this e-mail indicates
10	their trust and safety team?	10	that they used it to debunk the hammer/scorecard
11	A. I don't recall what his title was,	11	narrative, if the tweet that Director Krebs did
12	•	12	refers to the rumor page; correct?
	but he certainly was in charge of some trust and		
13	safety, safety stuff.	13	A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the
14	Q. Trust and safety, that means	14	question?
15	enforcing content moderation policies; right?	15	Q. Actually, let's move on to the page
16	A. I suspect that's one of the	16	8625, it's a couple pages down, on page 27 of
17	responsibilities.	17	the PDF. Here you're flagging, on Friday,
18	Q. He comes back to you with a kind of	18	November 13th of 2020, you've been flagging a
19	detailed report here at the top of the page	19	tweet for Twitter. And at one point you say, at
20	about what Twitter's been doing on this, he	20	11:26 p.m. on a Friday night, you e-mail Twitter
21	says, we've been tracking the hammer/scorecard	21	and say: Some Friday night fun for the two of
22	issue closely, particularly since Director	22	us, hope you are well; right?
23	Krebs's tweet on the subject, which is pretty	23	A. Yeah.
24	unambiguous as debunks go; correct?	24	 Q. So you were forwarding and routing
25	A. That's what he wrote, yeah.	25	disinformation concerns to social media
1	Page 290	1	Page 292
1	Q. Do you recall Director Krebs	1	platforms near midnight on a Friday?
2	debunking this in a tweet?	2	A. It appears so.
3	A. I suspect, and I keep on, let me	3	Q. And they were responding in
4	just add, I don't recall Director Krebs'	4	realtime, for example, 7 minutes later, at 11:33
5	specific tweet. Two, its possible, as part of	5	p.m., Twitter's responding to you late on a
6	our universe reality page, and Director Krebs	6	Friday night; correct?
7	would put a new item up on our universe reality	7	A. Yeah.
8	page, he would tweet out the new universe	8	Q. And she says, among other things,
9	reality entry, but I'm not aware of the specific	9	we have labeled so many tweets tonight, so I'm
10	tweet, but that would be my guess as to what was	10	afraid that the answer is there isn't any
11	going on.	11	tonight; correct?
12	Q. Were you aware that the social	12	A. I'm sorry, what are you asking?
13	media platforms were following the rumor page	13	Q. Directly above, she said: We've
14	posted by CISA and using that as a debunking	14	labeled so many tweets tonight that it isn't
15	method for content on their platforms?	15	ending tonight; correct?
16	A. We had a sense they were doing	16	A. We have labeled so many tweets
17	that, yeah.	17	tonight, so I am afraid that for now the answer
18	Q. And that's kind of the point of it,	18	is that it isn't ending tonight?
19	right, the point of the rumor page is to debunk	19	Q. Right.
20	things; right?	20	A. Yes, that's what she wrote.
21	A. No. The point of the page is just	21	Q. This is based on an exchange a
22	to provide accurate information about rumors	22	little lower down, that you flagged something on
23	that we were hearing.	23	Dominion machines for her, at 11:20 p.m. And
24	Q. Okay. You were aware, I think you	24	she responded at 11:21 p.m., within one minute,
25	just said, that the social media platforms, like	25	saying, thanks, Brian, we will escalate;
25	just said, that the social media platforms, like	-	ou, mg, thanks, briain, we will escalate,

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	Page 293		Page 295
1	correct?	1	know.
2	A. Yep, that's what the timestamps	2	Q. Okay. Next page, Lauren Protentis,
3	say.	3	thanks so much for sending, this looks great.
4	Q. Were you getting you were kind	4	The only thing I recommend is any steps for
5	of reporting misinformation on social media late	5	flagging or escalating MDM content, if possible;
6	at night to social media platforms during this	6	right?
7	timeframe?	7	A. Yeah, that's what Lauren said.
8	A. I accidently closed that's page	8	Q. And she said: I think then that
9	24?	9	this I think, then, that would make this a
10	Q. Yeah.	10	comprehensive product on both the critical needs
11	A. Sorry. Yeah, as I said, if I were	11	of officials, account security, and MDM
12	on my phone, and I saw something come in, I	12	concerns; correct?
13	would push it along.	13	A. Yeah, that's what she wrote.
14	Q. Jump ahead to and was it common	14	Q. She says: We discussed this a bit
15	for Twitter or Facebook or other platforms to	15	in our in-person meting a few weeks ago; right?
16	respond almost immediately, even near midnight	16	A. Yep.
17	on a Friday?	17	Q. Okay. Were you aware of Lauren
18	A. I mean, it's hard to say common. I	18	asking for Facebook to produce a document and
19	know it happened. They were generally pretty	19	asking them to include steps for planning or
20	responsive. Common's a pretty loose term so,	20	escalating MDM content for officials?
21	you know, I don't know how to respond to that.	21	A. I was not aware of this document,
22	Q. But you say they were generally	22	no. I know that the I knew those
23	responsive, and that includes prompt in their	23	conversations about the one-pagers we discussed
24	responses to you?	24	earlier, but I'm not I'm not entirely sure
25	A. Correct. Right. So they were	25	what this is referring to.
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1	prompt in letting me know that they had received	1	Q. Well, I think you said earlier the
2	any e-mail that I sent them, that's essentially	2	one-pagers would talk about what their content
3	what I was talking about.	3	moderation policies are?
4	Q. Let's go to 8557, it's page 42 of	4	A. Right.
5	the PDF.	5	Q. If you look higher, on that same
6	A. 42? Okay.	6	page, Facebook is replying to Lauren and saying,
7			
,	Q. Here it looks like Facebook is	7	would it be would it work to just provide my
8	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I	7 8	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right?
			would it be would it work to just provide my
8 9 10	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for	8	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up.
8 9	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that	8	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that?
8 9 10 11 12	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep.	8 9 10 11 12	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that?
8 9 10 11 12 13	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security	8 9 10 11	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes.
8 9 10 11 12 13	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022?	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I don't know what specific	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's going on?
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I don't know what specific documents they're talking about.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's going on? A. Again, I'm not sure. It could be
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I don't know what specific documents they're talking about. Q. Is it possible this is the	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's going on? A. Again, I'm not sure. It could be two different one-pagers that she's talking
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I don't know what specific documents they're talking about. Q. Is it possible this is the one-pager that we were talking about earlier,	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's going on? A. Again, I'm not sure. It could be two different one-pagers that she's talking about, one on account security and one that
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I don't know what specific documents they're talking about. Q. Is it possible this is the one-pager that we were talking about earlier, does that ring a bell?	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's going on? A. Again, I'm not sure. It could be two different one-pagers that she's talking about, one on account security and one that Lauren was working on, I wouldn't be again, I
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I don't know what specific documents they're talking about. Q. Is it possible this is the one-pager that we were talking about earlier, does that ring a bell? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's going on? A. Again, I'm not sure. It could be two different one-pagers that she's talking about, one on account security and one that Lauren was working on, I wouldn't be again, I wouldn't be surprised if they were similar, but
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on, and we're grateful for any feedback; right? A. Yep. Q. Do you know what account security document they're talking about, here in April 15th of 2022? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. A. Yeah, I don't know what specific documents they're talking about. Q. Is it possible this is the one-pager that we were talking about earlier, does that ring a bell?	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	would it be would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? Do you see that? A. So I'm scrolling up. Q. When you share out this one-pager; do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So so does it seem that Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all the social media platforms were asked to provide for state and local elections; is that what's going on? A. Again, I'm not sure. It could be two different one-pagers that she's talking about, one on account security and one that Lauren was working on, I wouldn't be again, I

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one-pager, Lauren is specifically asking that	1	The team has a few upcoming engagements with
they add to it a procedure for state officials	2	elections officials for this one-pager, would be
3 to flag and escalate MDM content; correct?	3	particularly helpful to share as a leave behind;
4 A. It appears she's asking for a	4	correct?
5 process for election officials to report MDM	5	A. Yes, that's what she's written.
6 content to Facebook, yeah.	6	Q. And Twitter goes back and says:
7 Q. Jump ahead to 12223, here on the	7	I'll have a one-pager for you later today, just
8 starting at the 48th page of the PDF and	8	getting the final signoff; right?
9 spilling to the 49th page, there's another	9	A. Correct.
10 e-mail from Lauren Protentis, this time to	10	Q. And then, once he sends it to him,
people at Microsoft, which is subject is	11	scrolling back up, first, she says: State and
one-pager for election officials; do you see	12	local officials in New Hampshire, Illinois, will
13 that?	13	be the first recipients of this; right? There
14 A. Did you say 48?	14	at the top of the page.
15 Q. Yeah, 48, spilling over onto 49,	15	The first line on page 45 of the
16 it's the header's on 48 and the oh, I'm	16	PDF Lauren says
sorry, 43. Bad eyesight. Sorry. It really	17	A. Yeah, the e-mail chain is a little
18 looks like an 8.	18	funky, so I was just trying to read and make
19 A. That's okay.	19	sure the e-mails were connected.
20 Q. Sorry, 43.	20	Okay. So Twitter provided the
A. I understand that.	21	one-pager. Lauren said thanks. State and local
Okay. So one-pager for election	22	officials in New Hampshire and Illinois will be
officials, got the header, okay.	23	the first recipients to this? Okay. Sorry.
2 4 Q. And in this e-mail Lauren says to	24	Q. Then she follows up with another
25 Microsoft: META is working with industry	25	e-mail, saying: Actually, one question, is
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1 agc 200		Page 300
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partners to create one-pagers for election	1 2	there a way to include something about how to
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4 Q. Well, suffice to say that she's asking Twitter to include information specifically about how do you report MDM; correct? A. About how election officials should support MDM, correct. A. About how election officials should support MDM, correct. A. About how election officials should support MDM, correct. A. About how election officials should support MDM, correct. A. A about how do you report MDM; A. No, no specific efforts, that I'm aware of, I believe there might have been so additional funding requested in the budget, and they did; right? A. It appears so, yeah. A. I don't included it in a one-pager, and she asked them to put it in; correct? A. I don't recall that e-mail. Which e-mail is that? C. Exhibit No. 27 was marked for identification.) BY MR. SAUER: A. Ladon't included it in a one-pager, and she asked them to put it in; correct? A. I don't recall that e-mail. Which e-mail is that? C. Exhibit No. 27 was marked for identification.) BY MR. SAUER: A. Ladon't included it in a one-pager, and she asked them to put it in; correct? A. I don't recall that e-mail. Which e-mail is that? C. Exhibit No. 27 was marked for identification.) BY MR. SAUER: A. I don't recall that e-mail. Which e-mail is that? Page 302 Page 303 Page 304 Page 305 Page 306 Page 307 Page 307 Page 308 Page 309		Page 301		Page 303
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4 Q. Well, suffice to say that she's specifically about how do you report MDM; correct? 8 A. About how election officials should support MDM, correct. 9 support MDM, correct. 10 Q. And Twitter had not included that in theirs, and she asked them to put it in and they did; right? 11 In theirs, and she asked them to put it in and they did; right? 12 A. It appears so, yeah. 15 YouTube in your earlier e-mail, right, they hadn't included it in a one-pager, and she asked them to put it in; correct? 18 A. I don't recall that e-mail. Which e-mail is that? 19 e-mail is that? 20 (Exhibit No. 27 was marked for identification). 21 identification). 22 BY MR. SAUER: 23 Q. Let's move on, actually. 24 I'm going to e-mail you some new exhibits. 25 of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 6 MR. GARDNER: Yeah. 7 John, we're still waiting for your - oh, just got it. Hold on. Hold up. You said 27? 9 MR. SAUER: 10 Q. Dyou see the headline: CISA expands efforts to fight election disinformation ahead of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 10 A. It appears on the filted: CISA expands efforts to fight election disinformation ahead of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 10 A. About how election morniformation ahead of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 21 BY MR. SAUER: 22 BY MR. SAUER: 23 O. Do you see the headline: CISA expands efforts to fight election disinformation ahead of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 3 A. It was a said they are a said she saked them to put it in and they did in the said in the budget, b in more and the budget, b in more advantaged in the budget, b in more said additional funding requested in the budget, b in more sure in ght have the pen she additional funding requested in the budget, b in more sure if that actually went up or not undertake to fight election disinformation and saked they did in did call the product. 4 No not undertake to fight election disinformation and they during the vour of the more and they did in did a they during the vour of the more and the	2	You're making it more dramatic than it was, I	2	A. When this was written, in August of
asking Twitter to include information specifically about how do you report MDM; correct? A. About how election officials should support MDM, correct. Q. And Twitter had not included that in theirs, and she asked them to put it in and they did; right? A. It appears so, yeah. Q. Same thing happened, actually, with You'tube in your earlier e-mail; right, they hadn't included it in a one-pager, and she asked them to put it in; correct? A. I don't recall that e-mail. Which e-mail is that? Cishibit No. 27 was marked for identification.) BY MR. SAUER: Q. Let's move on, actually. I'm going to e-mail you some new exhibits. Page 302 Page 303 Page 304 Page 305 Page 306 Page 306 Page 307 Page 308 Page 308 Page 309	3	think.	3	2022? I'm sorry, what time?
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A. About how election officials should 9 support MDM, correct. 10 Q. And Twitter had not included that 11 In theirs, and she asked them to put it in and 12 they did; right? 13 A. It appears so, yeah. 14 Q. Same thing happened, actually, with 15 YouTube in your earlier e-mail, right, they 16 hadn't included it in a one-pager, and she asked 17 them to put it in; correct? 18 A. I don't recall that e-mail. Which 19 e-mail is that? 20 (Exhibit No. 27 was marked for 20 (Exhibit No. 27 was marked for 21 identification.) 22 BY MR. SAUER: 23 Q. Let's move on, actually. 24 I'm going to e-mail you some new 25 exhibits. Page 302 1 I'm pulling up Exhibit 27, which 2 should also be popping up in your inbox. 17 There's a news report entitlect. CISA expands 24 efforts to fight election disinformation ahead 25 of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 26 MR. GARDNER: Here you go. 27 MR. SAUER: 28 Q. Dyou see the headline: CISA 29 MR. SAUER: 30 Q. Dyou see the headline: CISA 31 There's a news report entitlect. See years 32 Q. Dyou see the headline: CISA 33 There's a news report entitlect. See years 34 efforts to fight election disinformation ahead 35 of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 36 MR. GARDNER: Hene you go. 37 MR. SAUER: 38 Q. Do you see the headline: CISA 49 MR. SAUER: 40 A. On you see the headline: CISA 40 Easterly has taken several specific steps to fight the problem, including bringing Kim Wyr former Secretary of State of Washington into CISA to bolster its election work; correct? 41 A. No, no specific efforts, that Pm additional individue and additional calculation in additional calculation in the budget, in mot sure of, it is build resilience in the budget, or not. 42 A. Non the efforts to fight election of the build beneated of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 44 A. That's what the erforts to fight election disinformation approach is efforts	5	asking Twitter to include information	5	aware, around August of 2022, did CISA was
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John, we're still waiting for your oh, just got it. Hold on. Hold up. You said 27? MR. SAUER: Yeah. MR. GARDNER: Here you go. THE WITNESS: Okay. BY MR. SAUER: Q. Do you see the headline: CISA expands efforts to fight election disinformation A. I do. Q. What steps are you aware of CISA taking to expand its efforts to fight election disinformation going into the next election danger in the second paragraph it says: The danger of disinformation has become an incredibly difficult problem, CISA Director Jer Easterly said on Friday; do you see that? A. I do. Q. And it goes on in his report: That Easterly has taken several specific steps to fight the problem, including bringing Kim Wyr former Secretary of State of Washington into CISA to bolster its election work; correct? A. That's what the article says, yep. Q. What has Kim Wyman done to fight election-related disinformation at CISA? A. At this time, I'm not aware of any. Dipaction, lack of foundation, calls for				• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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9 MR. SAUER: Yeah. 10 MR. GARDNER: Here you go. 11 THE WITNESS: Okay. 12 BY MR. SAUER: 13 Q. Do you see the headline: CISA 14 expands efforts to fight election disinformation 15 ahead of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 16 A. I do. 17 Q. What steps are you aware of CISA 18 taking to expand its efforts to fight election 19 disinformation going into the next election 20 cycle, 2024? 21 A. At this time, I'm not aware of any. 20 log MR. SAUER: 21 BY MR. SAUER: 22	8		8	The danger of disinformation has become an
10 MR. GARDNER: Here you go. 11 THE WITNESS: Okay. 12 BY MR. SAUER: 13 Q. Do you see the headline: CISA 14 expands efforts to fight election disinformation 15 ahead of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that? 16 A. I do. 17 Q. What steps are you aware of CISA 18 taking to expand its efforts to fight election 19 disinformation going into the next election 20 cycle, 2024? 21 A. At this time, I'm not aware of any. 21 Easterly said on Friday; do you see that? A. I do. 20 Easterly said on Friday; do you see that? A. I do. C. A. I do. C. And it goes on in his report: That Easterly has taken several specific steps to fight the problem, including bringing Kim Wyr former Secretary of State of Washington into CISA to bolster its election work; correct? A. That's what the article says, yep. Q. What has Kim Wyman done to fight election-related disinformation at CISA? MR. GARDNER: Objection. Objection, lack of foundation, calls for			9	incredibly difficult problem, CISA Director Jen
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18taking to expand its efforts to fight election18Q. What has Kim Wyman done to fight19disinformation going into the next election19election-related disinformation at CISA?20cycle, 2024?20MR. GARDNER: Objection.21A. At this time, I'm not aware of any.21Objection, lack of foundation, calls for	16	A. I do.	16	CISA to bolster its election work; correct?
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20 cycle, 2024? 21 A. At this time, I'm not aware of any. 22 MR. GARDNER: Objection. 21 Objection, lack of foundation, calls for	18	taking to expand its efforts to fight election	18	Q. What has Kim Wyman done to fight
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	20	cycle, 2024?	20	MR. GARDNER: Objection.
	21	A. At this time, I'm not aware of any.	21	Objection, lack of foundation, calls for
22 Q. This is dated August 12th, 2022, if 22 speculation.	22	Q. This is dated August 12th, 2022, if	22	speculation.
23 you scroll down. 23 BY MR. SAUER :	23		23	BY MR. SAUER:
24 A. Sure. 24 Q. You may answer.	24	A. Sure.	24	Q. You may answer.
25 Q. Were you aware of any discussions 25 A. Yeah, can you be more specific	25	Q. Were you aware of any discussions	25	A. Yeah, can you be more specific

76 (Pages 301 to 304)

	Page 305		Page 307
1	about what you're trying to get to?	1	Here's an e-mail chain, starting
2	Q. Well, what does Kim Wyman do at	2	with Facebook sending an e-mail directly to Jen
3	CISA?	3	Easterly, saying she had spoken to Facebook
4	 A. Kim Wyman is essentially the new 	4	about receiving a briefing from us on 2022
5	Matt Masterson. So she's a senior advisor to	5	election approach; do you see that there, the
6	the director on election security. Most of her	6	second page of the document, the beginning of
7	work has been engagement with election	7	the chain?
8	officials. I also think she was CISA's	8	A. I do.
9	representative on the CSAC for MDM.	9	Q. Were you aware that Easterly had
10	So beyond some public speaking	10	reached out to Facebook directly and asked for,
11	and and the CSAC work, I'm not sure what else	11	I guess in January of 2022, a briefing on how
12	she would have done, would have been doing on	12	Facebook planned to approach the election?
13	MDM.	13	A. I was not.
14	Q. Down here at the very last	14	Q. Facebook says: We're happy to do
15	paragraph, second page of the document, sorry,	15	this with your team at your convenience, and
16	this is hard to highlight, very last paragraph,	16	we'd also love to discuss further how we might
17	it says: While it's not CISA's role to police	17	help support the JCDC effort; do you see that?
18	social media Easterly said her team has	18	A. I do.
19	discussions with platforms, but they're more to	19	Q. What does JCDC stand for?
20	understand large trends, not specific tweets; is	20	A. I was afraid you were going to ask
21	that right?	21	me that. I don't know exactly what it what
22	 A. That's what the article says, yeah. 	22	it stands for, I think it's joint cyber
23	Q. Do you have discussions with	23	something or another. Sorry, I I forget the
24	platforms discussing large trends of online	24	exact acronym, too many acronyms.
25	disinformation?	25	Q. Is it a committee or a subdivision
	Page 306		Page 308
_	-		-
1	A. Yeah, I think that's consistent	1	within CISA or within DHS?
2	with what we talked about from the sync meetings	2	A. I believe it's a it's an effort
3	and the discussions around the public reporting	3	by CISA to to collaborate with private sector
4	that the platforms have done.	4	on cyber defense.
5	Q. Any other time when there would	5	Q. Okay. And Director Easterly
6	be where there was discussions with platforms	6	responds to Facebook saying: Looping in Kris
7	about disinformation trends?	7	and teammates to please follow up; do you see
8	A. I think it's just the two, the	8	that?
9	normal sync meetings we discussed, and then the normal if they were putting up public reporting	9	A. I do.
10	, , , , , ,	10	Q. And then Kris Rose; do you know who Kris Rose is?
11	we might get a briefing on it. I'm trying to	11	
12	think if we ever received yeah, I think those	12	A. My understanding is counselor for
13	are the big things. We may have done a briefing	13	the director, for Director Easterly.
14	where we had a platform maybe talk about talk	14	Q. So and he says: Thank you,
15	with election officials, but I'm not sure if I'm	15	Director. Moving you to BCC; does that stand
16	remembering that correctly, so just those two, I	16	for blind carbon copy?
17	think, would be the main ones.	17	A. That would be my understanding.
18	(Exhibit No. 28 was marked for	18	Q. And he says per Geoff, G-e-o-f-f, I
19	identification.)	19	presume that's a Geoff Hale; right?
20	MR. SAUER: Exhibit 28.	20	A. Yeah.
21	MR. GARDNER: Should be right	21	Q. Sounds like we may want to discuss
22	there.	22	three primary topics that include 2022
23	THE WITNESS: Okay.	23	elections; right?
	DV MD CALLED.		A . N.A I
24 25	BY MR. SAUER: Q. Should be on the screen share, too.	24 25	A. Mm-hmm. Q. Risk management in the face of

77 (Pages 305 to 308)

	Page 309		Page 311
1	influence of operations; do you know what that	1	A. I'm sorry, what was the last part?
2	means?	2	Q. What else does he do for Facebook
3	A. I mean, I don't know what context	3	on misinformation?
4	he was saying it here, but generally speaking,	4	A. Again, I think he would articulate
5	that's CISA's mission to reduce risks to	5	the inoffensive behavior, coordinating
6	critical infrastructure. So I assume it's risk	6	inoffensive behavior. So I don't know if he
7	management from critical infrastructure to	7	would talk about it in the context of
8	influence of operations.	8	disinformation. But my understanding is he
9	Q. And JCDC, that's the thing you	9	leads the team one of the teams that deals with
10	testified before?	10	the coordinated inoffensive behavior.
11	A. Yeah.	11	Q. Let me ask you about Rob Silvers.
12		12	
	Q. Do you know let me ask you this:		Do you know who Rob Silvers? A. Yes.
13	Were you included in this meeting between	13	
14	Director Easterly and Facebook?	14	Q. Who's Rob Silvers?
15	A. I was not, in fact, I don't know if	15	A. He heads up the DHS office of
16	the meeting actually ever occurred.	16	policy. I don't know what his back title is,
17	Q. Do you know if Geoff Hale	17	assistant secretary or secretary, something like
18	participated?	18	that.
19	A. I I don't.	19	Q. So he's in the secretary's office?
20	(Exhibit No. 29 was marked for	20	A. I believe he reports up to the
21	identification.)	21	secretary, yeah.
22	BY MR. SAUER:	22	Q. He he and Mr. Gleicher says
23	Q. Let's look at Exhibit 29.	23	to Jen Easterly: Do you have any context you
24	A. Okay.	24	can share in the role Rob Silvers is playing on
25	Q. Here's a series of text messages	25	disinfo; right?
			Page 312
	_		
1	that were produced to us as coming from Director	1	A. Yep, that's what the text says.
2	Easterly.	2	Q. I understand his team is a task
3	So do you see the blue text, that	3	force set up, and it was suggested that his team
4	would be Director Easterly, the other side, in	4	is handing policy on disinfo while CISA is
5	the gray, is the interlocutor here on the first	5	handling operations; right?
6	page is this gentleman from Facebook; do you see	6	A. Yeah, that's what Nathaniel wrote.
7	that?	7	Q. What is what was your
8	A. Yeah.	8	understanding of Rob Silver being involved in
9	Q. This he he issued a	9	policy on disinformation?
10	series of texts. Do you know why he would be	10	A. So that is the DHS office of
11	texting Director Easterly, does he know her?	11	policy. He would be involved in most, I would
12	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.	12	say, policy activities related to any topic that
13	Objection, calls for speculation.	13	crossed the department, including
14	A. Yeah, I I don't know is the	14	disinformation.
15	short answer. I don't know what their	15	Q. And Director Easterly says she's
16	relationship is.	16	happy to chat with Mr. Gleicher; right?
17	Q. Do you know him, Mr. Gleicher?	17	A. Yep.
18	A. Yeah, I know Nathaniel Gleicher,	18	Q. You don't know if they actually
19	yeah.	19	talked to each other, do you?
20	Q. Does he interact with CISA about	20	A. I don't.
21	misinformation issues on Facebook?	21	Q. She goes on to say: Rob is running
22	A. He does, he participates in the	22	a governance board to look at potential new
23	monthly regular meetings that we talked about.	23	areas of confronting MDM; correct?
24	Q. What else does he do, do you know,	24	A. That's what she wrote, yeah.
25	for Facebook on	25	Q. Then she says: It doesn't change
		1 2 2	a. mon one says. It account change

10		Page 313		Page 315
A Yes, that's what she wrote, Q. What were the potential – what potential new areas of confronting MDM were discussed, do you know? MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of foundation. A I don't have any clue. Q. Next page, there's an e-mail from Matt Masterson to the director, right? A Yep. A Yep. This is a – Matt Masterson know appointed, I take it he was a political appointee, clid you say that? A In previous administration — Pervious em — yeah, he was a political appointee, I don't know what his relationship with the diffector well, he was a political appointee, I don't know what his relationship with the diffector was, so I don't know how well he knew her. What was the director's role in the previous administration, was she at CISA? A No. Director Easterly was not at CISA, no. Q. Who was she? Page 314 A I'm sorry? Q. Was she in government? A I'm sorry? A I'm sorry and in the mithe previous administration in government. A I'm sorry and a single previous administration in government. A I'm sorry and a single previous administration in government. A I'm sorry and a single previous administration in government. A I'm sorry? A A I'm sorry? A A I'm sorry? A A I'm sorry? A Neion I'm he in the previous administration in government. A I'm sorry and a single previous administration in government. A I'm sorry and a single previous administration in government. A I'm sorry and a single previous administration in government. A I'm sorry and a single previous administration in government. A I'm sorry? A That's what she wrote, yeah. A A That's what she would do to, again, help people understand how MDM works and steps they can take to reduce the risks. A That's what she wrote, yep. A That's what she wrote, yeah. A She mentioned trends in both,	1	or impact anything, we, meaning CISA, are doing	1	wants to understand the trends from the
C. What were the potential – what 5 discussed, do you know?	2	or have already established; right?	2	platforms is so that the relevant agencies can
potential new areas of confronting MDM were discussed, do you know? MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of foundation. A. I don't have any clue. Q. Next page, there's an e-mail from 10 it? A. Yea. Matt Masterson to the director, right? A. Yea. A. Yea. A. Yea. I don't have any clue. Q. Next page, there's an e-mail from 11 it? A. Yea. A. Yea. Matt Masterson to the director, right? A. Yea. A. Yea. I don't have any clue. Q. Next page, there's an e-mail from 12 it? A. Yea. I don't Matt Masterson to the director, right? A. Yea. A. Yea. I don't Matt Masterson to the director, right? A. Yea. A. Yea. I don't Matt Masterson to the director, right? A. Yea. I don't know, what we try to do is provide accurate information about those issues and topics that are relevant to us. So from an election perspective we would try to provide appropriate information about elections. A. In previous administration — Personable in the previous administration with the director was, so I don't know how well he knew here previous administration, was she at CISA? A. No. Director Easterly was not at CISA, no. Q. Who was she? Page 314 A. I'm sorry? Q. Was she in government? A. Prior to the — in the previous administration? A. Prior to the — in the previous administration? A. Prior to the — in the previous administration? A. Prior to the — in the previous administration? A. Prior to the — in the previous administration in government. Q. Was she in government. Q. And here, Director Easterly says to make the director with platforms to better understand the mis, dis trends so relevant agency to previous administration in government. Q. And that discussion of trends is similar to her statement in the media article we just trying to go tus in a place where FED can work with platforms to better understand the mis, dis trends so relevant agency to prevolvik/debunk as useful; the covered? A. That's what she wrote, yeah. Q. And that discussion of trends is similar to her statement in the media article we just tooked at	3	A. Yes, that's what she wrote.	3	try to prebunk or debunk the mis and
discussed, do you know? MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of foundation. A I don't have any clue. Q. Next page, there's an e-mail from 10	4	Q. What were the potential what	4	disinformation; correct?
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foundation. A I don't have any clue. Q Next page, there's an e-mail from It Matt Masterson to the director; right? A Yep. O This is a – Matt Masterson know the director well, I take it he was a political appointee, did you say that? A In previous administration — excuse me — yeah, he was a political appointee, I don't know what his relationship with the glicetor was, so I don't know how well he knew her. O What was the director's role in the provious administration, was she at CISA? A No. Director Easterly was not at CISA, no. CISA, no. Q Who was she? Page 314 A I'm sorry? Q Was she in government? A Prior to the — in the previous administration? A I'don't know how I think her immediate previous job was in the private sector, but I don't know how long and if she spent any time, at all, in the — in the previous administration in government. Q And hore, Director Easterly says to Matt Masterson, Just trying to get us in a place where FED can work with platforms to better understand the mis, dis trends so relevant Q And that discussion of trends is similar to her statement in the media article we just looked at about thow CISA is la ineracting with social media platforms to identify trends; correct? A Se again, from a reslience. building perspective, you know, what we try to do is provide accurate information about those is susues and topics that are relevant to us. So from an election perspective, you know, what we try to do is provide accurate information about those is susues and topics hat are relevant to us. So from an election perspective, you know, what we try to do is provide accurate information about those issues and topics hat are relevant to us. So from an election perspective, you know, what we try to do is provide appropriate information about those designed the susue of the provide appropriate information about diverse reality page would be an example of that, it would fall mit is suspensed to the provide appropriate information about those and the new and in the manufacture of the p	6	discussed, do you know?	6	saying.
9 A. I don't have any clue. Q. Noxt page, there's an e-mail from 11 Matt Masterson to the director, right? 12 A. Yep. 13 Q. This is a – Matt Masterson know 14 the director well, I take it he was a political 15 appointee, did you say that? 16 A. In previous administration 17 excuse me yeah, he was a political appointee. 18 I don't know what his relationship with the 19 director was, so I don't know how well he knew 19 previous administration, was she at CISA? 20 A. No. Director Easterly was not at 21 Q. What was the director's role in the 22 previous administration, was she at CISA? 23 A. No. Director Easterly was not at 24 CISA, no. 25 Q. Who was she? Page 314 1 A. I'm sorry? 2 Q. Was she in government? 3 A. Prior to the in the previous administration? 4 A. I'don't know. I think her 10 previous administration in government? 4 administration? 5 Q. Yeah. A. I don't know. I think her 10 previous administration in government. 11 Q. And here, Director Easterly says to 12 appointee, all, in the in the 10 previous plot was in the private 11 sector, but I don't know how long and if she 12 sector, but I don't know how long and if she 13 sepent any time, at all, in the in the 14 understand the mis, dis trends so relevant 15 agencies can try to prebunk/debunk as useful; 16 correct? 17 A. That's what she wrote, yeah. 18 Q. And here, Director Easterly says to 19 similar to her statement in the media article we 19 just tooked at about how CISA is Interacting 20 with social media platforms to identify trends; 21 correct? 22 A. She mentioned trends in both, 23 A. She mentioned trends in both, 24 C. Her nost text here, Director 25 D. What does DIA mean, is that department or agency? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. 26 Province accurate information about those is suited apportide accurate information about those is sue would day perported to sportide accurate information about those is sues and topics that are relevant to us. So from an election perspective, we would that the interacting with soci	7	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	7	Q. Can you do that at CISA, when you
10	8	foundation.	8	find out about a trend do you go try to work
11 Matt Masterson to the director; right? A. Yep. O. This is a – Matt Masterson know the director well, I take it he was a political appointee, did you say that? A. In previous administration — excuse me — yeah, he was a political appointee, it director was, so I don't know how well he knew her. D. What was the director's role in the provious administration, was she at CISA? A. No. Director Easterly was not at CISA, no. CISA, no. Drage 314 Drage 314 A. I'm sorry? Q. Was she in government? A. Prior to the — in the previous administration? A. I don't know. I think her immediate previous job was in the private spent any time, at all, in the — in the previous administration in government. Q. And here, Director Easterly says to where FED can work with platforms to better understand the miss, distrends so relevant agencies can try to prebunk/debunk as useful; correct? A. That's what she wrote, yeah. Q. And that discussion of trends is both; with social media platforms to identify trends; correct? A. She mentioned trends in both, A. She mentioned trends in both, A. She mentioned dirends in both, A. She mentioned trends in both, A. That's – that is one of our common	9	A. I don't have any clue.	9	with another federal agency to prebunk or debunk
12	10	Q. Next page, there's an e-mail from	10	it?
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agencies can try to prebunk/debunk as useful; correct? A. That's what she wrote, yeah. Q. And that discussion of trends is similar to her statement in the media article we just looked at about how CISA is interacting with social media platforms to identify trends; correct? A. That's what she wrote, yep. Q. What does D/A mean, is that department or agency? MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation. BY MR. SAUER: Q. If you know. A. That's that is one of our common	13	where FED can work with platforms to better	13	was looking to play a coord role so not every
16	14	understand the mis, dis trends so relevant	14	D/A is independently reaching out to platforms
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18 Q. And that discussion of trends is 19 similar to her statement in the media article we 20 just looked at about how CISA is interacting 21 with social media platforms to identify trends; 22 correct? 23 A. She mentioned trends in both, 21 department or agency? 19 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 20 speculation. 21 BY MR. SAUER: 22 Q. If you know. 23 A. That's that is one of our common	16	correct?	16	
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with social media platforms to identify trends; correct? A. She mentioned trends in both, with social media platforms to identify trends; 21 BY MR. SAUER: 22 Q. If you know. 23 A. That's that is one of our common				• •
22 correct? 22 Q. If you know. 23 A. She mentioned trends in both, 23 A. That's that is one of our common		,		•
A. She mentioned trends in both, 23 A. That's that is one of our common				
				•
24 correct. 24 abbreviations for department and agency, but I'm		•		
25 Q. And here she the reason she 25 not sure if that's what she's referring to here.	25	Q. And here she the reason she	25	not sure if that's what she's referring to here.

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	Page 317		Page 319
1	Q. Do you know let me ask this: Do	1	bathroom break.
2	you believe that if every federal department and	2	MR. SAUER: Well, why don't we make
3	agency is independently reaching out to the	3	it five, and try to make it the last break of
4	platforms that could cause chaos?	4	the day. How long have we been on the record?
5	A. Yeah, I think chaos might be a	5	MR. SCOTT: We got back on at 3:50,
6	little strong. But, you know, it does create	6	so it's 4:40, so it's 50 minutes in, we have an
7	challenges and provides the platforms	7	hour and 10 minutes left.
8	opportunities to play departments off each	8	MR. GARDNER: He's been reliable.
9	other.	9	We need to do this off the record, first of all.
10	Q. Does does CISA try to play a	10	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
11	coordinating role in that, in other words,	11	4:42. We are off the record.
12	coordinating between the federal agencies and	12	(Recess.)
13	the social media platforms on disinformation and	13	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is
14	misinformation issues?	14	4:53. We are back on the record.
15	 A. So we did do that as it relates to 	15	(Exhibit No. 30 was marked for
16	the sync meetings we discussed throughout the	16	identification.)
17	testimony. Beyond that, we didn't we didn't	17	BY MR. SAUER:
18	attempt to play a substantial role in terms of	18	Q. Exhibit 30 should be in your inbox.
19	coordinating between.	19	I'll put it up on the screen share.
20	Q. Let me ask you this: Matt	20	Here's an article in The Intercept
21	Masterson responds to this e-mail or this text	21	called Truth Cops, Leaked Documents Outline
22	and says: We'll get there, and that kind of	22	DHSA's Plans to Police Disinformation; do you
23	leadership really helps. Platforms have got to	23	see that?
24	get more comfortable with government. It's	24	A. Yeah, we don't have it on here, but
25	really interesting how hesitant they remain;	25	I saw the headline in your screen share.
	Page 318		Page 220
	. ago o lo		Page 320
1	correct?	1	•
1 2	correct?	1 2	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down,
2	correct? A. That's something I wrote.	1 2 3	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The
	correct?	2	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down,
2	correct? A. That's something I wrote. Q. Is that consistent with your experience that the social media platforms have	2	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The Department of Homeland Security is quietly
2 3 4	correct? A. That's something I wrote. Q. Is that consistent with your	2 3 4	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The Department of Homeland Security is quietly broadening its effort to curb speech it
2 3 4 5	correct? A. That's something I wrote. Q. Is that consistent with your experience that the social media platforms have to be kind of pushed or encouraged to coordinate	2 3 4 5	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The Department of Homeland Security is quietly broadening its effort to curb speech it considers dangerous; do you see that?
2 3 4 5 6	correct? A. That's something I wrote. Q. Is that consistent with your experience that the social media platforms have to be kind of pushed or encouraged to coordinate with the government on misinformation issues?	2 3 4 5 6	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The Department of Homeland Security is quietly broadening its effort to curb speech it considers dangerous; do you see that? A. I see that in the article, yep.
2 3 4 5 6 7	correct? A. That's something I wrote. Q. Is that consistent with your experience that the social media platforms have to be kind of pushed or encouraged to coordinate with the government on misinformation issues? A. I don't think that's how I would	2 3 4 5 6 7	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The Department of Homeland Security is quietly broadening its effort to curb speech it considers dangerous; do you see that? A. I see that in the article, yep. Q. Are you aware of DHS broadening its
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. That's something I wrote. Q. Is that consistent with your experience that the social media platforms have to be kind of pushed or encouraged to coordinate with the government on misinformation issues? A. I don't think that's how I would characterize it. You know, we operate in a voluntary kind of manner, so it's voluntary whether for CISA, again, for CISA, the MDM team, so it's always up to the platforms what level of engagement they want to have with us. Q. Do you know whether Masterson and Easterly had any further discussion of these issues? A. I don't know. Q. Let me send you a couple more exhibits. And while they are coming, do you know, were you involved, at all, in the formation MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, John, I'm sorry, the witness just asked me if we can take a break. MR. SAUER: Oh.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The Department of Homeland Security is quietly broadening its effort to curb speech it considers dangerous; do you see that? A. I see that in the article, yep. Q. Are you aware of DHS broadening its efforts to address disinformation? A. I am not, no. Q. Has CISA been expanding its MDM team? A. As I mentioned earlier, we have not. Q. Let me ask you this: Scrolling down here, third page of the document, it says: There is also a formalized process for government officials to directly flag content on Facebook or Instagram and request that it be throttled or suppressed through a special Facebook portal that requires a government or law enforcement e-mail to use; do you see that? A. Yeah, I see that in the article. Q. And it actually provides a link for it, Facebook.com/Xtakedowns/login; are you aware
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	correct? A. That's something I wrote. Q. Is that consistent with your experience that the social media platforms have to be kind of pushed or encouraged to coordinate with the government on misinformation issues? A. I don't think that's how I would characterize it. You know, we operate in a voluntary kind of manner, so it's voluntary whether for CISA, again, for CISA, the MDM team, so it's always up to the platforms what level of engagement they want to have with us. Q. Do you know whether Masterson and Easterly had any further discussion of these issues? A. I don't know. Q. Let me send you a couple more exhibits. And while they are coming, do you know, were you involved, at all, in the formation MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, John, I'm sorry, the witness just asked me if we can take a break.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down, still on the first page, it says: The Department of Homeland Security is quietly broadening its effort to curb speech it considers dangerous; do you see that? A. I see that in the article, yep. Q. Are you aware of DHS broadening its efforts to address disinformation? A. I am not, no. Q. Has CISA been expanding its MDM team? A. As I mentioned earlier, we have not. Q. Let me ask you this: Scrolling down here, third page of the document, it says: There is also a formalized process for government officials to directly flag content on Facebook or Instagram and request that it be throttled or suppressed through a special Facebook portal that requires a government or law enforcement e-mail to use; do you see that? A. Yeah, I see that in the article. Q. And it actually provides a link for

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Page 321	Page 323
1 officials?	1 related to them, and we just participate in
2 A. I am not, no.	2 meetings with them. From our perspective,
3 Q. On the next page, fourth page of	again, we're trying to understand trends, how
4 the document, it says: According to a draft	4 this information is spreading tactics so we can
5 copy of DHS's quadrennial Homeland Security	5 help the public, the public and organizations,
6 review, DHS's capstone report outlining the	6 critical infrastructure organizations, as well
7 department's strategy and priorities in the	7 as some others, understand the risks from MDM
8 coming years, the department plans to target	8 and how it works and what they can do about it.
9 inaccurate information on a wide range of	9 Q. Do you do you obtain information
topics; do you see that?	10 from CDC and HHS about how COVID vaccine
A. Yeah, I see that in the article.	11 misinformation spreads?
Q. Are you aware of the document	12 A. I believe that they provided some
that's a draft of the quadrennial Homeland	13 briefings on that, yeah.
1 4 Security review?	14 Q. And do you also provide briefings
A. I know it says quadrennial Homeland	15 to them or information to them?
Security review is, I don't know if I've seen	16 A. We did some work on the kind of
the draft of the most recent one.	17 bio-lab narratives, so this is essentially
Q. Have you seen any drafts of the	foreign governments, whenever anything happens,
19 most recent one?	19 whether biological and sometimes not, they will
A. Not that I recall.	20 point to US biolabs as being the culprit behind
Q. When does it when does it get	it, and so as part of our resilience-building
22 finalized?	efforts we're trying to understand how foreign
2.3 A. I I I don't know.	23 actors have used that narrative over time.
Q. It says: Including the origins of	24 And so we, starting back in the
the COVID-19 pandemic and the efforts of the	25 '80s, probably since back in the '80s, the
Dog 222	Dog 224
Page 322	Page 324
1 COVID-19 vaccines, racial justice, US withdrawal	1 Russians were using that. Usually they're
from Afghanistan, and the nature of US support	2 saying at Fort Detrick or some other kind of US
for Ukraine, in quotes; do you see that?	a entity is a biolab, and that's where whatever it
4 A. I do.	4 starts.
5 Q. Are you aware of discussions	5 We saw this with COVID. We saw
anywhere in DHS about addressing misinformation	6 this Monkey Pox. We saw this around Ukraine.
about the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic?	7 And so, again, just helping people understand
8 A. I am not.	8 that a lot of these disinformation narratives
9 Q. So how about the efficacy of	9 are recycled over time, for different issues, as
0 COVID-19 vaccines?	10 a way to help build resilience.
A. Yes, I'm aware of some discussions	Q. How about racial justice, are you
on that.	doing anything to address misinformation about
Q. What discussions are you aware of?	13 racial justice issue?
A. So it was a as I mentioned	14 A. CISA has not, to my knowledge, done
earlier, our building critical infrastructure	15 anything related to racial justice.
help in public health is one of the sectors of	Q. How about other DHS components, do
critical infrastructure, so we engage with CDC	17 they do anything on that?
and HHS to help them. We've also put out one	18 A. Not that I'm aware of, but
product, sometime in mid 2020, for	19 obviously I don't know everything that they do.
infrastructure stakeholders about COVID-related	20 Q. How about US withdrawal from
disinformation.	21 Afghanistan, does CISA work on that?
	22 A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. What do you do to assist CDC and	
Q. What do you do to assist CDC and HSH?	Q. And how about other DHS components?
Q. What do you do to assist CDC and	

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	Page 325		Page 327
1	A. Yeah, I I'm not aware of what	1	A. I don't know. There was a call, at
2 o	ther components are doing.	2	some point, early, between between critical
3	Q. And then the nature of US support	3	infrastructure and I believe some social media
4 tc	o Ukraine?	4	around that, but I wasn't around for that call
5	A. So there was a department stood	5	so I don't really know the nature of what was
6 o	ut, what's called the Unified Coordination	6	discussed or anything along those lines.
7 G	Group, when Russia invaded Ukraine, to	7	Q. There was a call between and I'm
8 c e	oordinate DHS activities related to the crisis.	8	sorry, I couldn't hear clearly what you said
9 A	as a part of that there was an MDM component,	9	there was a call between social media platforms
10 a	nd a member of the MDM team was detailed to	10	and and who?
11 le	ead the MDM component of the Russian/Ukraine	11	A. So I believe the way I understand
12 w	ork. I believe it lasted about two months.	12	the call is it facilitated a call with critical
13	Q. What did they do?	13	infrastructure, the critical infrastructure
14	A. The Unified Coordination Group.	14	community, to private sector companies, sector
15 S	Sorry.	15	risk management agencies, folks that were
16	Q. What did that group do?	16	involved in critical infrastructure security. I
17	A. So most of it took place while I	17	believe, my understanding is that call did
18 w	as out, so I don't have a super clear	18	include some social media platforms.
19 u	nderstanding of everything, but generally	19	Q. And you but you don't know what
20 s	peaking, they provided a they would monitor	20	was said in that call?
21 o	pen source researching.	21	A. No, I wasn't I wasn't back at
22	So we talk about third-party	22	CISA yet.
23 re	esearchers, we put out reports, and things like	23	Q. Do you know when the call occurred?
24 t h	nat, and they would provide situational	24	A. It would have been in probably the
25 a	wareness, at least from our perspective, CISA	25	February February time timeframe, I would
1	Page 326 erspective, they would provide situational wareness up to the MDM Unified Coordination	1 2	Page 328 think. Q. February 2022?
_	Group.	3	A. Correct.
4	Q. Who at CISA participated in that?	4	(Exhibit No. 31 was marked for
5	A. So Rob Schaul from the MDM team was	5	identification.)
	etailed to the Unified Coordination Group, and	6	BY MR. SAUER:
	nen several members of the team would have been	7	Q. I'm putting up Exhibit 31 on the
	nonitoring open source.	8	screen share. You should have it in front of
9	So we have the open source	9	you.
	eporting. These are third-party research	10	A. Okay. I got it.
	eports, things like that, to point to	11	Q. Here's a report from the Office of
	formation to just make leadership aware.	12	the Inspector General, entitled: DHS needs a
13	Q. Did they did that group	13	unified strategy to counter disinformation
	ommunicate with social media platforms about	14	campaigns; do you see that?
	isinformation relating to Ukraine?	15	A. I do.
16	A. By that group, do you mean Unified	16	Q. Are you familiar with this OIG
	coordination Group?	17	report?
18	Q. Correct.	18	A. Mostly familiar with it, yeah.
19	A. I I don't know.	19	Q. Were you aware that they do you
20	Q. Rob Schaul would know that?	20	know what the day of the report is?
21	A. He led the team, so I suspect he	21	A. Says August 10th, 2022.
	night.	22	Q. And I take it this report is
23	Q. Do you know if that team	23	recommending that here to what we have found,
	ommunicated with social media platforms, at	24	DHS needs unified strategy or to address
	II?	25	disinformation; right? Right here, it says:
1			, 3 · 3 · 3 · · 3 · · 3 · · 3 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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Page 329		Page 331
DHS does not yet have a unified department-wide	1	staff plus one on maternity leave, so six. And
strategy to effectively counter disinformation	2	then we have one, two, two contractor's
that originates from both foreign and domestic	3	support no, three contractor's supporting us.
sources; correct?	4	Q. Did at some time you have 15 people
A. I'm trying to find that. Okay.	5	working on this on the MDM team?
Q. Yeah.	6	A. I suspect at the height of the team
A. DHS does not yet have a unified	7	if you add in all the contractors there it
strategy. Correct, yeah, that's what's written	8	probably got close to 15, but I'm not sure of
there.	9	the exact number.
Q. Do you share that view, do you	10	Q. When was the height of the team?
think DHS lacks a department-wide strategy?	11	 A. Staff plus contractors was
A. Yes.	12	probably good question. When was the height
Q. Do you think that different	13	of the team? We didn't have much contract
components of DHS are engaging in different sort	14	support in 2020, so I would probably say 2021,
of MDM-related activities without coordinating	15	while I was gone.
with each other?	16	Q. It says: The MDM team focuses on
A. Yeah, I think that's a fair	17	disinformation activities targeting elections
assumption.	18	and critical infrastructure. According to a
Q. Were you aware that this	19	CISA official, the MDM team counters all types
recommendation was made for DHS to do internal	20	of disinformation, to be responsive to current
and external coordination better?	21	events; is that right?
A. Was I aware that this report was	22	 A. That's what the document says, yep.
stating that DHS needs to do better in internal	23	Q. Is that true that the MDM team
and external coordination?	24	counters all types of disinformation to be
Q. Yeah.	25	responsive to current events?
A. I I don't know if that's what it says, is there a page in here where that	1 2	A. We, again, try to build resilience and reduce risks to critical infrastructure. So
recommendation is or those recommendations?	3	I you know, if the event could impact
Q. Let's go to page 7.	4	critical infrastructure, that would be something
A. Is this PDF 7 or document page 7?	5	we would consider addressing.
Q. Good question. It's PDF 9,	6	Q. Does critical infrastructure
document	7	include cognitive infrastructure?
A. PDF 9? Okay.	8	A. Not through national policy.
Q. It's here underneath the graphic	9	Q. Okay. Let me go two pages further,
novels images, there's a paragraph that begins:	10	paragraph page 9, it says: For example,
More recently; do you see that?	11	according to an ODNI official, prior to the
A. Yep.	12	November 2020 elections CISA and I&A joined in
Q. It says: In January 2021 CISA	13	weekly teleconferences to coordinate
transitioned its countering foreign influence	14	intelligence community activities to counter
task force to promote more flexibility to focus	15	election-related disinformation; correct?
on general MDM; right?	16	A. That's what the document says, yes.
A. Mm-hmm, that's what it says.	17	Q. Were you aware of those calls,
Q. And that CISA's got 15 dedicated	18	that's a coordinating call between CISA, I&A and
part- and full-time staff; is that still true?	19	ODNI?
A. No.	20	A. No, that was a coordinate so
Q. I'm sorry, the MDM team has 15	21	yeah, from the call, but the calls were DNI-led
staff; is that still true?	22	coordination calls of the intelligence
·		
A. No.	23	community. CISA was there mostly from an
·		community. CISA was there mostly from an observer standpoint, to do as an election
	DHS does not yet have a unified department-wide strategy to effectively counter disinformation that originates from both foreign and domestic sources; correct? A. I'm trying to find that. Okay. Q. Yeah. A. DHS does not yet have a unified strategy. Correct, yeah, that's what's written there. Q. Do you share that view, do you think DHS lacks a department-wide strategy? A. Yes. Q. Do you think that different components of DHS are engaging in different sort of MDM-related activities without coordinating with each other? A. Yeah, I think that's a fair assumption. Q. Were you aware that this recommendation was made for DHS to do internal and external coordination better? A. Was I aware that this report was stating that DHS needs to do better in internal and external coordination? Q. Yeah. Page 330 A. I I don't know if that's what it says, is there a page in here where that recommendation is or those recommendations? Q. Let's go to page 7. A. Is this PDF 7 or document page 7? Q. Good question. It's PDF 9, document A. PDF 9? Okay. Q. It's here underneath the graphic novels images, there's a paragraph that begins: More recently; do you see that? A. Yep. Q. It says: In January 2021 CISA transitioned its countering foreign influence task force to promote more flexibility to focus on general MDM; right? A. Mm-hmm, that's what it says. Q. And that CISA's got 15 dedicated part- and full-time staff; is that still true? A. No.	DHS does not yet have a unified department-wide strategy to effectively counter disinformation that originates from both foreign and domestic sources; correct? A. I'm trying to find that. Okay. Q. Yeah. A. DHS does not yet have a unified strategy. Correct, yeah, that's what's written there. Q. Do you share that view, do you think DHS lacks a department-wide strategy? A. Yes. Q. Do you think that different components of DHS are engaging in different sort of MDM-related activities without coordinating with each other? A. Yeah, I think that's a fair assumption. Q. Were you aware that this recommendation was made for DHS to do internal and external coordination better? A. Was I aware that this report was stating that DHS needs to do better in internal and external coordination? Q. Yeah. Page 330 A. I I don't know if that's what it says, is there a page in here where that recommendation is or those recommendations? Q. Let's go to page 7. A. Is this PDF 7 or document page 7? Q. Good question. It's PDF 9, document A. PDF 9? Okay. Q. It's here underneath the graphic novels images, there's a paragraph that begins: More recently; do you see that? A. Yep. Q. It says: In January 2021 CISA transitioned its countering foreign influence task force to promote more flexibility to focus on general MDM; right? A. Mm-hmm, that's what it says. Q. And that CISA's got 15 dedicated part- and full-time staff; is that still true? A. No.

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	Page 333		Page 335
l comn	nunity-focused coordination and conversation.	1	MR. GARDNER: Not Exhibit 27?
2	Q. Who from CISA participated in those	2	MR. SAUER: 27 should look familiar
3 calls	?	3	to you. We talked about it already.
4	A. I think it was just a random a	4	MR. GARDNER: Okay. Just to be
5 rando	om mix. Geoff did not generally participate	5	clear, are we talking about 27 now or a
	m. I didn't generally participate in	6	different exhibit?
7 them	, although I think I did maybe once or	7	MR. SAUER: 23.
	, normally somebody at the staff level.	8	MR. GARDNER: Okay. Don't have
9	Yeah, we have an intel office in	9	that yet, but as soon as we do.
CISA	, so I suspect that at least somebody from	10	MR. SAUER: And I'm putting it up
	itel office was on the calls. But I think	11	on the screen share, too.
	s just, you know, it was who's available at	12	(Exhibit No. 23 was marked for
	taff level would go participate at that	13	identification.)
time.	an lover would go participate at that	14	BY MR. SAUER:
	Q. Was disinformation, you know, how	15	Q. Here's a November 2021 report on
	mbat disinformation on social media, is	16	public comments by Director Easterly and The
	discussed in these calls?	17	Hill; do you see that?
7 	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	18	A. Yes.
	ulation, lack of foundation.		Q. It says: The title is cyber agency
•	•	19	
	A. My understanding, my recollection	20	beefing up disinformation misinformation team;
	e calls, at least the couple I was on, it	21	correct?
-	generally the intel community talking about	22	A. Correct.
	products they were developing, what	23	Q. And in the first paragraph says:
-	sis they were doing, things along those	24	CISA is beefing up its disinformation and
5 lines.		25	misinformation team in the wake of a dismissive
	Page 334		Page 336
1	Q. The next sentence says: The office	1	precedential election that saw a proliferation
of the	DNI official stated the teleconferences	2	of misleading online information; correct?
3 conti	nue to occur every two weeks after the 2020	3	A. Yeah, that's what the article says.
4 elect	ions, and were still taking place at the	4	Q. Were you aware of efforts to beef
5 time	of this audit in August of 2022; do you see	5	up the misinformation team in November of '21?
6 that?		6	A. No, not specific efforts. I was
7	A. Ido.	7	over at the National Security Council at the
3	Q. Yeah, what are those calls still	8	time.
	g on today, every two weeks?	9	Q. When did you come back from that
	A. I don't know. That was that's	10	detail?
	THAT they're still continuing to November	11	A. The detail officially ended in
	22 is news to me. So yeah, I don't as	12	early March, and I took some leave and started
	s I know, we weren't participating in them.	13	back at CISA in early to mid April.
	Ildn't be surprised if there was some calls	14	Q. And the director says in the next
	g on, but I don't recall. The intel	15	paragraph: I'm actually going to grow and
0 0	nunity doesn't tell community things when I	16	strengthen my misinformation and disinformation
	nvolved in that.	17	team; do you see that?
	Q. Why don't I e-mail you another	18	A. I do.
	it, 27.	19	Q. I know you were on detail then, are
g ex ilik		20	
	MR. GARDNER: John, if you just		you aware of efforts to grow and strengthen the
1	e, I couldn't hear you, but sound wasn't	21 22	team, for example, by adding new people?
	ng through.		A. Again as I mentioned earlier in my
2 comi			
2 comi	MR. SAUER: I'm sorry. Yeah,	23	testimony, my understanding is there was some
comi comi actua	MR. SAUER: I'm sorry. Yeah, ally, I'm going to skip that one. I meant bit 23, which I'm now e-mailing you.	23 24 25	budget increase that was proposed. I don't I don't know if that moved forward or not, from

	Page 337		Page 339
1	the department.	1	and those are the critical infrastructure
2	Q. Is the do these remarks coincide	2	factors we look to protect. So we wouldn't
3	with what you said was kind of the high point,	3	include cognitive infrastructure in that list.
4	when you had 15 people on the MDM team, was that	4	Q. One of them is election
5	around, you know, November 2021?	5	infrastructure; is that right?
6	A. It's hard to say for sure. I'm	6	A. Election infrastructure is actually
7	not I'm not sure how they're counting	7	a subsector of the government's stability
8	positions. So I don't think we ever had 15	8	structure.
9	federal employees. So there's, you know, it	9	Q. So if someone posts information on
10	seems to me like they were probably counting	10	social media implying that, you know, ballots
11	contract support, so so it's hard for me to	11	were being shredded by poll workers, what
12	say exactly when that would have been.	12	infrastructure is that a threat to?
13	Q. You say there was, in this	13	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
14	timeframe, some attempt to get budget authority	14	a hypothetical.
15	to add people to the MDM team?	15	A. Yeah, I would rather not answer
16	A. It was my understanding that there	16	hypotheticals.
17	was a request for additional funds made to the	17	Q. You have no instruction not to
18	budget. But again, I don't know, the budget	18	answer, please answer the question.
19	process is a little bit of a mystery to me, so	19	MR. GARDNER: Same objection.
20	I'm not sure what exactly happened along the	20	A. Yeah, I'm not answering a
21	way, if it ended up in the you know, in the	21	hypothetical.
22	budget requests or what.	22	Q. Please answer the questions. If
23	Q. The next paragraph says that	23	someone posts on social media
24	Easterly noted that earlier this week she had a	24	A. Can you give me an example of the
25	meeting with six of the nation's experts in that	25	post?
1	Page 338 misinformation and disinformation space; do you	1	Page 340 Q. If you look at all the posts we
2	see that?	2	looked at earlier in your e-mails, where, for
3	A. I do.	3	example, suppose someone posts the hammer and
4	Q. Do you know who she met with?	4	scorecard conspiracy on social media, and
5	A. I don't.	5	Director Krebs tells you to reach out to social
6	Q. Do you know who are six of the	6	media platforms to see what they're doing about
7	nation's experts in disinformation and	7	it, how does the posting about the hammer and
8	misinformation?	8	scorecard narrative on social media threaten
9	A. I mean, I could come up with a list	9	critical infrastructure?
10	of experts. I don't know if that's who she met	10	A. So it so generally speaking,
11	with.	11	this mis, mal-information threatens critical
12	Q. She stressed her concerns around	12	infrastructure in a number of ways, it could be
13	this being a top threat for CISA; correct?	13	operational impact, so in the case of the
14	A. That's what the article says, yep.	14	elections, disrupting election operations,
15	Q. And it goes on to quote her,	15	things along those lines. It could be human
16	saying: One could argue we're in the business	16	impact, so again, see election example, there's
17	of critical infrastructure, and the most	17	a lot of threats of violence made against
18	critical infrastructure is our cognitive	18	election officials, making it harder to do their
19	infrastructure; correct?	19	jobs.
20	A. That's what the quote says, yep.	20	So a multitude of ways that
21	Q. Do you do you do you does	21	disinformation could impact critical
	the MDM team view protecting our cognitive	22	infrastructure, like I said, we you know,
22		1	•
22 23	infrastructure as part of its mission?	1 23	there's financial, there's reputational there's
23	infrastructure as part of its mission? A. No. We look at the again, the	23	there's financial, there's reputational, there's iust a multitude of ways that this
	infrastructure as part of its mission? A. No. We look at the again, the international policy there's, like, 16 sectors,	23 24 25	inere's financial, there's reputational, there's just a multitude of ways that this disinformation could affect critical

	Page 341		Page 343
1	infrastructure.	1	financial services industry?
2	Q. Does infrastructure have a	2	A. So again, our mission is to build
3	reputational interest?	3	resilience. And so we would work if the
4	A. Does infrastructure have a	4	financial services sector wanted us to work with
5	reputational interest?	5	them, to develop products to help them
6	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.	6	understand how mis, dis and mal-information
7	THE WITNESS: Yeah, could you be a	7	could impact their their sector, we would
8	little more specific.	8	we would work with them on that yes.
9	BY MR. SAUER:	9	Q. What sorts of mis, dis and
10	Q. You just used the word, you said	10	mal-information might undermine confidence in
11	there's financial, there's reputational, what do	11	the financial services?
12	you mean by that? What is the reputational	12	A. I don't know. We haven't we
13	threat to critical infrastructure from social	13	haven't dealt with that. We're not financial
14	media postings?	14	services experts, so we generally defer to a
15	A. Well, I wouldn't I wasn't saying	15	department or agency.
16	specifically from social media postings. I was	16	So in this case, Treasury, the
17	saying from fraud, from mis, dis and	17	sector risk management agency responsible for
18	mal-information, a reputational risk could come	18	the financial services sector, so our expertise
19	about if the integrity or the public confidence	19	with the MDM team is understanding MDM and
20	in a particular sector was critical to that	20	potentially to mitigate risks and to build
21	sector's functioning.	21	resilience, and so we wouldn't be the experts on
22	So I think the financial services	22	the actual financial services MDM.
	would probably be a good example. So if there's		Q. So everything you just said about
23		23	
24 25	a loss of confidence by the American public in	24	the financial services was a lengthy
23	financial services, financial systems of the	25	hypothetical?
	Page 342		Page 344
1	United States, that could create national	1	A. Like I said, I don't like getting
2	security concerns.	2	into hypotheticals.
3	Q. Explain that to me, how would a	3	Q. You did for awhile, there.
4	loss of confidence in the financial system	4	Scrolling down in the same
5	create national security concerns?	5	document, it says there's a quote from
6	A. Lots of ways, you can have runs on	6	Director Easterly, where she says now
7	banks, such as the banking, you could have, you	7	MR. GARDNER: Sorry, hold on.
8	know, other sorts of issues related to that, so	8	MR. SAUER: Can you guys hear me
9	yeah, so there's you know, if there's a loss	9	now?
10	of confidence, if there's a run on banks and	10	MR. GARDNER: Yeah.
11	there's a run on the financial systems, those	11	MR. SAUER: Okay.
12	sorts of things can create physical harms,	12	BY MR. SAUER:
13	operational harms.	13	Q. Quote from Director Easterly, we
14	So again, if we go back to the list	14	now live in a world where people talk about
15	of potential harms, the reputational could lead	15	alternative facts, post truth, which I think is
16	to operational, right? So banks could be	16	really, really dangerous, if you get to pick
17	overwhelmed with people showing up trying to	17	your own facts, and it's particularly corrosive
18	take money out. They could be overwhelmed with	18	when you talk about matters of election
19	people showing up elsewhere at other facilities	19	security; right?
20	and disrupt our operations. So it's a full	20	A. That's the quote, yeah.
21	range of potential risks. A lot of these are	21	Q. And is that kind of consistent with
22	cascading, and so, yeah.	22	what the MDM team does, it tries to prevent a
23	Q. So is it part of the MDM team's job	23	situation where Americans get to pick their own
	and CISA's job to counter disinformation that	24	facts?
24	and olog job to counter distribution that	47	iuoto.
24 25	creates reputational risks to, for example, the	25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.

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	Page 345		Page 347
1	A. I I that's no, that's not	1	media, is that a form of engagement?
2 c	onsistent with what we do.	2	A. Yep.
3	Q. So that's that's not a you	3	Q. How about just reading it, is that
4 d	on't think Director Easterly's description is	4	a form of engagement?
	ery fair?	5	A. No.
6	MR. GARDNER: Objection,	6	Q. So if you're reading disinformation
7 n	nischaracterizes the witness's previous	7	is not engagement with it?
	estimony.	8	A. Correct.
9	A. Yeah, if I understand your question	9	Q. But but so engagement is taking
10 y	ou said that CISA played a role in alternate	10	some affirmative step further, like you said,
11 fa	acts and post truths and things like that, and	11	amplify, like, repost, that's kind of
12 C	CISA does not do that sort of thing.	12	disinformation, in your view, I'm sorry, that's
13	MR. SAUER: Sending you a few more	13	engagement; correct?
14 e	xhibits by e-mail. You should be getting two	14	A. Yes.
15 e	-mails, the first one with three attachments,	15	Q. And it's part of CISA's or the
16 a	nd the second one with one.	16	CISA's job to try to reduce the amount that that
17	It may take a minute. It's loading	17	happens; right?
18 s	lowly on my end. Okay. I'm opening Exhibit	18	A. I wouldn't characterize it that
19 4	9, and I'll put that on the screen share.	19	way. I would say the ultimate goal of building
20	(Exhibit No. 49 was marked for	20	resilience is that people are less likely to
21 ic	dentification.)	21	amplify mis and disinformation.
22 B Y	MR. SAUER:	22	Q. And that's what you're trying to do
23	Q. Did you give an interview to the	23	at the MDM team, is reduce the amount that
24 B	Serkman Klein Center on June 18th of 2020?	24	Americans engage with disinformation?
25	A. I don't recall the specific date,	25	A. Yeah, through public awareness and
2 pro	at I did give them an interview, so that's obably about right.	1 2	public engagement and things like that, yep. Q. The last page of the document, you
3	Q. And this is an interview by The	3	say here there's a paragraph where you say:
	eakdown. And do you recall doing this	4	The question is, we have people calling for more
	terview?	5	monitoring of speech on platforms. And then you
6	A. I do.	6	go on to say: We have to built the platforms
7	Q. On the third page of the document,	7	that this is a lie and they need to take it down
_	u say: For us, in particular oops, it	8	or we're asking the platforms to do that; right?
	dn't highlight well for us, in particular,	9	A. Yeah, that's what that's what
	u see here, it's the second bullet for us,	10	the quote is, yep. Q. Okay. Is that, in fact, what the
	particular, we're trying to reduce the amount at Americans engage with disinformation;	11	
		12	MDM team is doing or I guess it was countering foreign influence task force team was doing in
1	jht? A. Yes.	13	2020 when it was routing disinformation concerns
14 15	Q. Is that to your mind, is that a	14 15	to Facebook, were you telling them to
	ood summary of what the MDM team does, it tries	16	A. No.
_	reduce the amount that Americans engage with	17	Q. Go ahead.
	sinformation?	18	A. No. Essentially what this quote is
19	A. That's the general idea behind	19	saying is that in the general conversation about
	silience-building, yeah.	20	how to address mis and disinformation there are
21	Q. What is engaging with	21	a lot of people saying that we should the
	sinformation?	22	government should be the ones taking things
23	A. Amplifying it, re-tweeting it,	23	down, or the government should be asking the
	sending it, things like that.	24	platforms to do certain things, and that's not
25	Q. How about liking it on social	25	necessarily the right spot for government to be.

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1	Q. So when you say: We have to tell	1	reached out, but CISA obviously, as we discussed
2	the platforms that this is a lie and they need	2	earlier, has points of contact in various social
3	to take it down, you're attributing that view to	3	media companies.
4	other people, not yourself?	4	Q. Does that happen from time to time,
5	A. Yeah, so that's generally what we	5	that other agencies would reach out to CISA and
6	hear a lot, you go out and you talk to different	6	say: Can you put us in touch with a social
7	groups about disinformation that's just a common	7	media contact?
8	theme that we would hear from people that we	8	A. It's it's happened a couple
9	should be doing.	9	times. I don't I don't I don't recall how
10	And as I mentioned, the rest of the	10	many, and it's it's been awhile, I think,
11	quote is is it's just not a question of	11	but so if that qualifies as time to time.
12	what we should be doing. There's lots of issues	12	Q. Do you know what Lauren Protentis
13	and things like that there. So that's what I	13	meant when she talked about social media
14	was trying to get across there.	14	influence matters, do you know what that means?
15	(Exhibit No. 52 was marked for	15	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
16	identification.)	16	speculation.
17	BY MR. SAUER:	17	A. Yeah, I don't know what she means.
18	Q. Exhibit 52.	18	Q. Were you on detail when this e-mail
19	A. 52? I've got it.	19	was sent?
20	MR. SAUER: How long have we been	20	A. I was.
21	on the record.	21	Q. Do you remember any discussions
22	MR. SCOTT: So I have an unofficial	22	with anyone about the Department of Treasury
23	tally of six hours and 32 minutes.	23	reaching out to discuss I'm sorry wanting
24	MR. SAUER: Okay. Exhibit	24	to be put in place in contact with social media
25	MR. GARDNER: I agree.	25	platforms?
1	BY MR. SAUER:	1	A. I don't, no.
2	Q. Exhibit 52, if we go in this	2	Q. There's a follow up e-mail from
3	e-mail excuse me, there's an e-mail from	3	Ms. Protentis, saying: Apologies for the second e-mail, this is somewhat time sensitive. Do you
4 5	Lauren Protentis copying Allison Snell and Geoff Hale and Rob Schaul to a contact at Google; do	4 5	know why Treasury was raising a time sensitive
6	you see that?	6	concern concern?
	-	7	
7 8	A. Mm-hmm. Q. And she says, this is in February	8	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for speculation.
9	17th of 2022; do you see that?	9	A. I don't know.
10	A. I do.	10	Q. Do you know if Treasury ever
11	Q. And she says: Hi Richard, I hope	11	connected with the social media platform?
12	this e-mail finds you well. The Department of	12	A. I don't know.
13	Treasury has asked our team for an appropriate	13	(Exhibit No. 46 was marked for
14	POCs I assume that means points of contact	14	identification.)
15	to discuss social media and influence matters.	15	BY MR. SAUER:
16	We would like to make a connection to Google, if	16	Q. I'm pulling up Exhibit 46. It
17	you're amenable; do you see that?	17	should be in the second e-mail I sent you a
18	A. I do.	18	moment ago.
19	Q. What do you know why Treasury	19	A. I got it.
20	reached out to CISA to get a contact for at	20	Q. Here's a draft report to the CISA
21	social media platforms to discuss social media	21	director, dated June 22nd, 2022; correct?
22	and influence matters?	22	A. Yes.
23	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	23	Q. This is from the CISA cyber
24	foundation.	24	security advisory committee; correct?
25	A. I I don't know why Treasury	25	A. It appears so, yep.
			. i. it appears so, yop.

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	Page 353		Page 355
1	Q. I believe you said in your	1	A. Correct.
2	interrogatory responses that this also has an	2	Q. So the advisory committee is
3	MDM subcommittee; is that right?	3	recommending that CISA focus on election-related
4	A. Yes, that's correct.	4	disinformation; right?
5	Q. Do you participate in those	5	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
6	committees, either the security advisory	6	foundation.
7	committee or the MDM subcommittee?	7	A. That's how I would read that
8	A. I don't.	8	sentence, correct.
9	Q. Who participates from does	9	Q. Okay. Second bullet point says:
10	anyone participate from the MDM team in those	10	MD that undermines critical functions carried
11	those committees?	11	out by other key democratic institutions, such
12	A. Not from the MDM team, no.	12	as the courts or by other sectors, such as the
	Q. So no one on the MDM team	13	financial system or public health measures;
13		14	•
14	participates in the committees?		right?
15	A. No.	15	A. That's what it says, yep.
16	Q. Who from CISA participates, do you	16	Q. You talked about the financial
17	know?	17	system, earlier, and interestingly that's raised
18	A. Kim Wyman is, as I mentioned	18	in this recommendation. Are you aware of CISA
19	earlier, I think, that was one of her	19	doing anything to address MD that undermines the
20	responsibilities, and then Geoff Hale	20	financial system?
21	participated.	21	A. So we've as I mentioned earlier,
22	Q. And then who else, from outside	22	we we're working with Treasury to develop a
23	CISA, participates in these meetings?	23	product to help the financial services sector
24	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	24	understand MDM risks to the sector.
25	foundation.	25	Q. What risks have there been to that
1 2	A. I don't know who's I don't know who's in the the participant list. I believe	1 2	sector? And I don't remember any runs on banks, you know, recently, what risks?
3	it's all publicly available online.	3	A. So again, as I mentioned earlier,
4	Q. Turning to the second page of this	4	we're not the experts in financial services, so
5	document.	5	we, you know, depend on the financial services
		6	sector to kind of work us through, help us work
6 7	A. Okay. Recommendations?Q. Yeah. First bullet point, do you	7	through what those risks are, we're pretty early
8	see there, it says: CISA should focus on MD	8	in the process, so we're still kind of working
9	l assume that's mis and disinformation?	9	through those sorts of questions.
		1	Q. Do you know what, what was the
10	A. Is that a question?	10	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
11	Q. Yeah. Is that	11	impetus for doing that product in the first place? Was someone worried about MDM that would
12	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	12	•
13	speculation, lack of foundation.	13	undermine financial services?
14	BY MR. SAUER:	14	A. I I don't I don't know why
15	Q. Does MD refer to mis and	15	Treasury reached out to us and discussed that, I
16	disinformation?	16	don't recall.
17	A. In the context, I would say that it	17	Q. Is that unrelated to the last
18	does, but I don't I don't know what they	18	e-mail we saw, where they wanted to talk to
19	meant by it.	19	social media platforms about social media and
20	Q. It says: CISA should focus on MD	20	influence matters?
21	that risks undermining critical functions of	21	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
22	American society, including sub-bullet one, MD	22	speculation, lack of foundation.
23	that suppresses election participation or	23	A. Yeah, I don't know. I don't know
		24	if the two are connected.
24 25	falsely undermines confidence in election procedures and outcomes; correct?	25	Q. Okay. The bottom of the same page,

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	Page 357		Page 359
1	there's a bullet recommending that CISA should	1	approach the MDM problem, you know, with a whole
2	consider MD across the information ecosystem;	2	information universe in mind, including
3	right?	3	mainstream media, cable news, hyper partisan
4	A. Yep.	4	media, talk radio, and other online resources?
5	Q. And it goes down in the second	5	MR. GARDNER: Objection, form.
6	sub-bullet there, it says: CISA should approach	6	A. What I would say, from a
7	the MD problems with the entire information	7	resilience-building standpoint, we generally
8	ecosystem in mind, this includes social media	8	don't try not to hone too much on any one
9	platforms of all sizes, mainstream media, cable	9	particular medium for communication. There's
10	news, hyper partisan media, talk radio and other	10	obviously tactics that fall across multiple, but
11	online resources; do you see that?	11	we don't generally try to hone in on any one in
12	A. I do.	12	particular.
13	Q. Has CISA been taking steps to	13	(Exhibit No. 59 was marked for
14	consider or address misinformation in these	14	identification.)
15	other venues, besides social media, for example,	15	BY MR. SAUER:
16	mainstream media?	16	Q. I'm pulling up Exhibit 59.
17	A. No. What I would say is that,	17	A. Okay.
18	generally speaking, we we I believe it's	18	Q. And then here's a cyber security
19	generally too much of a focus on just the social	19	advisory committee e-mail to a group, I assume
20	media platform, and MDM that kind of flows	20	it's the committee members; does that look right
21	through social media. When potentially it's MDM	21	to you or do you not know?
22	that flows through all different sources of	22	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
23	media communication.	23	foundation, calls for speculation.
24	So that's kind of how we think	24	A. Yeah, I don't I don't know who
25	about it, we try not to just focus on MDM, but	25	all the members are, so it would be hard for me
1 2	we don't do anything counter to your point. Again, we built resilience helping people	1 2	to say if that's the case. Q. Here's some people that are copied
3	understand what's going on and how to mitigate	3	on this e-mail from the CISA cyber security
4	the risks.	4	advisory committee e-mail, the first one is Kate
5	Q. Do you try to build resilience to	5	Starbird; right?
6	MDM on in cable news?	6	A. Yeah.
7	A. I mean, generically speaking, all	7	Q. Do you know who she is?
8	of our resilience activity would be useful	8	A. She's a professor at the University
9	regardless of how we try to make it as broad	9	of Washington.
10	as possible so it's applicable anywhere that	10	Q. She was involved in the Election
11	somebody may come across MDM.	11	Integrity Partnership that we talked about
12	Q. How about hyper partisan media,	12	earlier; right?
13	what does that mean, do you know?	13	A. I believe so, yeah.
14	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for	14	Q. Next one is Vijaya Gadde or Gadde,
15	speculation.	15	do you know who she is?
16	A. I don't know what it's meant in	16	A. I don't know.
17	this context, but again, we try to be general	17	Q. Was she a senior official at
18	enough in our kind of guidance to help people	18	Twitter, at the time, do you know?
19	understand.	19	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
20	We're essentially agnostic of where	20	speculation.
21	it's coming from, we just want people to be able	21	A. I don't know.
22	to understand where what it is, how it works,	22	Q. I see you've got Kim Wyman and
23	and things they can do to mitigate those risks.	23	Geoff Hale on this e-mail. They were the two
20	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		•
24	Q. I take it, then, the MDM team would	24	that you testified earlier are involved in the

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	Page 361		Page 363
1	right?	1	5:53 p.m. We're back on the record.
2	A. Yep.	2	MR. SAUER: Are we back on the
3	Q. And then lower down, there's a list	3	record?
4	of we have identified a list of potential	4	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yes.
5	subject matter experts to potentially brief at	5	MR. SAUER: Oh, sorry.
6	our biweekly meetings, bios attached; do you see	6	(Exhibit No. 19 was marked for
7	that?	7	identification.)
8	A. Ido.	8	BY MR. SAUER:
9	Q. So and that's a list of, I take	9	Q. Exhibit 19, I put it on the screen
10	it, experts who would provide briefings at the	10	share.
11	advisory committee's meetings; is that how you	11	Here's a proposal from CIS, Center
12	read that?	12	For Internet Security, to create an election
13	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of	13	misinformation reporting portal, and it talks
14	foundation, calls for speculation.	14	about the benefits to election officials being
15	A. So the paragraph reads: Identify a	15	in a single place for reporting mis and
16	list of subject matter experts. Please be	16	disinformation across multiple social media
17	prepared to provide your feedback. I'm sorry,	17	platforms.
18	what was your question again?	18	Do you know if this proposal was
19	Q. Let me just ask: Is the third	19	ever implemented to create a single election
20	expert on the list is Renée DiResta; right?	20	misinformation reporting portal?
21	A. Yeah.	21	A. I I don't know. I'm not
22	Q. And she's at Stanford Internet	22	entirely sure. I don't know that I've seen
23	Observatory; right?	23	this, I don't know if I've seen this proposal
24	A. Correct.	24	before, so I'm not certain.
25	Q. You were involved in conversations	25	Q. So you don't know?
25	Q. Tod were involved in conversations	23	Q. 30 you don't know!
	Page 362		Page 364
1	with her, because she was a part of the Election	1	A. It sounds like what they were
2	Integrity Partnership; right?	2	trying to do, that we discussed earlier, but I
3	A. We should have Stanford Internet	3	don't know to what extent it was, to your
4	Observatory, we were certainly involved in	4	question, to what extent it was stood up or
5	conversations with her, as I talked about	5	established.
6	earlier.	6	Q. You don't know to what extent that
7	Q. And those conversations were	7	CIS managed to implement this proposal for an
8	related to the commencement of the Election	8	elections misinformation reporting portal?
9	Integrity Partnership; right?	9	A. Yeah, or if they if they did it
10	A. I I don't know if she was	10	at all.
11	involved in the early conversations, before it	11	(Exhibit No. 21 was marked for
12	stood up. I know Stamos was there, I don't know	12	identification.)
13	if Renée was there in those early conversations.	13	BY MR. SAUER:
14	Q. Was she in some conversations	14	Q. Exhibit 21, it's on the screen
15	between with you about the EIP?	15	share, this is a CNN political report, September
16	A. As I mentioned before, she briefed	16	of 2022. If you go to the third fourth page
17	us about the 2022 EIP work. I don't recall	17	of the document, in this report it says: While
18	conversations in 2020, but again, it wouldn't	18	the anti-doxing and foreign influence parts of
19	surprise me if she was involved in those.	19	the proposal remain stalled, work on the online,
	MR. SAUER: Let's go off the	20	quote, portal for election officials to flag
20	5	21	misinformation to social media platforms
20 21	record.	2.1	
21			predated the proposal and continues today.
21 22	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now	22	predated the proposal and continues today, according to people familiar with it.
21 22 23	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 5:46 p.m. We are off the record.	22 23	according to people familiar with it.
21 22	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now	22	

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1 online portal for ele	ection officials to flag	1	A. No. Like I said earlier, we didn't
2 misinformation to s	social media platforms.	2 do t	his in 2022, so we should change that to
3 A. So I think a	as I testified to	3 serv	ed. Thank you for finding that.
4 earlier, my understa	anding is that CIS did do	4	Q. And I take it you you testified
5 something along the	e lines, I just don't know the	5 earl	ier that that decision was made in late
6 extent of it.		6 Apr	il or early May of 2022?
7 Q. And you d	on't know whether or when	7	A. That's my recollection.
8 it it might be con		8	Q. Do you know why the decision was
9 A. Correct.		9 mac	de?
10 (Exhibit No.	24 was marked for	10	A. I don't, but as I also mentioned,
11 identification.)		11 it wa	as something that we were comfortable with,
12 BY MR. SAUER:		12 from	n the MDM team perspective, because of heavy
13 Q. Exhibit 24	, here's a CISA bulletin	13 burd	den on our resources.
14 that's on your web		14	Q. You anticipate serving in a
15 A. Mm-hmm.		15 swi t	tchboard in the future or do you not know
16 Q misinfor	mation, you go to the		ther you will?
17 third page.		17	A. That's not my decision to make,
18 A. Correct.		18 so -	so I don't want to speak on behalf of the
19 Q. Are you fa	miliar with this		ctor or future directors.
20 bulletin?		20	Q. You don't know what the director's
	think this may be our	21 plar	ns are for the future when it comes to
22 website. I'm not sur	-	•	ring as a switchboard for routing
			nformation concerns?
24 know if it's a bullet		24	A. I don't know what direct
	,		ector Easterly's position is, and obviously l
	Page 366		Page 368
1 third page, it says:	Bridging election	1 wor	uldn't know any future director's position on
2 stakeholders and so	ocial media, and under there	2 tha	t, either.
3 it says: The MDM te	eam serves as a switchboard	3	(Exhibit No. 6 was marked for
4 for routing disinforr	nation concerns to		ntification.)
5 appropriate social n	nedia platforms and law	5 BY N	MR. SAUER:
6 enforcement; correct	ct.	6	Q. Exhibit 6?
7 A. It does, yep	D.	7	A. Okay.
8 Q. You guys re	efer stuff to law	8	Q. Here's a public comments by Renée
9 enforcement, too?		9 DiF	Resta about about the Election Integrity
10 A. Yes, if there	e was particularly	10 Pro	ject. And let me put it on the screen share.
11 if there was violence	e, promoted in whatever was	11	On the third page, call which is
sent to us from an e	lection official.	12 cal	led page 2 of the transcript, she talks or
13 Q. Anything el	lse involved that would	13 sor	ry, it's quoting Alex Stamos, saying that the
14 be reported to law e	enforcement, other than		started with our team at Stanford sending a
15 threats of violence?	•	15 gro	up of interns to work with CISA; right? Do
16 A. So we wou	ld generally share	16 yo u	see that?
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	17	A. Yep.
		18	Q. It talks about the sort of stuff we
·			sed about the gap earlier, about how there's
± 5 III V C Stigation i Ciatoa			ick of capability, about disinformation.
20 forwarded to them.			But Stamos says they lack a funding
20 forwarded to them.	still true, I mean,	Z	
forwarded to them. 21 Q. And is this	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	21 22 and	
forwarded to them. 21 Q. And is this it's on your website	today, is it still true	22 and	l legal authorization to do the kinds of work
forwarded to them. Q. And is this it's on your website that the MDM teams	today, is it still true serves as a switchboard for	22 and23 that	

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	Page 369		Page 371
1	Q. And he goes on to say: Our	1	government taking the leadership role and
2	partners in government, most particularly those	2	analyzing to respond to election mis and
3	in CISA and DHS, but also state and local	3	disinformation; correct?
4	governments whom we worked with; correct?	4	A. I'm not seeing that in here, is
5	A. He says that, yes.	5	that a sentence or are you asking me to
6	Q. Were CISA and DHS partners of the	6	Q. I'm just
7	EIP, in your view?	7	A interpret what Renée is saying?
8	A. We generally describe any external	8	Q. Yeah, interpret, is that how you
9	organization that we have a relationship as a	9	read it? That's how I read it.
10	partner. So I think that probably, you know	10	MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, can you
11	so yeah.	11	John, can you re-ask that question?
12	Q. Okay. So in a sense that you were	12	BY MR. SAUER:
13	a partner of the EIP, fair to say?	13	Q. Let me ask you this: Were there
14	A. Again, we would say that of any	14	any discussions of that you're aware of,
15	external entity that we have a relationship	15	relating to the EIP, that related to unclear
16	with.	16	legal authorities, including very real first
17	(Exhibit No. 7 was marked for	17	amendment questions, when it comes to direct
18	identification.)	18	involvement of the federal government?
19	BY MR. SAUER:	19	A. I'm not aware, but, in general,
20	Q. On the screen share I put Exhibit	20	conversations about MDM, first amendment comes
21	7, which is now public comments from Renée	21	up.
22	DiResta from the EIP; do you see it up there?	22	Q. Did it come up with the CISA
23	A. Sorry, you are an on Exhibit 7?	23	interns who originated the idea of the EIP?
24	Q. Yeah.	24	A. I don't I don't recall that
25	A. Yep.	25	being the nature of the conversation. I think
1	Page 370 Q. If you go to page 2 of the	1	Page 372 it was really mostly around gaps for election
2	transcript, which is page 4 of the PDF, and	2	officials. But as you probably picked up, I
3	it it quotes Renée DiResta, again, talking	3	don't remember in detail the conversations that
4	about the students from Stanford doing an	4	well that long ago.
5	internship at CISA and identifying a gap, right,	5	MR. SAUER: I think that's all the
6	that was the word we used earlier?	6	questions I have.
7	A. Mm-hmm.	7	MR. GARDNER: Well, the government
8	Q. It talks about how there was no	8	has no questions. We just, again, we emphasize
9	clear federal lead to coordinate, and it wasn't	9	that the witness will read and sign.
10	prepared to identify it; correct?	10	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This
11	A. I don't	11	concludes this concludes the deposition of
12	Q. It says that gap, the federal	12	Brian Scully. The time is now 6:04 p.m. We are
13	government wasn't prepared to identify and	13	off the record.
14	analyze election mis and disinfo; correct?	14	THE REPORTER: Mr. Sauer, when do
15	A. Correct. That's what she says,	15	you need the transcript?
16	yep.	16	MR. SAUER: Could we have it
17	Q. And she says there was no clear	17	expedited within two days, that's Ben, I
18	federal lead to coordinate the work and so	18	think our standard request for these is two
19	forth?	19	business days?
-	A. Correct.	20	MR. GARDNER: Yes.
20		0.1	THE REPORTER: And Mr. Gardner,
	Q. And she says: There were unclear	21	THE REPORTER AND CONTROL
20	Q. And she says: There were unclear legal authorities, including very clear first	22	will you be purchasing a copy.
20 21	•	22 23	
20 21 22	legal authorities, including very clear first	22	will you be purchasing a copy.

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	Page 373		Page 375
1	same delivery?	1	LEXITAS LEGAL
2	MR. GARDNER: Yes, ma'am.	2	,,,
3	THE REPORTER: Is it okay if I	3 January 4	/ 17, 2023
4	e-mail you spelling questions on Monday?		A E. GARDNER, ESQUIRE
5	MR. GARDNER: You have until	DEPAR	TMENT OF JUSTICE
6	Tuesday, with the holiday.		STREET, NORTHWEST NGTON, D.C. 20530
7	(Signature having not been waived,	7	1461614, B.C. 20000
8	the deposition of BRIAN SCULLY was concluded at		THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al. v. JOSEPH R.
9	6:04 p.m.)	9 9	DEN, JR., et al.
10	ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEPONENT		OSHUA E. GARDNER:
11	I, BRIAN SCULLY, do hereby acknowledge	11 Please	find analogad your against of the deposition of
12	that I have read and examined the foregoing		find enclosed your copies of the deposition of J. SCULLY taken on January 12, 2023 in the
13	testimony, and the same is a true, correct and	13 above-r	eferenced case. Also enclosed is the original
14	complete transcription of the testimony given by	14 signatu	re page and errata sheets.
15	me and any corrections appear on the attached	15 Please	have the witness read your copy of the
16	Errata sheet signed by me.		pt, indicate any changes and/or corrections
17			on the errata sheets, and sign the signature efore a notary public.
18		10 page be	Store a riotary public.
19	(DATE) (SIGNATURE)		return the errata sheets and notarized
20			re page within 30 days to our office at 1608 Street, Kansas City, MO 64108 for filing.
21			
22		22 Sincere	ly,
23		23	
24		24 Lexitas	Legal
25		25 Enclosu	ıres
	Page 374		Page 376
1	Page 374	1	Page 376
1	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER	1 Witness	ERRATA SHEET
2	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER I, Cassandra E. Ellis, Registered	2 Witness I	ERRATA SHEET Name: BRIAN J. SCULLY
2	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER I, Cassandra E. Ellis, Registered Professional Reporter, the officer before whom the	Witness ICase Nan	ERRATA SHEET
2 3 4	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER I, Cassandra E. Ellis, Registered Professional Reporter, the officer before whom the foregoing proceedings were taken, do hereby	Witness ICase NaBI	ERRATA SHEET Name: BRIAN J. SCULLY me: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al. v. JOSEPH R.
2 3 4 5	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER I, Cassandra E. Ellis, Registered Professional Reporter, the officer before whom the foregoing proceedings were taken, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true	Witness ICase NaBI	ERRATA SHEET Name: BRIAN J. SCULLY me: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al. v. JOSEPH R. DEN, JR., et al.
2 3 4 5 6	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER I, Cassandra E. Ellis, Registered Professional Reporter, the officer before whom the foregoing proceedings were taken, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct record of the proceedings; that said	 Witness I Case Nai BI Date Tak Page # 	ERRATA SHEET Name: BRIAN J. SCULLY me: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al. v. JOSEPH R. DEN, JR., et al. en: JANUARY 12, 2023 Line #
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1	STATE OF)	
2	COUNTY OF)	
4	L DDIAN L COULLY de beneficie estátic	
5 6	I, BRIAN J. SCULLY, do hereby certify: That I have read the foregoing deposition;	
7	That I have made such changes in form	
8	and/or substance to the within deposition as might	
9	be necessary to render the same true and correct;	
10 11	That having made such changes thereon, I hereby subscribe my name to the deposition.	
12	I declare under penalty of perjury that the	
13	foregoing is true and correct.	
14	Executed this day of,	
15 16	20, at	
17		
18		
19 20	RDIAN I COLLIV	
21	BRIAN J. SCULLY	
22		
23	NOTARY PUBLIC	
24	My Commission Expires:	
25		

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